CHOWKHAMBA SANSKRIT STUDIES VOL. LXII

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE ACCORDING TO ABHINAVAGUPTA

By

RANIERO GNOLI



CHOWKHAMBA SANSKRIT SERIES OFFICE, VARANASI

CHOWKHAMBA SANSKRIT STUDIES
VOL. LXII


THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE ACCORDING TO ABHINAVAGUPTA

By
RANIERO GNOLI

CHOWKHAMBA SANSKRIT SERIES OFFICE
VARANASI-1 (India)

1985

Publisher : *Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Varanasi-1*
Printer : *Chowkhamba Press, Varanasi-1*
Edition : *Third, 1985*
Price : *Rs.* [redacted]*00*



First Edition having appeared in the SOR, NO. XI, published by ISMEO (Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente), Rome 1956.

PUBLISHERS AND ORIENTAL & FOREIGN BOOK-SELLERS
K. 37/99, Gopal Mandir Lane
P. O. CHOWKHAMBA, P. BOX 8, VARANASI-1 (India)
1985

PUBLISHERS' NOTE

ABHINAVAGUPTA seems to have given the final shape to the philosophy of beauty in India. His name is familiar to all students of Sanskrit poetics and Indian Aesthetics. His fame is still alive and his poetical and philosophical theories hold ground even today. It is no wonder that the aesthetic thought of Abhinavagupta, one of the most profound and keenest minds that India has ever known, captured the imagination of Prof. Raniero Gnoli who, besides being an erudite scholar, well-known editor and able translator of various Sanskrit Texts, is a *Sahṛdaya* to the true sense of the term. His thorough understanding and scholarly but lucid exposition of the Rasa-theory of Abhinavagupta in particular and the aesthetic theories of other thinkers in general, are simply wonderful. In the present work, AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE ACCORDING TO ABHINAVAGUPTA, he has edited and translated the Commentary by Abhinavagupta on the famous *sūtra* of Bharata, *Vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārisaṃyogādrasaniṣpattiḥ* (*Nāṭya śāstra*) which constitutes the most important text in the whole of Indian aesthetic thought, and explained it in the light of the views of prominent rhetors and philosophers—both ancient and modern. The theory of Abhinavagupta has actually been presented here in a garb which can very easily appeal to the modern mind.

The first edition of this work was issued some ten years back by the ISMEO of Rome in the SERIE ORIENTALE ROMA (No. XI) under the direction of Giuseppe Tucci, and was much welcomed by the lovers

of Sanskrit literature, all over the globe. But the learned author, following the famous maxim of Kālidāsa, '*Ā paritoṣād viduṣāṃ na sādhu manye prayogavijñānam,* etc.', carried on most devotedly his researches in the field of his favourite study and as a result, could revise, enlarge and re-elaborate the previous edition into the present one.

While presenting the second edition before the readers we fervently hope that it will be welcomed by scholars and students alike.

Our sincerest thanks are due to ISMEO, Rome, Prof. G. Tucci and Prof. R. Gnoli, the learned author, but for whose kind approval, active encouragements and keen interest, it would have not been possible for us to print and publish this valuable work in India.

TO MY MASTER
GIUSEPPE TUCCI

CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS

A.Bh. = Abhinavagupta's *Abhinavabhāratī* cf. Preface, p. XIII.

A.G. = Abhinavagupta,

Daśarūpa, Haas = Haas, George C. O., *The Daśarūpa, A Treatise of Hindu Dramaturgy by Dhanamjaya,* Columbia University Press, New York 1912.

Dasgupta, *H. I. Ph.* = Dasgupta, Surendranath, *A History of Indian Philosophy,* 5 vols., Cambridge 1932-1955.

De, *S.K.* = De, Sushil Kumar, *Studies in the History of Sanskrit Poetics,* Luzac, 2 vols., London 1923, 1925.

Dh.Ā. = Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka* with the *Locana* and *Bālapriyā* commentaries by Abhinavagupta and Rāmaśāraka, ed. by Pandit Paṭṭābhirāma Śāstrī, Chowkhamba, Benares 1940.

Dh.Ā.L. = Abhinavagupta's commentary (*locana*) on the *Dhvanyāloka* by Ānandavardhana.

G = Kavi's edition of the *Abhinavabhāratī,* cf. Preface, p. XIII.

Hc. = Hemacandra's *Kāvyānuśāsana,* cf. Preface, p. XIII.

Ind. Th. = Chandra Bhan Gupta, *The Indian Theatre,* Motilal Banarsidass, Banaras 1954.

Ī.P.V. = Abhinavagupta's *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī,* K.S T.S., 2 vols., Śrīnagar 1918-1921.

Ī.P.V.V. = Abhinavagupta's *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī,* K. S. T. S., 3 vols., Śrīnagar 1938-1943.

J. = Jayaratha, the commentator of the Abhinavagupta's *Tantrāloka.*

JBORS = *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society.*

JBU = *Journal of Bombay University.*

JOR = *Journal of Oriental Research,* Madras.

K. Ād. = Daṇḍin's *Kāvyādarśa,* edited and translated by O. Böhtlingk, Leipzig 1890.

Kane, *S.D.V.* = Kane, P. V., *The Sāhityadarpaṇa of Viśvanātha* (Paricchedas I, II, Arthālaṅkāras), with exhaustive Notes and the History of Sanskrit Poetics, Bombay 1951.

K.M. = Rājaśekhara's *Kāvyamīmāṃsā,* Gaekwad Oriental Series, Baroda 1916.

K.P. = Mammaṭa's *Kāvyaprakāśa,* cf. Preface, p. X V.

K.S.T.S. = Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies.

Mahimabhaṭṭa, *Vyaktiviveka* = *The Vyaktiviveka* of Mahimabhaṭṭa, ed. with a comm. of Ruyyaka and the Madhusūdanī comm. by Madhusūdana Miśra, Chowkhamba, Benares 1936.

M.C. = Māṇikyacandra, cf. Preface, p. XIII.

N.M. = *The Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, ed. by Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Śukla, Benares 1936.

N.Ś. = *Nāṭya Śāstra*, cf. Preface, p. XIII.

P = Pandey, cf. Preface, p. xv.

Pandey = Pandey, Kanti Chandra, *Indian Aesthetics*, Chowkhamba, Banaras 1950.

Pandey, *A.G.* = Pandey, Kanti Chandra: *Abhinavagupta, an Historical and Philosophical Study*, Chowkhamba, Banaras 1935.

P.T.V. = Abhinavagupta's *Parātriṃśikāvivaraṇa*, K. S. T. S., Śrīnagar 1918.

P.V. = Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārtika* with a commentary of Manorathanandin ed. by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Appendix to *JBORS*, vol. XXIV-XXVI, 1938-1940.

P.V., svavṛtti = MS. of the commentary by Dharmakīrti on the ch. I (*svārthānumānaparicccheda*) of his *Pramāṇavārtika*. This MS. belongs to Prof. Giuseppe Tucci.

R.T. = Kalhaṇa's *Rājataraṅgiṇī*, ed. by M. A. Stein, Bombay 1892.

S. Kā. = *The Sāṅkhya Kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa with the *Sāṅkhya Tattvakaumudī* of Vāchaspati Miśra, Bombay 1940.

Somānanda, *Śivadṛṣṭi* = Somānanda's *Śivadṛṣṭi* with the *vṛtti* of Utpaladeva, Śrīnagar 1934.

Spandanirṇaya = Kṣemarāja's *Spandanirṇaya*, K.S.T.S., Śrīnagar 1925.

Stavacintāmaṇi = *The Stava-Chintāmaṇi* of Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa with commentary by Kṣemarāja, K.S.T.S., Śrīnagar 1918.

T.Ā. = Abhinavagupta's *Tantrāloka*, with the commentary of Jayaratha, K.S.T.S., 12 vols., Śrīnagar 1918–1938.

Vijñānabhairava = *The Vijñānabhairava* with comm. partly by Kṣemarāja and partly by Śivopādhyāya, K.S.T.S., Śrīnagar 1918.

V.P. = Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* ed. by Cārudeva Śāstrī Lahore 1939.

ZDMG = *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft.*

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE ACCORDING TO ABHINAVAGUPTA

PREFACE

This book was first printed in 1956. Since then I have never relinquished my researches in the fields of Indian Rhetoric and Aesthetics. Some misinterpretations and mistakes occurring in the first edition have already been corrected by myself in 1957, in the paper *Further Observations on the Abhinavabhāratī*, East and West, year VIII, N. 1.—April, 1957 pp. 100-103. This new edition represents, I trust, a great improvement in regard to the first one. The Introduction, the critical apparatus, the translation and the notes have been completely revised. The basic text of Abhinavagupta, i.e. the commentary to the famous *sūtra* by Bharata, VI, after st. 31, *vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārisaṃyogād rasaniṣpattiḥ*, has been supplemented by three new texts, viz. the Commentaries on *Nāṭyaśāstra*, I, st. 107, on *Dhvanyāloka*, I, st. 18, and II, st. 4.

As to the text I have directly compared the MS of *Abhinavabhāratī* preserved in the library of Madras (M). References to the Kavi's edition of the *Abhinavabhāratī* are to the second edition of it. The letters Hc and M. C refer to the *viveka* of Hemacandra and to the *saṃketa* of Māṇikyacandra respectively. Although the additions and explanations of Hc do not alter in any way the thought of AG., I have not reproduced them in the text, which I have tried to set forth such as it was before the exegetical activity of the great jaina scholar.

In so many changes, one thing has remained unchanged in these ten years : I mean the profound debt of gratitude I owe to Prof. Giuseppe Tucci, to whom, now as then, this book is dedicated.

INTRODUCTION

The Nāṭyaśāstra

1. In India, the study of aesthetics—which was at first restricted to the drama—draws its origin from no abstract or disinterested desire for knowledge but from motives of a purely empirical order. The most ancient text that has come down to us is the *Nāṭyaśāstra* (4th or 5th Century A. D. ?), ascribed to the mythical Bharata. This is a voluminous collection of observations and rules concerned in the main with the production of drama and the training of actors and poets. The author, or the authors, with a certain sententiousness and pedantry typical of Indian thought, classify the various mental states or emotions of the human soul and treat of their transition from the practical to the aesthetic plane. The *Nāṭyaśāstra* is a work of deep psychological insight. Drama appeals to sight and hearing at the same time (the only senses that are capable, according to some Indian thinkers, of rising above the boundaries of the limited " I ") and is then considered the highest form of art. In it both sight and hearing collaborate in arousing in the spectator, more easily and forcibly than by any other form of art, a state of consciousness *sui generis*, conceived intuitively and concretely as a juice or flavour, called Rasa. This typically Indian conception of aesthetic experience as a juice or a taste savoured by the reader or spectator should not surprise us. In India, and elsewhere, sensations proper to the senses of taste and touch, almost devoid of any noetic representation, are easily taken to designate states of consciousness more intimate and removed from abstract representations

than the ordinary one—that is the aesthetic experience and various forms of religious ones.

This Rasa, when tasted by the spectator, pervades and enchants him. Aesthetic experience is, therefore, the act of tasting this Rasa, of immersing oneself in it to the exclusion of all else. Bharata, in a famous aphorism which, interpreted and elaborated in various ways, forms the point of departure of all later Indian aesthetic thoughts, says, in essence, that Rasa is born from the union of the play with the performance of the actors. " Out of the union of the Determinants—he says literally—, the Consequents and the Transitory Mental States, the birth of Rasa takes place". What is then the nature of Rasa ? What are its relations with the other emotions and states of consciousness ? And how are we to understand this word " birth " ? The whole of Indian aesthetics hinges on such questions, which have been an inexhaustible source of polemic material to generations of rhetors and thinkers, down to our own days. But, before undertaking an examination of their various interpretations, let us briefly expound here the essentials of the empirical psychology of Bharata.

According to the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, eight fundamental feelings, instincts, emotions or mental states called *bhāva* or *sthāyibhāva*[1] , can be distinguished in the human soul : Delight (*rati*), Laughter (*hāsa*), Sorrow (*śoka*), Anger (*krodha*), Heroism (*utsāha*), Fear (*bhaya*), Disgust (*jugupsā*), and Wonder (*vismaya*). These

1) The word *bhāva* is made to derive by Bharata, VII, 342-346, from the causative of *bhū*, to be, which may be intended in two different meanings, that is " to cause to be " (viz. bring about, create, etc.) and " to pervade ". According to the first meaning, that which is brought about are the purposes of poetry, *kāvyārtha*, that is, the Rasas (cf. below, p. 50, n. 2*a*). According to the second meaning these are so called because they pervade, as a smell, the minds of the spectators. The meaning of *sthāyin* is permanent, basic, etc.

eight states are inborn in man's heart. They permanently exist in the mind of every man, in the form of latent impressions (*vāsanā*) derived from actual experiences in the present life or from inherited instincts, and, as such, they are ready to emerge into his consciousness on any occasion. In ordinary life each feeling is manifested and accompanied by three elements, causes (*kāraṇa*), effects (*kārya*) and concomitant elements (*Sahakārin*). The causes are the various situations and encounters of life, by which it is excited ; the effects, the visible reactions caused by it and expressed by our face, our gestures and so on; and the concomitant elements, the accessory and temporary mental states accompanying it. These eight *bhāvas*, indeed, do not appear in a pure form. The various modulations of our mental states are extremely complex, and each of the fundamental or permanent states appears in association with other concomitant mental states, as Discouragement, Weakness, Apprehension and so on. These occasional, transitory, impermanent states are, according to Bharata, thirty six. These same causes, etc., being acted on the stage or described in poetry, not lived in real life, give spectators the particular pleasure to which Bharata gives the name of Rasa. The fundamental mental states being eight in number, there are also eight Rasas, i.e., the Erotic (*śṛṅgāra*), the Comic (*hāsya*), the Pathetic (*karuṇa*), the Furious (*raudra*), the Heroic (*vīra*), the Terrible (*bhayānaka*), the Odious (*bībhatsa*) and the Marvellous (*adbhuta*). Later speculation generally admits a ninth permanent feeling, Serenity (*śama*); the corresponding Rasa is the Quietistic (*śānta*). When they are not part of real life but are elements of poetical expression, even the causes, effects and concomitant elements, just as the permanent mental states, take another name and are called respectively Determinants (*vibhāva*), Consequents (*anubhāva*) and Transitory Mental States

(*vyabhicāribhāva*)[1]. Of course, from the spectator's point of view, the consequents do not follow the feeling, as they do in the ordinary life, but they act as a sort of causes which intensify and prolong the feeling, brought about by the determinants.

2. *Daṇḍin and Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa*. Bharata's text and the aforesaid aphorism in particular became, as we have said, the subject of study and analysis for a whole series of thinkers, each of whom was anxious to contribute to a clearer understanding of the words of the Master. The earliest of these were, so far as is known, Daṇḍin (7th century) and Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa (9th Cent.),[2]

1) There is no need to insist upon the fact that all these English renderings are far from being satisfying. According to Bharata, VII, 346, the term *vibhāva* has the meaning of cognition, *vijñāna*. They are so called, because words, gestures and the representation of the temperament are determined, *vibhāvyate* (that is, known, according to AG) by them. The *anubhāva*, on their turn, are so called because the representation, in its three aspects, that is, voice, *vāc*, gestures, *aṅga*, and physical reactions, *sattva*, causes (the spectators) to experience (the correspondent feeling). I have followed here the reading accepted by AG (*yad ayam anubhāvayati vāgaṅgasattvakṛto' bhinayaḥ tasmād anubhāvaḥ*). The commentary of AG on this part of the Nāṭyaśāstra is, however, not available, and there are, of this passage, many different readings.

2) Daṇḍin (7th century ?) wrote the *Kāvyādarśa* (this work may be consulted also in the translation of O. Böhtlingk, Leipzig 1890). Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa flourished in Kashmir in the 9th or 10th century. He wrote a commentary, now lost, on the Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharata. Kṣemarāja (*Spandanirṇaya*, p. 34) and A.G. (*M.V.V.*, v. 778) quote a Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa who wrote a commentary (*vṛtti*) to the *Spandakārikā* of Vasugupta. In my opinion, it seems probable that these two Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭas are one and the same person ; Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa would, in that case, have lived in the reign of Avantivarman (856-83 A.D. ; Vasugupta lived under Avantivarman) or in the reign of his successor, Śaṅkaravarman. This change, also, involves a change in the dates of Śaṅkuka (cf. infra, p. 32, n. 4), who could then no longer be identified with the poet Śaṅkuka, who was a contemporary of Ajitāpīḍa (early 9th century).

who like his great successor, was a Kashmiri and probably a follower of one of the Sivaite mystical schools flourishing in Kashmir. According to them, Rasa is simply the permanent mental state (anger, fear, etc.) raised to its highest pitch by the combined effect of the Determinants, Consequents and Transitory Mental States. Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa maintains that Rasa lies both in the represented personage and in the imitating actor. The actor he says, feels the different *bhāvas* and *rasas* as though they belonged truly, or rather personally, to him. To the objection that, being it so, the actor would fail to maintain or follow the tempo and the other dramatical conventions, Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa answers that, on the contrary, the actor can manage very well with them by virtue of *anusaṃdhi* or *anusaṃdhāna*[1] . *Anusaṃdhi*—that literally signifies recollection, memory and even something more than this, i.e., consciousness, awareness, reflection, etc.[2] and I have tentatively rendered by " realisation "[3]—is at the same time the power thanks to which the actor " becomes " for the time being the represented or imitated personage (e.g. Rāma), feels himself as Rāma, and the faculty through which he nevertheless does not forget his real

1) Cf. *A.Bh.*, I, p. 264 : *rasabhāvānām api vāsanāveśavaśena naṭe saṃbhavād anusaṃdhibalāc ca layādyanusaraṇāt* ; cf. also *Dh.Ā.L.*, *infra* p. 109 ; and, on all this, K. M. Varma, *Seven Words in Bharata*, Calcutta 1958, pp. 37, 38. An opposit view to that of Lollaṭa was maintained by the followers of Udbhaṭa (a Kashmiri poet and writer at the court of King Jayāpīḍa (779-813), according to whom our perception of the actor as having really *bhāvas* and Rasas is an illusion (*dṛṣṭas tu tatpratyayo naṭe bhramaḥ.*, *A.Bh.*, I, 264).

2) Cf. f. i. *A. Bh.* I, 43, where *niranusaṃdhi* means uncontrolled, thoughtless.

3) According to some later commentators, the meaning of *anusaṃdhāna* is visualization or something like that ; cf. f.i. Prabhākara, *Rasapradīpa*, Benares 1925, p. 23 : *anusaṃdhānaṃ ca kavivivakṣitasyārthasya vāsanāpāṭavavaśāt sākṣād iva karaṇam* ||

nature of actor. Seemingly, Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa's theory does not concern the problem of how the spectators do relish Rasa.

3. *Śaṅkuka.*—Śaṅkuka, a Kashmiri who lived a little later than Lollaṭa, disagrees[1] with this view. According to him, Rasa is not as the " ancients " put it, an intensified state but an imitated mental state. In ordinary life, the mental state of a man is revealed by the causes which excite it, i.e. the determinants; by the visible effects of his feeling, i.e., the consequents; and by his concomitant feelings, i.e., the transitory mental states. The successful imitation by the actor of the characters and their experiences is no doubt, Śaṅkuka says, artificial and unreal, but is not realized to be so by the spectators, who forget the difference between the actors and the characters, and inferentially experience the mental state of the characters themselves. This experience—which is actually a peculiar form of inference—is, to Śaṅkuka, different from any other kind of knowledge. A horse, imitated by a painter, Hemacandra observes, hinting at Śaṅkuka's theory, seems to onlookers neither real nor false, and is nothing but an image which precedes any judgement of reality or unreality. So far, so good. According to Abhinavagupta, the weak point of Śaṅkuka's theory is his premise that the aesthetic state of consciousness or Rasa is nothing but the perception of an imitated mental state.

1) Śaṅkuka flourished in Kashmir after Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa. It is doubtful whether he should be identified with the poet Śaṅkuka, author of a poem called *Bhuvanābhyudaya*, who according to Kalhaṇa (*R.T.*, IV, 705) lived under the reign of Ajitāpīḍa (about 830 A.D.). In this case, his predecessor, Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, can no longer be identified with the commentator, of the same name on the *Spandakārikā*, and so his period should be brought back to the end of the 8th century and the beginning of the 9th. Cf. above, p. XVII, n. 1. Śaṅkuka wrote a commentary to Bharata, now lost, which is frequently quoted by A.G. On Śaṅkuka, see De, *S.P.*, I, p. 38 ; Pandey, *A.G.*, p. 128.

This concept of imitation was refuted by Abhinavagupta, as it had been before him by his master Bhaṭṭa Tauta, the author of the *Kāvyakautuka*, an important work on poetics, now lost. Their reasoning is painstaking and acute: the effect of imitation (as when a clown imitates the son of a king) is in fact laughter and mockery and has no connection with the aesthetic experience. The imitation theory is also clearly contradicted by certain arts—dancing, for example—which obviously do not imitate anything in real life.

4. *Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka*.—A third thinker who is very important in the history of the doctrine of Rasa is Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, a Kashmiri of about the first half of the 10th century, author of the lost *Sahṛdayadarpaṇa*[1]. His critique deals first of all

1) Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka flourished in Kashmir after Ānandavardhana (who was a contemporary of King Avantivarman, 856-883 A. D.), the author of the *Dhvanyāloka*, whom he refutes. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka is, therefore, to be placed around 900 A.D. It is not, probably, mistaken to identify him with the Brāhmaṇa Nāyaka, who lived during the reign of Śaṅkaravarman (883-902 A.D.), and who is mentioned by Kalhaṇa (*R.T.*, V., 159). In the *Ī.P.V.V.*, III, p. 96, A.G. quotes a stanza of śaiva inspiration, which he attributes to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, to whom he gives the title of *mīmāṃsakāgraṇīḥ* (the same title is given by A.G., elsewhere, to Kumārila, *mīmāṃsakapravara*). Another stanza of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka (taken from a *stotra*) is quoted by Kṣemarāja (*Spandanirṇaya*, p. 18). I am inclined to think that these two Bhaṭṭa Nāyakas were one and the same person. The poetic work of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka was the *Hṛdayadarpaṇa* (or *Sahṛdayadarpaṇa*) which has not yet come to light. The opening stanza of this work, which contains an invocation to Śiva, has been preserved in the *A.Bh.*, I, p. 5. The fragments of the poetic work of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka have been collected by T.R. Chintamani, *J.O.R.M.*, Vol. I, pp. 267-276. On the poetic doctrine of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and the confutation of the *dhvani*, cf. T. R. Chintamani, *J.B.U.*, vol. 17, part 2, pp. 267-276. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's theory is also stated with few variations in the *Dh.Ā.L.*, pp. 180 ff. (infra, p. 107). On Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka in general, see Sankaran, *op. cit.*, pp. 86-88, 102-4 ; Kane, *S.D.V.*, pp. 212-215 ; Pandey, *A.G.*, pp. 128-130.

with the word " birth ", used by Bharata ; in what sense, he asks, should the word be understood ? Perception, production, and manifestation are facts of everyday life; they have nothing to do with the aesthetic fact, with Rasa. Hence the real meaning of " birth ", as used by Bharata, cannot be perception, or production, or manifestation. Theatrical performance (the actions of actors) or poetry (the words of a poet) does not make Rasa perceptible, produce it, or manifest it. The relation between the practical, or literal meaning, and the poetic meaning lies in none of these ; rather, it lies in something entirely different from these three facts of everyday life, namely in " revelation " (*bhāvanā*). This revelation, as Abhinavagupta says in his paraphrase of the *Sahṛdayadarpaṇa* is a special power, different from the power of denoting, that words assume in poetry and drama. The specific task of this power, which as Nāyaka says, " has the faculty of suppressing the thick layer of mental stupor occupying our consciousness[1], is generalization or universalization of the things represented or described. " The Rasa, revealed by this power is then enjoyed (*bhuj*) through a sort of enjoyment different from direct experience, from memory etc." The core of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's doctrine is precisely this concept of generalization—one of the main contributions of Indian aesthetics. The aesthetic state of consciousness—whether its material be anger, love, pain, etc.—does not insert itself into the texture of everyday life but is

1) During the aesthetic experience, the consciousness of the spectator is free from all practical desires. The spectacle is no longer felt in connexion with the empirical " I " of the spectator nor in connexion with any other particular individual ; it has the power of abolishing the limited personality of the spectator, who regains, momentarily, his immaculate being not yet overshadowed by *māyā*. *Moha*, stupor, is the specific state aroused by *tamaḥ*.

seen and lived in complete independence of any individual interest. The images contemplated on the stage or read in poetry are seen by the man of aesthetic sensibility independently of any relationship with his ordinary life or with the life of the actor or of the hero of the play or poem, and appear, therefore, in a generalized (*sādhāraṇīkṛta*, *sādhāraṇa*) way, that is to say, universally and released from individuality.

The drama performed or the poem recited has the power to raise the spectator, for the moment, above his limited ego, his practical interests, which in everyday life, like " a thick layer of mental stupor ", limit and dim his consciousness. Things and events that in practical life when associated with " I ", with " mine ", repel or grieve us, are felt as a source of pleasure— the aesthetical pleasure or Rasa—when they are described or represented aesthetically, that is, when they are generalized or contemplated universally[1]. This conversion of pain into

1) Generality (*sādhāraṇya*) is the principal character of aesthetic experience. The events and facts of which the determinants, etc., consist are independent of any relation with any particular individual and of any particular association. The situation represented, says Mammaṭa, is independent of the following specifications : " This concerns me "; " This concerns my enemy " ; " This concerns a person who is indifferent to me "; " This does not concern me " ; " This does not concern my enemy "; " This does not concern a person who is indifferent to me ". Generality is thus a state of self-indentification with the imagined situation, devoid of any practical interest and, from this point of view, of any relation whatsoever with the limited Self, and as it were impersonal. The determinants and consequents differ from ordinary causes and effects just on account of this state of generality. The same feelings of delight, sorrow and anger which pervade ordinary life appear in a completely different manner in the aesthetic state of consciousness. The witnessing of a scene of ordinary life (e.g., a love scene) necessarily arouses in the spectator a certain series of feelings (anger, envy, disgust, etc.) proportionate to the closeness of the

a sort of pleasure is proved, Nāyaka holds, by the fact that, as depicted on the stage, sights and events painful in themselves do not repel us ; on the contrary, we enjoy them. Rasa, the aesthetic experience revealed by the power of revelation (*bhāvanā*), is not noetic in character, is not a perception, but an experience, a fruition (*bhoga*). This fruition is characterized by a state of lysis (*laya*), of rest into our own consciousness[1],

ties which bind him to the protagonists of the scene in question. It may be that he is completely indifferent to the actors in the scene and also to the act which they perform; in this case he will be in a state of indifference (*tāṭasthya*), which also is at the very opposite pole of the aesthetic experience, which is characterized by just an active participation (*anupraveśa*) of the cognizing subject in the event represented. The same scene represented on the stage is, on the contrary, devoid of all particular associations and free from any extraneous interference (*vighna*)—anger, disgust, etc. The spectator is without any pragmatic requirement, any of the interests (desire for gain, etc.), by which ordinary life is characterized. He is immersed in the aesthetic experience to the exclusion of everything else ; the task of generalization carried out by the poetic expression breaks the barrier of the limited " I " and eliminates in this way the interests, demands and aims associated with it.

1) *Viśrānti*, rest, denotes the fact of our being absorbed in something, immerged in it, to the exclusion of every other thing (*vigalitavedyāntaratayā*), without, that is, having any mental movement, any extraneous desire (in other words no obstacle, *vighna*), which comes to break into that state of consciousness. In aesthetic language, *viśrānti* denotes, at the same time, the fact of being absorbed in the aesthetic object, and the sensation of pleasure *sui generis* which accompanies that state of consciousness. In the *śaiva* metaphysics *viśrānti* denotes the repose of everything that exists in the " I " (everything that exists is reposing in the consciousness, but the consciousness does not repose in any other thing different from itself, it is reposed in itself) and, implicitly, the repose of the limited " I " in the consciousness in its original fullness. The terms "solution" (*nirvṛti*), "lysis" (*laya*), concentration (*samāpatti*) etc., express the same concept (cf. *infra*, p. 62). They

the pervasion of consciousness by bliss and light : it belongs to the same order as the enjoyment of the supreme *brahman*. This last conception is very interesting, and even at first glance clearly reveals its kinship with certain religious schools of India, which must have influenced him, if only indirectly. *Brahman*—Bhartṛhari said more than four centuries before Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka—is nothing but the overcoming of the knots of " I " and of " mine "[1]. Not enough. The same idea of a conversion of the things of reality (according to Nāyaka, in the aesthetic moment they appear, as it were, under another aspect) is to be found, applied to the mystical rather than to the aesthetic experience in some Buddhist schools. In religious experience the world of reality is not suppressed but is seen otherwise. "If it be true (the Buddhist Vasubandhu says) that things are unreal, lacking that substantial reality consisting in their own nature as imagined by the ignorant, it cannot nevertheless be denied that they do exist in that ineffable way of being, which Buddhas perceive " (*Viṃśatikā*, 10). The nature of things is inexhaustible and they reveal more and more modes of being, corresponding to the beholder's varying states of consciousness. Reality, in this sense, may be the matter of a revulsion (*parāvṛtti*), of a sort of sudden reinterpretation through which it is revealed under a new aspect: the painful and restless flow of history, the *saṃsāra*, appears to the saint as ineffable quiescence, *nirvāṇa*. This conception, as will be seen, will recur frequently in the works of the *śaiva* schools of Kashmir. Consciousness manifests and illuminates everything. The appearing of all things presupposes the existence of Consciousness, which is, in this sense, light (*prakāśa*).

On the concept of beatitude (*ānanda*), see infra p. XLII-XLV.

1) *Vākyapadīya*, I, 5 (comm.), ed. e.f. : *mamāham ity ahaṃkāragranthisamatikramamātraṃ brahmaṇaḥ prāptiḥ*.

be criticized and at the same time developed by Abhinavagupta. The final transfiguration of pain, it is true, is as if anticipated and foreshadowed in the aesthetic experience (this, like the mystical experience, transforms reality, converts the very language, which magically reveals a new sense that exists side by side with the practical meaning), but one must not forget that, while the mystical experience is perfect fullness, in which the knots of " I " and " mine " are already completely undone, in the aesthetic experience the process of undoing has only just begun. In it, the history, the pain has not yet entirely lost its weight; it is still present, ready to break out in all its violence. The poet's fullness is not that of the saint. "That fresh outlook of poets—declares Ānandavardhana—whose activity succeeds in enjoying Rasas all, and that learned outlook which proceeds towards probing the truth of objects verily—both of them we have tried to utilize in figuring out the world, so long that have become exhausted in the attempt. O Lord sleeping on the sea, we never obtained in any of these, Happiness comparable to devotion for Thee[1]." Aesthetic enjoyment itself is veined by an obscure unrest. " Often a man ", says Kālidāsa in a stanza quoted by Abhinavagupta, "in the act of admiring in happiness beautiful shapes or listening to sweet sounds, feels in himself a keen disquiet. Does he, perhaps, recall, in his soul, affections of past lives, deep within his spirit without his knowledge[2] ?" The disquiet to which Kālidāsa alludes, is, observes Abhinavagupta, an unobjectified desire; it corresponds to what is, metaphysically, the desire which induces consciousness to deny its original fullness and to crumble in time and space[3].

1) *Dh.Ā.*, III, 43 (comm.). I have reproduced here the translation of K. Krishnamoorthy.

2) See below, p. 60.

3) See below, p. 60, n. 4.

The religious and the aesthetic experience spring from the same source. This is the tenor of two stanzas, almost certainly by Nāyaka, quoted by Mahimabhaṭṭa, a rhetor of the 11th century : " Dramatic performances and the music accompanying them feed the Rasa in all its fullness; hence the spectator, absorbed in the tasting of this, turning inward, feels pleasure through the whole performance. Sunk into his own being, he forgets everything (pertaining to practical life). There is manifested in him that flow of inborn pleasure, from which the yogins draw their satisfaction "[1].

Another problem explored by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka is the didactic value of poetry. Differing from the current opinion that drama and poetry should instruct while they entertain, Nāyaka maintains that instruction is completely secondary and that what really matters is the intrinsic value of the work[2]. The two approaches are reconciled by Abhinavagupta, who says, in brief, that the aesthetic experience in so far as it nourishes our sensitivity has also a didactic value[3].

5. *Ānandavardhana*. These are the outlines of the development of Indian aesthetics toward the end of the 10th century, as Abhinavagupta, who was one of India's greatest thinkers, has transmitted them. A Kashmiri like his forerunners, Abhinavagupta unified the scattered voices of earlier philosophers into a masterful synthesis, embracing philosophical speculation and mysticism as well as aesthetics. But, before turning to him, we ought to go back in time and precisely at the epoch of Avantivarman (855-83), king of Kashmir. At the court of this king, there lived a great rhetor and philo-

1) See below, p. 48.
2) See below, App. III, p. 114.
3) See below, App. III, p. 114.

sopher indeed, by the name of Ānandavardhana. In a justly famous book, on which Abhinavagupta was to comment a century and half later, called the *Dhvanyāloka* ("Light of Resonance"), Ānandavardhana reached certain conclusions which were accepted, with some rare exceptions, by all later Indian rhetors. The starting point of his speculation is the difference between ordinary and poetical language. The philosophy of language has very ancient roots in India, and in various epochs its problems have been dealt with by diverse and radically differing schools; yet Indian thinkers, both Buddhist and Hindu, are in substantial agreement on one point—the instrumental and transitive nature of ordinary speech. Language is essentially pragmatic: the words we use exist in so far as they serve some purpose, and after we have used them they cease to be. They, Buddhists hold, are powerless to grasp the living reality of things; they deal with the general, which is simply an image of things, an image out of focus, so to speak, and ultimately unreal. What is then this new nature or dimension, that speech assumes in poetry? And from what is it derived? According to another Kashmiri rhetor, Udbhaṭa, flourished in the 8th century, the essence of poetical language was the secondary or metaphorical function of the words[1]. The poetical speech—he must have thought—at the very expense of the practical value, enriches itself with various proceedings—rhymes, figures, inversion—conceived as useless in a purely functional language, but essential in the poetical one. One of the most important elements of these figures of speech, differing from the modes of practical language dominated by a direct way of expression, is undoubtedly the secondary function of words.

1) See, on all that, R. Gnoli, *Udbhaṭa's Commentary on the Kāvyālaṃkāra of Bhāmaha*, Roma 1962, of which I have reproduced here some passages.

This and nothing but this will then be the very life of poetical language, in antithesis with the practical one. Ānandavardhana disagrees. The secondary function does not necessarily imply poetry. Actually, all language is metaphorical. The source of poetry must then be another sense or value that is assured by words, altogether different from the primary (i. e., historical or literal) and the secondary one. " Poetical meaning is different from conventional meaning. In the words of great poets it shines out and towers above the beauty of the well-known outer parts even as charm does in ladies " (*Dhvanyāloka*, I, 4). This new sense—the poetical sense—irreducible, as it is, to the literary one, cannot however do without it, but is, as it were, supported by it. " The poetic meaning ", he says,

> " is not understood by a mere learning in Grammar and Dictionary. It is understood only by those who have an insight into the true essence of poetry. This meaning, and that rare word which possesses the power of conveying it, these two must be studied carefully by those who wish to become true poets. Just as a man interested in perceiving objects (in the dark) directs his efforts towards securing the flame of a lamp since this is a means to realise his end, so also does one who is ultimately interested in the poetic meaning first evince interest in the conventional meaning. Just as the purport of a sentence is grasped only through the sense of individual words, the knowledge of the poetic sense is attained only through the medium of the literal sense. Though by its own power the word-import conveys the sentence-import, just as it escapes notice once its purpose is served, so also does that poetic meaning flash suddenly across the truth-perceiving minds of cultured critics, when they are indifferent towards the conventional meaning. To conclude, connoisseurs give the name of

"resonance" (*dhvani*) to that particular sort of poetry in which both the conventional meaning and the conventional word are subordinate" (*Dhvanyāloka*, I, 7-13)[1].

A truly poetical word or expression is that which cannot be replaced by other words, without losing its value. Poetry knows no synonyms. This poetic meaning of words, which coexists, paradoxically, with the historical or literal meaning—as Maheśvarānanda, a philosopher of the 13th century, points out—stands in relation to the other powers of words just as freedom does to men's other capacities and activities. The name by which it is known, is resonance (*dhvani*) or suggested, manifested sense (*vyaṅgya*). Rasa is nothing but it. Poetic words make manifest, suggest it unexpectedly and without any noticeable bridge[2]. The theory of Ānandavardhana, which we

1) I have quoted here the transl. of K. Krishnamoorthy.

2) When we read a poem we become, as it were, simultaneously aware of the Rasas, viz. the sentiments not practically experienced but aesthetically contemplated, that it suggests. The temporal sequence between the cognitions of the expressed and the suggested sense would be noticeable only in case the suggested sense were opposed to the expressed one or similar to it, that is, on the same footing. See *Dh. Ā.*, III, 33: "But this temporal sequence in the two function of sounds cannot be noticed when sentiments (i.e., Rasas) are suggested; because sentiments are neither opposed to the expressed sense nor appear as similar to the other senses; they are not capable of being conveyed by aught else and all their accessories work together with lightning—quickness" (transl. cited above). The concept of *alakṣyakrama* and the necessity of admitting it has been expounded at length by Ānandavardhana himself, *Dh. Ā.*, III, 33. I cite here some words of P. Valéry (*Variété, Première Lecon du Cours de Poétique,* ed. cit., p. 1356): "J'expliquerai un jour comment cette altération se marque dans le language des poètes, et qu'il y a un langage poétique dans lequel les mots ne sont plus le mots de l'usage pratique et libre. Ils ne s'associent plus selon les mêmes attractions; il sont chargés de deux valeurs simultanément engagée et d'importance equivalente: leur son et leur effèt psychique instantané".

have expounded in its essentials here, is one of the greatest contributions of India to the aesthetic problem, and it deserves even now all our attention. One of the most sensitive critics of our times, Paul Valéry, more than ten centuries later, ideally connects himself to him. " La poésie ", he says,

" est un art du langage. Le langage, cependant, est une création de la pratique. Remarquons d'abord que toute communication entre les hommes n'a quelque certitude que dans la pratique, et par la vérification que nous donne la pratique. *Je vous demande du feu. Vous me donnez du feu* : vous m'avez compris.

Mais, en me demandant du feu, vous avez pu prononcer ces quelques mots sans importance, avec un certain ton, et dans un certain timbre de voix—avec une certaine inflexion et une certaine lenteur ou une certaine précipitation que j'ai pu remarquer. J'ai compris vos paroles, puisque, sans même y penser, je vous ai tendu ce que vous demandiez, ce peu de feu.

Et voici cependant que l'affaire n'est pas finie. Chose étrange: le son, et comme la figure de votre petite phrase, revient en moi, se répète en moi ; comme si elle se plaisait en moi ; et moi, j'aime à m'entendre la redire, cette petite phrase qui a presque perdu son sens, qui a cessé de servir, et qui pourtant veut vivre encore, mais d'une tout autre vie. Elle a pris une valeur; et elle l'a priseaux *dépens de sa signification finie*. Elle a créé le besoin d'être encore entendue... Nous voici sur le bord même de l'état de poésie. Cette expérience minuscule va nous suffire à découvrir plus d'une vérité "[1]

1) P. Valéry, *Variété, Poésie et Pensée Abstraite,* pp. 1324-25 (La Pléiade, Paris 1957).

And again :

"La poésie n'a pas le moins du monde pour object de communiquer à quelqu'un quelque notion déterminée,—à quoi la prose doit suffire. Observez seulement le destin de la prose, comme elle expire à peine entendue, et expire de l'être,—c'est-à-dire d'être remplacée dans l'esprit attentif par une idée ou figure finie. Cette idée, dont la prose vient d'exciter les conditions nécessaries et suffisantes, s'étant produite, aussitôt les moyens sont dissous, le langage s'évanouit devant elle. C'est un phénomène constant dont voici un double contrôle ; notre mémoire nous répète le discours que nous n'avons pas compris. La répétition répond à l'incompréhension. *Elle nous signifie que l'acte du langage n'a pu s'accomplir.* Mais au contraire, et comme par symétrie, si nous avons compris, nous sommes en possession d'exprimer sous d'autres formes l'idée que le discours avait composée en nous. L'acte du langage accompli nous a rendus maîtres du point central qui commande la multiplicité des expressions possibles d'une idée acquise. En somme, le sens, qui est la tendance à une substitution mentale uniforme, unique, résolutoire, est l'objet, la loi, la limite d'existence de la prose pure.

Toute autre est la fonction de la poésie. Tandis que le fond unique est exigible de la prose, c'est ici la forme unique qui ordonne et survit. C'est le son, c'est le rythme, ce sont les rapprochements physiques des mots, leurs effets d'induction ou leur influences mutuelles qui dominent, aux dépens de leur proprieté de se consommer en un sens dêfini et certain. Il faut donc que dans un poème le sens ne puisse l'emporter sur la forme et la détruire sans retour; c'est au contraire le retour, la forme conservée, ou plutôt exactement reproduite comme unique et nécessaire expression de l'état ou de la pensée qu'elle vient d'engendrer au lecteur, qui est le ressort

de la puissance poétique. *Un beau vers renait indéfiniment de ses cendres,* il redevient,—comme l'effet de son effet,—cause harmonique de soi-mêne "[1].

Let us now listen to some lines of the great commentator of the *Dhvanyāloka,* Abhinavagupta:

" Aesthetical experience takes place, as everyone can notice, by virtue, as it were, of the squeezing out of the poetical word. Persons aesthetically sensitive, indeed, read and taste many times over the same poem. In contradiction to practical means of perception, that, their task being accomplished, are no more of any use and must then be abandoned[2], a poem, indeed, does not lose its value after it has been comprehended. The words, in poetry,must therefore have an additional power, that of suggestion, and for this very reason the transition from the conventional meaning to the poetic one is unnoticeable[3]".

"What some people say, namely that a phrase would then come to have many different meanings, is due solely to their ignorance. A sentence—they say referring to ordinary strumental language—which has been pronounced once and the meaning of which has already been perceived by force of convention, cannot lead one to perceive two different meanings. The subject, indeed, cannot remember, at the same time, several mutually contrasting conventions; and if, on the other hand, these conventions are not contrasting, the meaning of the sentence remains, then, one. Nor can it be admitted that the different

1) *Variété, Commentaire dy* Charmy, p. 1510 (ed. cit.).

2) This is a quotation from the *Vākyapadīya,* II, 38. Apart from Bhartṛhari, the practical purpose of language has been discussed at length and with an admirable penetration by Dharmakīrti in his *Pramāṇavārttika,* especially I, 92 ff. Dharmakīrti's work was well-known to Abhinavagupta, who cites it frequently. See, f.i., *Locanā,* pp. 444 and 542 (Benares ed.).

3) See above, p. XXIX, n. 2.

meanings are perceived one after the other, because the words, after they have made one meaning perceptible and have thus ceased to be efficacious, have no longer any power to render perceptible any other meaning. And even if the phrase is pronounced a second time, the meaning remains invariably the same, the convention and the context being the same. Should someone object that a sentence can lead one to perceive another meaning, independently of the one perceived through convention and context, it can be replied that, then, there is no longer any fixed relation between word and meaning; and that one falls thus into the countersense, described in the stanza: "Therefore, what reason can one adduce for the fact that, on hearing the phrase : 'He who desires Heaven, must offer the fire-sacrifice', one does not perceive the meaning 'he must eat dog-flesh' ?"[1] Moreover, there would be no limit to the number of possible meanings and a general state of uncertainty would exist. The fact of admitting that a sentence can have several meanings is thus a fallacy.

"The case of the poetical word is however different. Here, indeed, the aesthetical expression, etc., once perceived, tends to become itself an object of aesthetic experience and one has therefore no ulterior application of conventions. Aesthetic cognition is not, in fact, the same as the forms of perception proper to a didactic work, namely "I am commanded to do this", "I want to do this", and "I have done what I had to do". Such forms of perception tend, in fact, to an extrinsic end, successive to them in time, and are thus of an ordinary, practical nature. In aesthetic experience, what happens is, instead, the birth of the aesthetic tasting of the artistic expression. Such an experience, just as a flower born of magic, has, as its essence,

1) This is *Pramāṇavārttika*, I, 318 (ed. cit.).

solely the present, it is correlated neither with what came before nor with what comes after. This experience is therefore different both from the ordinary experience and from the religious one[1]."

Apart from some modern intuitions, of which Paul Valéry is perhaps the most penetrating and brilliant interpreter, in order to find something similar in the western linguistical exegesis, one must turn to the conception—in the West connected with the holy scriptures—of a *sensus historicus vel literalis*, different from the *sensus spiritualis*, *qui*, however, *super litteralem fundatur et eum supponit*.[2] Some passages of the Scriptures, if literaly taken, are absurd and meaningless. They must therefore have another sense. Every word of the Scriptures has, as a point of fact, a hidden or spiritual sense.[3] The main difference between India and the West is based on the fact that with us this conception—which goes back to the Alexandrine school and especially to Origines—has remained restricted to the theological speculation. Had it been developed in a literary direction, we would have had a sort of counterpart to the conception of Ānandavardhana. Notwithstanding the undeniable differences, these two conceptions have, however, as a common foundation, the intuition that both the poetical language, and, in another sense, the religious one, do not exhaust themselves in their transitive value, but, using the very words of Paul Valéry, survive to comprehension.

1) *Locana*, I, 21 (ed. of Benares, pp. 158-160).

2) St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica*, 1, 1, 10.

3) On the scriptural exegesis in the West one may now consult the beautiful book by H. de Lubac, *Histoire et Esprit, L'intelligence de l'Ecriture d'après Origène* (Paris 1950). This conception has been sucessively examined by the same author in the three volumes, *Exégèse-Médiévale, Les Quatre Sens de l'Ecriture*, Paris, 1959-61.

6. *Abhinavagupta.* With the only exception of the *Dhvanyāloka*, the theories put forward by Lollaṭa, Śaṅkuka and Nāyaka are known to us through the pen of Abhinavagupta. Abhinavagupta, son of Narasiṃhagupta, alias Cukhula, was born in Kashmir during the second half of the 10th century, of an illustrious brahmin family. His works in the field of aesthetics are two, namely, the *Abhinavabhāratī*, which is a commentary on the *Nāṭyaśāstra* and a commentary on Anandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka*. The commentary on the *Kāvyakautuka* of Bhaṭṭa Tota, who was his direct master in poetics is now lost. The *Kāvyakautuka* itself has not come down to us. The commentary on Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka* constitutes one of the most important works of the *dhvani* school, which Abhinava played a leading role in developing. He accepts and elaborates the core of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's aesthetic ideas, that is, the concept of generalization, but he rejects Nāyaka's concepts of the aesthetic experience as fruition rather than as knowledge, and of assumption by poetic words of the power of revelation[1]. According to Abhinavagupta, in whose view the *dhvani* and the Rasa schools are indissolubly merged, Rasa is not revealed, but suggested, or manifested, as Ānandavardhana was wont to say. Aesthetic gustation is nothing but a perception *sui generis*, differing from all others.

Rasa is unique[2]. The division into eight or nine Rasas corresponding to the permanent mental states (according to Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta there is indeed a ninth

1) See below, pp. 49-51.

2) *A.Bh.*, I, p. 271: *eka eva paramārthato rasaḥ*. A.G. says in another passage (*A.Bh.*, I, p. 267) that all the various Rasas derive from one 'great Rasa' only. On the unicity of Rasa, cf. also V. Raghavan, *The Number of Rasa*, pp. 175-9.

mental state, Quiet, and then a ninth Rasa, the Quietistic) has only an empirical value. " We think ", he says, " that what is enjoyed is consciousness itself, all full of bliss. What suspicion of pain may be here ? The feelings of delight, sorrow, etc., deep within our spirit, have only one function, to vary it, and the representation's function is to awake them[1]." " The aesthetic experience ", we have seen in a passage previously quoted, " just as a flower born of magic, has, as its essence, solely the present, it is correlated neither with what came before nor with what comes after ". These lines are very important. The state of universality required by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka not only implies the elimination of any measure of time or space, but even of any particular knowing subject. Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa's question, where lies the Rasa, whether in the actor or in the represented character, for Abhinava is quite nonsensical. " The Rasa ", he says, "does not lie in the actor. But where then ? You have all forgotten and I remind you again (of what I have already said). Indeed, I have said that Rasa is not limited by any difference of space, time and knowing subject. Your doubt is then devoid of sense. But what is the actor ? The actor, I say, is the means of the tasting, and hence he is called by the name of " vessel ". The taste of wine, indeed, does not stay in the vessel, which is only a means necessary to the tasting of it. The actor then is necessary and useful only in the beginning[2]". This elimination of the

1) *A.Bh.*, I, 292 : *asmanmate saṃvedanam evānandaghanam āsvādyate | tatra kā duḥkhāśaṅkā | kevalaṃ tasyaiva citratākaraṇe ratiśokādivāsanāvyāpāraḥ | tadudbodhane cābhinayādivyāpāraḥ |*

2) *A.Bh.*, I, 291 : *ata eva naṭe na rasaḥ | kutra tarhi | vismṛtiśīlo na(na) bodhyate | uktaṃ hi deśakālapramātṛbhedāniyantrito rasa iti | keyam āśaṅkā | naṭe tarhi kim | āsvādanopāyaḥ | ata eva ca pātram ity ucyate |*

singular knowing subjects —that is, of the " practical " personalities of the spectators, different each from the other—is succeeded by a state of consciousness, a " knowing subject " which is, unique, " generalized ", not circumscribed by any determination of space, time, etc. This conception goes deep into the doctrines of the philosophical school, followed by Abhinava. According to it, the differences between the various " ego " are illusory. Actually the " I " or consciousness is unique. The so-called Buddhist Idealism (*vijñānavāda*), according to which reality is consciousness, but the various individualities or " mental series ", *saṃtāna*, are different each from the other, is, to the Śaiva, clearly contradicted by the fact that a thing appears in the same way to more subjects that see it in the same place and time. In other words, two or more subjects that see the same thing are in the same psychic condition, that is, they form a single knowing subject. " When more subjects—said Utpaladeva in a work now lost—are aware of a given thing, f.e., a vessel, in the same place and time, then about this thing, they come to make up an unity[1]". This state of unity, of course, is not permanent, and, at a certain point, the various limited "I's ", that came to constitute an unique " I ", again separate themselves. The responsible element of these unions and separations is nothing but the Lord, the liberty of consciousness itself.

This state of unity, which, in various degrees, occurs in

na hi pātre madyāsvādaḥ | api tu tadupāyakaḥ | tena pramukhamātre naṭopayoga iti |

1) This passage, borrowed from the lost *ṭīkā* on the *Pratyabhijñākārikā*, has been quoted by Jayaratha in his commentary to Tantrāloka, X, p. 67 : *taṃ taṃ ghaṭādim arthem ekadeśeryeravasthitāḥ pramātāreḥ samaṃ saṃvedyamānās tāvaty aṃśe tadaikyam upayānti |*

ordinary life also, is specially evident when we are assisting, f. i., to a performance or during certain religious ceremonies (f. i., the tantric *cakras*), which must be celebrated in common. In these assemblies, the distinction between one's own Self and the Self of other people, which is founded on the multiplicity of bodies, minds and so on, ceases for the moment to exist, and, beyond them, takes rise a psychological unity, correctly realized as a subject unique and more powerful than the preceding separated individualities. "The consciousness", says Abhinavagupta in the *Tantrāloka*, which consists of, and is animated by, all things, on account of the difference of bodies, enters into a state of contraction. But, in public celebrations, it returns to a state of expansion—since all the components are reflected in each other. The radiance of one's own consciousness in ebullition (*i.e.*, when it is tending to pour out of itself) is reflected in the consciousness of all the bystanders, as if in so many mirrors, and, inflamed by these, it abandons without effort its state of individual contraction. For this very reason, in meetings of many people (at a performance of dancers, singers, etc.), fullness of joy occurs when every bystander, not only one of them, is identified with the spectacle. The consciousness, which, considered separately also, is innately made up of beatitude, attains, in these circumstances—during the execution of dances, etc.—a state of unity, and so enters into a state of beatitude which is full and perfect. In virtue of the absence of any cause for contraction, jealousy, envy, etc. the consciousness finds itself, in these circumstances, in a state of expansion, free of obstacles, and pervaded by beatitude. When, on the other hand, even one only of the bystanders does not concentrate on the spectacle he is looking at, and does not share, therefore, the form of consciousness in which the

other spectators are immersed, this consciousness is disturbed, as at the touch of an uneven surface. This is the reason why, during the celebration of the *cakra*, etc., no individual must be allowed to enter who does not identify himself with the ceremonies and thus does not share the state of consciousness of the celebrants ; this would cause, in fact, a contraction of the consciousness[1] ".

These conceptions pose again a problem, namely, which is the relation between the aesthetic and the mystical experience. We have seen that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka likened them each to other. Abhinava, while accepting, on the one hand, the solution put forward by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, did not fail, on the other, to show up clearly the boundary lines which separate the state of mystical consciousness from that of aesthetic consciousness. Religious experience, he argued, marks the complete disappearance of all polarity, the lysis of all dialexis in the dissolving fire of God : Sun, Moon, day and night, good and evil are consumed in the

1) *Tantrāloka*, XXVIII, vv. 373 ff. :
saṃvit sarvātmikā dehabhedād yā saṃkucet tu sā |
melake 'nyonyasaṅghaṭṭapratibimbād vikasvarā ||
ucchalannijaraśmyoghaḥ saṃvitsu pratibimbitaḥ |
bahudarpaṇavad dīptaḥ sarvāyetāpy ayatnataḥ ||
ata eva nṛttagītaprabhṛtau bahuparṣadi |
yaḥ sarvatanmayībhave hlādo na tv ekakasya saḥ ||
ānandanirbharā saṃvit pratyekaṃ sā tathaikatām |
nṛttādau viṣaye prāptā pūrṇānandatvam aśnute ||
īrṣyāsūyādisaṃkocakāraṇābhāvato 'tra sā |
vikasvarā niṣpratighaṃ saṃvid ānandayoginī ||
atanmaye tu kasmiṃścit tatrasthe pratihanyate |
sthapuṭasparśavat saṃvid vijātīyatayā sthite ||
ataś cakrārcanādyeṣu vijātīyam atanmayam |
naiva praveśayet saṃvitsaṃkocananibandhanam ||
See below, pp. 56, 57.

ardent flame of consciousness. The knots of " I " and " mine " are, in it, completely undone. The yogin remains, as it were, isolated in the compact solitude of his consciousness, far beyond any form of discursive thought[1]. In the aesthetic experience, however, the feelings and the facts of everyday life, even if they are transfigured, are always present. In respect of its proper and irreducible character, therefore, which distinguishes it from any form of ordinary consciousness, the aesthetic experience is not of a discursive order. On the other hand, as regards its content—which is nothing but ordinary life purified and freed from every individual relationship—the aesthetic consciousness is no different from any other form of discursive consciousness. Art is not absence of life—every element of life appears in the aesthetic experience—but it is life itself, pacified and detached from all passions.[2] Further devotion (which is a preliminary and unavoidable moment of religious experience) postulates the complete abandon of the subject to the object of worship, God, *Parameśvara*,[3] who, although being immanent and consubstantial, according to Abhinavagupta, with the thought which thinks Him, becomes in the religious moment as if transcendent to it and separate from it[4].

1) See below, pp. 56 and 82; and Ī.P.V.V., III, pp. 350-1.

2) *A.Bh.*, I, p. 340 (cf. Raghavan, p. 104) : *tatra sarvarasānāṃ śāntaprāya evāsvādaḥ, viṣayebhyo viparivṛttyā* ||

3) The *bhakti*, religious devotion, is *parameśvaraviṣayavaivaśyasamāveśarūpā* (*Ī.P.V.V.*, I, p. 25). Cf. p. 82, n. 4, below.

4) In the very moment that thought (*vimarśa*, *saṃvit*, etc.), which, in reality, is nothing but subject, becomes the object of thought (*i.e.*, when it is taught, meditated upon, etc.), it transforms itself into the images of Ego (*aham*), Self (*ātman*), Consciousness (*saṃvid*), God (*Īśvara*, *Parameśvara*, *Śiva*), etc. This concept is fully developed and discussed in the *Ī.P.V.V.*, and in the *Ī.P.V.*, I, 5, *śl.* 15-17. Cf. also the *Ī.P.V.V.*, I, pp. 55, 56.

The purpose of the yogin is to identify himself with this transcendental object. Religious devotion implies therefore a constant drive towards an end which is outside it and, as such, is the very antithesis of the aesthetic experience, which is perfect self-sufficiency.

In every way, whatever the difference between them may be, they spring from the same source. Both are characterized by a state of consciousness self-centered, implying the suppression of any practical desire, and hence the merging of the subject into his object, to the exclusion of everything else. The appearance on the horizon of consciousness of desires, of practical needs, destroys *ipso facto* the unity of the aesthetic or of the mystical experience. Something is shattered, something cracks within us, and extraneous, dispersive elements penetrate—the so-called " obstacles ", *vighna*, born of the ego's disturbing influence.[1] The aesthetical and mystical bliss, in this sense, is nothing but a state of independence, of liberty from any extraneous solicitation and hence of rest, of " lysis[2] " in our own Self. On this hand, the concepts of rest " lysis ", tasting, gustation and bliss, are strictly connected. But let us now listen to Abhinavagupta himself :

1) The *vighna*, obstacles, are all the extraneous elements which break the unity of a state of consciousness (desires for gain, worry of all kinds, etc.). The same conception is met with in connexion with religious experience. The *vighna* are defined in the *Ī.P.V.V.*, I, p. 18 : *vighnanti vilumpanti kartavyam iti vighnāḥ ādhyātmikādayo' navadhānadoṣādayas trividhopaghātāḥ tadadhiṣṭhātāraś ca devatāviśeṣāḥ* | " The obstacles obstruct or hinder what one does; this is why they are called obstacles. They are of three kinds (inherent in the perceiving subject, etc.) : lack of attention, etc. The divinities which preside over them are also called obstacles ". Their principal source is lack of attention (*anavadhāna*), *i.e.*, the absence of a total rest of the whole being on the object of perception.

2) See above, pp. XXXVIII, XXXIX.

" What we call bliss is nothing but a full illumination of one's own being, accompanied by a form of cogitation which pervades all one's own nature, one's own Self. Let us consider, for instance, a man limited by his particular incomplete *ego*, defiled and contracted by the body and so on, and let us suppose that he feels a sense of vacuity in his body and is then hungry. Longing for food, that is, for something distinguished from himself, will actually occupy all his mind ; and therefore, since the self-cogitation of which we have spoken, does not occur in him in all its fullness, he is, as it were, devoid of bliss, bliss consisting in the self-cogitation. Now let us suppose that the belly of that very man becomes full of food. Obviously, in this case, the previous state of unfullness, consisting in the emergence of vacuity, will cease to exist. Soon after, however, he will begin to have new longings (he will desire to embrace women, etc.), that, until that moment, were in a state of latent impressions, because, as Patañjali has said, " the fact that Caitra is in love with one woman does not imply that he is out of love with the others ", etc. Owing to this very contact with other desires, such a bliss is then incomplete and, therefore, it is not the supreme bliss. In fact, according to the principle that, ' in the union one fears the future separation ', and ' one thing breeds the longing for another ', how can it be a source of happiness ? ', the forms of bliss which we can enjoy in practical life are unable to cut off completely the desire of a thing distinguished from one's Self and this is why they are incomplete bliss. As to the part ' bliss ' which is in them, its determinant element is, however, as before, the afore-said self-cogitation. In effect, because of this, Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa has said : ' Let us give a praise to Śiva ! All the forms of bliss which may be found here in these three worlds, are only his drops, belonging to him, a very ocean of bliss. (*Stavacintāmaṇi*,

v. 61). Which are these kinds of bliss ? One of them, for instance, arises while we are tasting a sweet flavour, etc. The man who is, as it is said, ' enjoying ', is in a state of consciousness quite different from the one of a hungry man who eats up his food greedily. He rests within himself. In other words, what in such a state is predominant, is not the exterior reality, but the knowing subject. A further form of pleasure, different from the former and devoid of any extrinsic alteration, is tasted when one, either through a poem or a drama, etc., is plunged in some Rasa, as the Erotic one, and so on. Owing to the absence of any possible obstacle (longing for earning, etc.), this pleasure is different from the forms of bliss of practical life, and just because it is devoid of obstacles, it is called Tasting, Delibation, Lysis, Perception, Rest in the nature of the knowing subject. The so-called aesthetic sensibility, the fact of being possessed of heart is caused by this very predominance of the heart,[1] that is, of thought (which gives it its very

1) Not everybody, A.G. observes, has the intrinsic capacity to taste a poem. Individuals possessed of aesthetic sensibility are called possessed of heart, those who have the consent of the heart (*sahṛdaya, hṛdayasaṃvādabhāk*). The fact of being possessed of heart is defined in the following way (*Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 38) : *yeṣām kāvyānuśīlanābhyāsavaśād viśadībhūte manomukure varṇanīyatanmayībhavanayogyatā te svahṛdayasaṃvādabhājaḥ sahṛdayāḥ* | *yathoktam* (*N.Ś.*, VII, v. 10)

yo 'rtho hṛdayasaṃvādī tasya bhāvo rasodbhavaḥ |
śarīraṃ vyāpyate tena śuṣkaṃ kāṣṭham ivāgninā ||

" The faculty of self-identification with the events represented [the Determinants, etc.,] demands that the mirror of the mind should be made completely clear, by means of repeated acquaintance with and practice of poetry. The possessed of heart, those who possess the consent of their own hearts, are they who have this faculty. For it has been said : ' the tasting of that which finds the consent of the heart arouses the Rasa. The body is pervaded by it, as dry wood by fire ' ". The mind and heart must be mirror-like (*viśada, vimala*), ready to receive all the images which are

name), and, at the same time, by a sort of indifference to the part "light", which consists and rests in the knowable—which however continues to exist. The mental movements that are made the matter of such a Tasting are the nine Rasas. They are devoid of obstacles and consist of a Sampling. The so-called supreme bliss, the lysis, the wonder, is therefore nothing but a tasting, that is, a cogitation in all its compact density, of our own liberty. This liberty is *realissima* (that is to say, not metaphorical) and inseparable from the very nature of consciousness. We must not, however, forget that in the tasting of a juice of sweet flavour, etc., there is, between this bliss and us, the separating screen, so to say, of the exterior reality. In

reflected in them : *vimalamukurakalpībhūtanijahṛdayaḥ*, *A.Bh.*, p. 37. In the *T.Ā.*, III, 200, A.G. says :

tathā hi madhure gīte sparśe vā candanādike |
mādhyasthyavigame yāsau hṛdaye spandamānatā ||
ānandaśaktiḥ saivoktā yataḥ sahṛdayo janaḥ |

" When the ears are filled with the sound of sweet song or the nostrils with the scent of sandal-wood, etc., the state of indifference (non-participation, impersonality, etc.), disappears and the heart is invaded by a state of vibration (*spandamānatā*; for the significance of the term *spanda*, cf. p. 60, n. 1). Such a state is precisely the so-called power of beatitude, thanks to which man is 'gifted with heart' ". According to the *śaiva* of Kashmir, heart is consciousness itself, thought, beatitude, etc.

Elsewhere (*A.Bh.*, II, p. 339), A.G. says that poetic sensibility is the faculty of entering into identity with the heart of the poet (*kavihṛdayatādātmyāpattiyogyatā*). Of course, people whose nature is " gentle (*sukumāra*)" will have a greater feeling for erotic poetry; people of bolder nature will heroic poetry, etc. Every individual has a particular nature (tendencies, innate instincts, beginningless root desires, *vāsanā*), according to which he will feel himself more drawn to some poets than to others. " Sensibility " (*sahṛdayatva*) also plays an important role in religious experience, but in this case we may not talk of aesthetic sensibility, the more correct term being religious sensibility; cf. *P.T.V.*, p. 45 ff.

poetry, in drama, and so on, this screen is actually missing, but it remains in a latent state. Also in these forms of limited bliss, however, those people whose hearts are carefully devoted to cancel the part which performs the function of a screen, succeed in reaching the supreme bliss. " Supreme bliss ", it has been said, "may even take place, disclosed by drinking and eating[1]."

The aesthetic and the mystical state of consciousness are not only characterized by a particular bliss or repose. According to Abhinavagupta and his school, they are accompanied by a sense of wonder or surprise. The word expressing this wonder, i.e. *camatkāra* is frequently to be found, in its ordinary, non-technical sense of surprise, amazement, in Indian literature. "It appears to me"—observes V. Raghavan[2]—"that originally the word *camatkāra* was an onomatopoeic word referring to the clicking sound we make with our tongue when we taste something snappy, and in the course of its semantic enlargements, *camatkāra* came to mean a sudden fillip relating to any feeling of a pleasurable type ". The first to use this term in a

1) These last lines introduce us into the very core of the doctrines professed by a mystical school, the so-called Krama, highly esteemed by Abhinavagupta. According to this school the consciousness, the 'I' is conceived as a nucleus of energy, nourished by the images offered it by the senses. These must be, as it were, saturated and concentrated into a unique point. Saturation and concentration imply each other. They arise when the senses are absorbed in something, to the exclusion of every other thing. The objects which arouse this state may indifferently be a food, an alcoholic drink, a drug, a sexual contact, a song, a dance, and so on. See on all that my translation of the *Tantrasāra* (Abhinavagupta, *Essenza dei Tantra*, Torino 1960), Introd., *passim*, and the Appendix No. 3, wherein I have translated the pp. 45-52 of the *Parātriṃśikāvivaraṇa*.

2) *Some Concepts of the Alankara Sastra*, Adyar 1942, p. 269.

technical sense was probably Utpaladeva, who was the master of the master of Abhinavagupta.[1] This word is indeed unknown to the father of the Pratyabhijñā school, Somānanda, and in Ānandavardhana it occurs once only, used in its ordinary sense, without any technical connotation. Its occurrence both in the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* (cf. the expression *cittacamatkāra*, which Dasgupta *HIPh*, p. 236 translates 'self-flashing of thought') and in the *Agnipurāṇa* is of no great significance, because these works are both later than Utpala and may be even than Abhinava. The term *camatkāra* was used, no doubt, by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, but probably, as appears from a passage of the *Hṛdayadarpaṇa* quoted by Abhinava[2], not in its technical meaning ; and anyhow, he was later than Utpala. In the Spanda School (Vasugupta, etc.) an idea very like to that expressed by *camatkāra* is conveyed by the word *vismaya*, astonishment. The yogin is penetrated by astonishment. The yogic stages are astonishment[3]. The general idea underlying these words (compare, in this connection, also the Pāli and buddhist term *saṃvega*) is that both the mystical and the aesthetic experience imply the cessation of a world—the ordinary, historical world, the *saṃsāra*—and its sudden replacement by a new dimension of reality. In this sense the two are wonder or surprise. A parallel of this idea of a kind of wonder which fills the soul in front of the beautiful or of the scared, exists in the western thought also. We find it in Plato and especially in Neoplatonismus. "Souls", Plato says, " when they see here any likeness

1) See, f.i., the commentary to the *Śivadṛṣṭi*, I, 8; *Śivastotrāvalī*, p. 41.

2) *Locana*, comm. on II, 1.

3) See *Śivasūtra*, I, 12 : *vismayo yogabhūmikā*. According to the M.V.V., II, 99, the yogin is *vismayāviṣṭaḥ*.

of the things of that other world, are stricken with wonder, ἐκπλήττονται and can no longer control themselves" (*Phaidros*, 250a). According to Proclus, this sense of amazement, ἔκπληξις, accompanies both the beautiful and the sacred. "The beautiful, he says in the *Theologia Platonica*, is appearing with wonder μετ' ἐκπλήξεως φαινόμενον, and incites "all the things towards itself through desire and wonder.[1]" In the same work we read eventually that "we are incited towards the beautiful with wonder and emotion" and that "the soul, seeing the invisible, as it were, rejoices itself, admires its appearing, and is astonished at it And as the mystics in the most saint religious rites, before the mystical visions, are stricken with wonder, so, among the intelligibles also, the beautiful appears in advance, before the communion with the good, and strikes with wonder them who are seeing.[2]"

According to Abhinavagupta and his school, this wonder is present, in a broader sense, in every form of life, it is like consciousness itself, the element which distinguishes consciousness or spirit from inanimate matter. Aesthetic sensibility, as Abhinava says, is nothing but a capacity of wonder more elevated than the ordinary one. An opaque heart does not wonder, *non obstupescit*. The appearance of the beautiful does not arouse in it any shock (*kṣobha*) or wonder.[3]

1) *Theologia Platonica*, Frankfurt, 1608, p. 51 :
ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ πάντα διὰ πόθου καὶ ἐκπλήξεως ἀνεγεῖρον...μέτ' ἐκπλήξεως φαινόμενον.

2) Ibid., p. 151 :
πρὸς δὲ τὸ καλὸν μετ' εκπλήξεως καὶ κινήσεως ἐγειρόμεθα τὸ ἀπόρρητον οἷον ἐκφανὲν ἰδοῦσα (Scl. ψυχη) χαίρει καὶ ἄγαται τὸ φανὲν καὶ ἐπτόηται περὶ αὐτὸ καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς ἁγιωτάταις τελεταῖς πρὸ τῶν μυστικῶν θεαμάτων ἔκπληξις τῶν μυουμένων, ουτω δὴ κἀν τοῖς νοητοῖς πρὸ τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μετουσίας τὸ κάλλος προφαινόμενον ἐκπλήττει τοὺς ὁρῶντας, κτλ.

3) *Parātriṃśikāvivaraṇa*, p. 49.

While the aesthetic experience, which concerns the spectator first of all, was receiving so much attention, Indian thought did not neglect to examine the creative moment, in which the poet gives life and breath to his work. The chief thinkers to study the nature of the birth of a work of poetry were Ānandavardhana and Bhaṭṭa Tota and later Abhinavagupta, his direct disciple.

" In the boundless *saṃsāra* of poetry "—writes Ānandavardhana—" the poet is the true and sole Creator (lit., Prajāpati) ; as it pleases him to create, so the whole is transformed. If the poet is pervaded by Rasa in his poem, the whole world will be suffused by Rasa. But if he be void of emotion, the world too will be void of Rasa. A good poet, by virtue of his independence, freely designs even insentient objects to act as sentient ones and sentient objects to act as insentient ones[1]". The same comparison with the Creator, Prajāpati has also been reproduced by Abhinavagupta. " Like the Creator ", he says in the *Abhinavabhāratī*, 1, 4, " the poet creates for himself a world according to his wish. Indeed, he is amply endowed with the power of creating manifold, extraordinary things, originating thanks to the favour of the Deity, the Supreme Vocality, called *pratibhā*[2], and continually shining wihin his heart ". The poet is at once he who sees (the seer, *ṛṣi*) and he who is able to express in words that which he sees. The famous stanzas by Bhaṭṭa Tota quoted by Hemacandra, *Kāvyānuśāsana*, p. 379, state very clearly that the poet must have this double quality and bear quotation. "It has been said that no non-seer can be deservingly called a poet, and one is a seer only by virtue of his

1) *Dh.Ā.*, III, 43.

2) On this term, see below, p. 49, n, 4 and J. Gonda, *The Vision of the Vedic Poets*. The Hague 1963, pp. 318-48.

vision. Vision is the power of disclosing intuitively the reality underlying the manifold materials in the world and their aspects. To be termed a " poet " in the authoritative texts it is enough to be possessed of this vision of reality. But in everyday speech the world accords that title to him alone who possesses vision as well as expression. Thus, though the first poet (*i.e.*, Vālmīki) was highly gifted with enduring and clear vision, he was not hailed as a poet by people until he embodied it in a descriptive work[1]". Rasa belongs, in reality, to the poet alone ; it is nothing but his " generalized " consciousness. " The activity of the actor ", says Abhinava in the *Abhinavabhāratī*, 1, 294", is depending on the poem and it is rooted in the generalized consciousness of the poet. Rasa, in reality, is nothing but this consciousness. The spectator also, in the beginning, is enchanted by this perception. The determinants, etc., are perceived by him only at a later time, thanks to a subsequent analysis. This is the purpose of Bharata. Thus, as regards the dramatic performance, the poem or the mind of the spectator, the root is only this, viz., the Rasa which lies within the poet. This is, as it were, the seed. The poet is, indeed, comparable to the spectator, for, as Ānandavardhana said, " if the poet is pervaded by Rasa, etc. (see above, p. XLVIII). The poem, for its part, is, so to say, the tree. The activity of the actor, that is, representation, etc., is, as it were, the flower, and the tasting of the spectators, the fruit. Therefore, all is pervaded by Rasa[2]." Rasa fills the poet entirely with itself,

1) See also Gonda, op. cit., p. 338.

2) *A.Bh.*, I, p. 294 : *kavigatasādhāraṇībhūtasaṃvinmūlaś ca kāvyapuraḥsaro naṭavyāpāraḥ | saiva ca saṃvit paramārthato rasaḥ | sāmājikasya ca tatpratītyā vaśīkṛtasya paścād apoddhārabuddhyā vibhāvādipratītir iti prayojanam | nāṭye kāvye sāmājikadhiyi ca tad eva mūlaṃ bījasthānīyaḥ kavigato rasaḥ | kavir hi sāmājikatulya eva | tata evoktaṃ śṛṅgārī cet kaviḥ ityādi ānandavardhanācāryeṇa|*

and is spontaneously translated into poetic expression, like a liquid which overflows a vase—" if a pot is not full, it cannot overflow "—or like the natural manifestation of a state of mind (interjections, exclamations, etc.)[1]. In other words, artistic creation is the direct or unconventional expression of a feeling or passion " generalized ", that is, freed from all distinctions in time and space, and therefore from all individual relationships and practical interest by an inner force within the poet himself, the creative or artistic intuition, *pratibhā*. This state of consciousness expressed in the poem, etc., is transferred to the actor or the reciter, and to the spectator. All three—poet, actor and spectator—, in the serene contemplation of the work of art, form in reality a single knowing subject, merged together by the same sensations and the same purified joy[2].

The use of the term *pratibhā* in Indian poetics is very old, and, before Abhinavagupta, we find it in various authors of treatises on poetics, as, f.i., Bhāmaha (7th century), Daṇḍin (7th century) and Vāmana (8th century). According to these authorities, *pratibhā* is, in brief, a sort of unborn genius, imagination or quick-wittedness, etc. conceived as the primary cause of excellence in literary art[3], as the very seed of poetry[4]. This intuition, to Rājaśekhara (9th century) is not limited to the poet, *kavi*. According to him, the word *pratibhā* has the double sense of creative imagination, genius, inspiration, *kārayitrī*

tato vṛkṣasthānīyaṃ kāvyaṃ | tatra puṣpādisthānīyo 'bhinayādivyāpāraḥ | tatra phalasthānīyaḥ sāmājikarasāsvādaḥ | tena rasamayam eva viśvam |

1) *Locana*, comm. to I, 5.

2) Cf., f.i., the verse by Bhaṭṭa Tota, quoted by A.G., (*Locana*, comm. on I, 6) : *nāyakasya kaveḥ śrotuḥ samāno 'nubhavas tataḥ |*

3) Cp. Bhāmaha, *Kāvyālaṃkāra*, 1, 5, and Daṇḍin, *Kāvyādarśa*, 1, 103.

4) Cp. Vamana, *Kāvyālaṃkāra*, 1, 3, 16 : *kavitvabījaṃ pratibhānam.*

pratibhā, and of aesthetic sensibility, here conceived in the terms of an active power which permits the manifestation of Rasa, *bhāvayitrī pratibhā*[1]. All these descriptions of *pratibhā*, however, were superseded by the definition laid down by the master of Abhinava, Bhaṭṭa Tota. "Intuition", he says, "is a form of intuitive consciousness, *prajñā*, which is an inexhaustible source of new forms. It is by virtue of this intuition alone that one deserves the title of 'poet', of one, that is, who is skilful to express[2]". This definition of *pratibhā* came to be accepted and quoted in later times by almost all of the Indian rhetoricians. Abhinava himself did not add very much to it and limits himself to stress the fact that *pratibhā* does not exhaust itself in the poetical intuition, but is, in a broader sense, the same consciousness, the same Self.

In the majority of men it does not succeed in liberating itself from the chain of relationships and practical interests which condition and constrict it, but, in the poet, it burns with a purified light—to shine out finally in all its fullness in the intuition of the saints[3].

1) Cp. Rājaśekhara, *Kāvyamīmāṃsā*, pp. 12-14.

2) This stanza was a part of the *Kāvyakautuka*, a work not extant now. It is quoted, with some variants, by many writers, either anonymously or mentioning the source by name. Cf. f.i. Hemacandra, p. 3; Māṇikyacandra, p. 7. The text runs as follows :

prajñā navanavollekhaśālinī pratibhā matā |
tadanuprāṇanājivadvarṇanānipuṇaḥ kaviḥ ||

3) This concept is expressed in the *T.Ā.*, XI, pp. 60-62 (cf. *M.V.V.*, vv. 1031 onwards) :

yathā yathā cākṛtakaṃ tadrūpam atiricyate |
tathā tathā camatkāratāratamyaṃ vibhāvyate ||
ādyāmayīyavarṇāntarnimagne cottarottare |
saṃkete pūrvapūrvāṃśamajjane pratibhābhidaḥ ||
ādyodrekamahattve'pi pratibhātmani niṣṭhitāḥ |
dhruvaṃ kavitvavaktṛtvaśālitāṃ yānti sarvataḥ ||
yāvad dhāmani saṃketanikārakalanojjhite |
viśrāntaś cinmaye kiṃ kiṃ na vetti na karoti ca ||

In brief, artistic intuition is a particular hypostasis of universal or total intuition, that is to say, of consciousness as a force which creates and continually renews the Universe[1].

After Abhinavagupta, the study of aesthetics continued in India up to the present day, but without receiving much creative stimulus. Ānandavardhana, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, Bhaṭṭa Tota and Abhinava are still the most characteristic exponents of this subject and their thought, although at times uncertain and ingenuous, reaches, with the latter, conclusions which are still valid today and even relatively novel to western thought. The conception of art as an activity and an independent spiritual experience, freed of practical interests, which the intuition of Kant perceived for the West, was already, in 10th century India, an object of study and controversy. Poetry, said Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta is inextinguishable : it exists and will exist for ever. Like love, it has kindled and will continue to kindle the hearts of men with new and pulsing life[2]; it is an essential and independent part of human nature and the poets, who will never cease to tap its source, far from exhausting it, only purify and enrich it with new and ever-changing experiences[3].

1) Ānandavardhana (*Dh.Ā.*, p. 91) says that poetic intuition is a particular form of *pratibhā* (*pratibhāviśeṣam*). A.G.'s comment (*Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 92) is :

pratibhā apūrvavastunirmāṇakṣamā prajñā | tasya viśeṣo rasāveśavaiśadyasaundaryaṃ kāvyakṣamatvam ||

The concept of *pratibhā* is identified in *śaiva* metaphysics with that of consciousness as creative emission (*visarga*); cf., p. es., *T.Ā.*, V., p. 432 :

. . .visargānandadhārayā | siktam tad eva sad viśvam śaśvad navanavāyate ||

2) *Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 540.

3) *Dh.Ā.*, pp. 545-6.

TEXT

[*A. Bh.*, I, pp. 274–287]

evaṃ kramahetum abhidhāya rasaviṣayalakṣaṇasūtram āha " vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārisaṃyogād rasaniṣpattiḥ " | atra bhaṭṭalollaṭaprabhṛtayas tāvad evaṃ vyācakhyuḥ | vibhāvādibhiḥ saṃyogo 'rthāt sthāyinaḥ, tato rasaniṣpattiḥ | tatra vibhāvaś cittavṛtteḥ sthāyyātmikāyā utpattau kāraṇam | anubhāvāś ca na rasajanyā atra vivakṣitāḥ, teṣāṃ rasakāraṇatvena gaṇanānarhatvāt, api tu bhāvānām eva ye 'nubhāvāḥ | vyabhicāriṇaś ca cittavṛttyātmakatvād yady api na sahabhāvinaḥ sthāyinā, tathāpi vāsanātmateha tasya vivakṣitā | dṛṣṭānte 'pi vyañjanādimadhye kasyacid vāsanātmakatā sthāyivad anyasyodbhūtatā vyabhicārivat | tena sthāyy eva vibhāvānubhāvādibhir upacito rasaḥ | sthāyī bhavatv[1] anupacitaḥ | sa cobhayor. api anukārye 'nukartary api cānusaṃdhānabalād iti[2] |

cirantanānāṃ cāyam eva pakṣaḥ | tathā hi daṇḍinā svālaṃkāralakṣaṇe 'bhyadhāyi " ratiḥ śṛṅgāratāṃ gatā rūpabāhulyayogena "[3] iti,

ity āruhya[4] parāṃ koṭiṃ kopo raudrātmatāṃ gataḥ |
ityādi ca |

etan neti śrīśaṅkukaḥ[5] | vibhāvādyayoge sthāyino liṅgābhāvenāvagatyanupapatteḥ, bhāvānāṃ pūrvam abhidheyatāprasaṅgāt, sthitadaśāyāṃ lakṣaṇāntaravaiyarthyāt, mandataratamamādhyasthyādyānantyāpatteḥ, hāsyarase ṣoḍhātvābhāva-

[1] *bhavatv* G, M; *tv* Hc 13, [2] *sa cobhayor apy anukārye 'nukartary api cānusaṃdhānabalād iti* G, M; the text of Hc is here somewhat enlarged, *sa cobhayor api mukhyayā vṛttyā rāmādāv anukārye 'nukartari ca naṭe rāmādirūpatānusaṃdhānabalād iti* II 17, [3] *KAD*, II, v. 281, *prāk prītir darśitā seyam ratiḥ sṛṅgāratāṃ gatā | rūpabāhulyayogena tad idaṃ rasavad vacaḥ* || [4] *KAD.*, II, v. 283 *ity āruhya* (Böhtlingk's ed.) : *adhiruhya* G· : *āruhya* M, corrected in a second hand into *adhiruhya* : *aruhya ca* Hc || [5] From this 1. to 1.14 the text has been freely paraphrased and enlarged by Hc ||

prāpteḥ, kāmāvasthāsu daśasv asaṅkhyarasabhāvādiprasaṅgāt, śokasya prathamaṃ tīvratvaṃ kālāt tu māndyadarśanaṃ, krodhotsāharatīnām amarṣasthairyasevāviparyaye hrāsadarśanam iti viparyayasya dṛśyamānatvāc ca | tasmād dhetubhir vibhāvākhyaiḥ kāryaiś cānubhāvātmabhiḥ sahacārirūpaiś ca vyabhicāribhiḥ prayatnārjitatayā kṛtrimair api tathānabhimānyamānair anukartṛsthatvena liṅgabalataḥ pratīyamānaḥ sthāyī bhāvo mukhyarāmādigatasthāyyanukaraṇarūpaḥ, anukaraṇarūpatvād eva ca nāmāntareṇa vyapadiṣṭo rasaḥ | vibhāvā hi kāvyabalād[1] anusaṃdheyāḥ, anubhāvāḥ śikṣātaḥ, A. Bh., I, p. 275 vyabhicāriṇaḥ kṛtrimanijānu*bhāvārjanabalāt | sthāyī tu kāvyabalād api nānusaṃdheyaḥ | ratiḥ śoka ityādayo hi śabdā ratyādikam abhidheyīkurvanty abhidhānatvena, na tu vācikābhinayarūpatayāvagamayanti | na hi vāg eva vācikam api tu tayā nirvṛttam, aṅgair ivāṅgikam | tena |

vāḍaveneva jaladhiḥ śokaḥ krodhena pīyate[2] |

iti | tathā |

śokena kṛtastambhas[3]
tathā sthito yo 'navasthitākrandaiḥ[4] |

ityevamādau na śoko 'bhineyo 'pi tv abhidheyaḥ |

bhāti patito likhantyā[5]

[1] *kāvyabalād* Hc : *kāvyabalā* G,M || [2] Untraced source ; the firs two pādas have been given by Hc and read as follows, *vivṛddhātmāpy agādho 'pi duranto' pi mahān api* || [3] *kṛtastambhas* Hc : *kṛtaḥ stambhaḥ* G, M ||[4] *yo 'navasthitākrandaiḥ* G : *yo 'vasthitākrandaiḥ* M : *yena vardhitākrandaiḥ* Hc. The two last pādas of this stanza, whose source I have not succeeded in identifying, are given by Hc and read as follows, *hṛdayasphuṭanabhayārtai roditum* (a.l., °*rtair arditum*) *abhyarthyate sacivaiḥ* ||
[5] This is Harṣa, *Ratnāvalī*, II, 11 ; the complete stanza runs as follows, *bhāti patito likhantyās tasyā bāṣpāmbuśīkarakaṇaughaḥ |svedodgama iva karatalasaṃsparśād eṣa me vapuṣi* ||

ity anena tu vākyena svārtham abhidadhatā udayanagataḥ sukhātmā ratiḥ sthāyibhāvo 'bhinīyate na tūcyate | avagamanaśaktir hy abhinayanaṃ vācakatvād anyā | ata eva sthāyipadaṃ sūtre bhinnavibhaktikam api muninā noktam | tena ratir anukriyamāṇā śṛṅgāra iti tadātmakatvaṃ tatprabhavatvaṃ ca yuktam | arthakriyāpi mithyājñānād dṛṣṭā [1] | na cātra nartaka eva sukhīti pratipattiḥ, nāpy ayam eva rāma iti, na cāpy ayaṃ na sukhīti, nāpi rāmaḥ syād vā na vāyam iti,[2] na cāpi tatsadṛśa iti [3] | yaḥ sukhī rāma asāv ayam iti pratītir astīti | tad [4] āha |

pratibhāti na saṃdeho na tattvaṃ na viparyayaḥ |
dhīr asāv ayam ity asti nāsāv evāyam ity api ||
viruddhabuddhyasaṃbhedād [5] *avivecitasaṃplavaḥ* [6] |
yuktyā paryanuyujyeta sphurann anubhavaḥ kayā || iti |

tad idam apy antastattvaśūnyaṃ na vimardakṣamam ity upādhyāyāḥ [7] | tathā hy anukaraṇarūpo rasa iti yad ucyate tat 1) kiṃ sāmājikapratītyabhiprāyeṇa, 2) uta naṭābhiprāyeṇa, 3) kiṃ vā * vastuvṛttavivecakavyākhyātṛbuddhisamavalambanena yathāhur " vyākhyātāraḥ khalv evaṃ vivecayanti [8] " iti, 4) atha bharatamunivacanānusāreṇa | *A. Bh.*, p. 276

1) tatrādyaḥ [9] pakṣo 'saṃgataḥ | kiṃcid dhi pramāṇenopalabdhaṃ tad anukaraṇam iti śakyaṃ vaktum | yathā evam asau surāṃ pibatīti surāpānānukaraṇatvena payaḥpānaṃ pratyakṣāvalokitam pratibhāti | iha ca naṭagataṃ kiṃ tad

[1] Hc adds here one stanza of Dharmakīrti, *PV*, II, 57, *maṇipradīpaprabhayor maṇibuddhyābhidhāvatoḥ* | *mithyājñānāviśeṣe 'pi viśeṣo' rthakriyāṃ prati* || [2] *nāpi rāmaḥ syād vā na vāyaṃ iti* G, Hc : omitted in M || [3] After *kiṃ tu* Hc adds *samyaṅmithyāsaṃśayasādṛśyapratītibhyo vilakṣaṇā citraturagādinyāyena* || [4] *tad* G,M ; *yad* Hc || [5] °*buddhyasaṃbhedād* Hc : °*buddhisaṃbhedād* G, M || [6] °*saṃplavaḥ* G, M. : °*viplavaḥ* Hc || [7] *upādhyāyāḥ* G : *upādhyāyaḥ* M : *bhaṭṭatotaḥ* Hc || [8] This is Dharmakīrti, *PV*, *Svavṛtti*, p. 39 (ed. Gnoli) || [9] *tatrādyaḥ* Hc, M : *ādyaḥ* G ||

upalabdhaṃ yat sa ity anukaraṇatayā [1] bhātīti cintyam | taccharīraṃ tanniṣṭhaṃ pratiśīrṣakādi romāñcakagadgadikādi [2] bhujākṣepacalanaprabhṛti [3] bhrūkṣepakaṭākṣādikaṃ ca na rateś cittavṛttirūpatayā[4]nukāratvena kasyacit pratibhāti | jaḍatvena bhinnendriyagrāhyatvena [5] bhinnādhikaraṇatvena ca [6] tato 'tivailakṣaṇyāt | mukhyāmukhyāvalokane [7] ca tadanukaraṇapratibhāsaḥ | na ca rāmagatāṃ ratim upalabdhapūrviṇaḥ kecit | etena rāmānukārī naṭa ity api nirastaḥ pravādaḥ | atha naṭagatā cittavṛttir eva pratipannā satī ratyanukāraḥ śṛṅgāra ity ucyate tatrāpi kimātmakatvena sā pratīyata iti cintyam | nanu pramadādibhiḥ kāraṇaiḥ kaṭākṣādibhiḥ kāryaiḥ dhṛtyādibhiś ca sahacāribhir liṅgabhūtair yā laukikī kāryarūpā kāraṇarūpā [8] sahacārirūpā ca cittavṛttiḥ pratītiyogyā tadātmakatvena sā naṭacittavṛttiḥ pratibhāti | hanta tarhi ratyākāreṇaiva sā pratipanneti dūre ratyanukaraṇatāvācoyuktiḥ | nanu vibhāvādayo 'nukārye pāramārthikā, iha tv anukartari na tatheti viśeṣaḥ | astv evam, kiṃ tu te vibhāvādayo [9] 'tatkāraṇātatkāryātatsahacararūpā api kāvyaśikṣādibalopakalpitāḥ kṛtrimāḥ santaḥ kiṃ kṛtrimatvena sāmājikair gṛhyante na vā | yadi gṛhyante, tadā taiḥ kathaṃ rater avagatiḥ | nanv ata eva tat pratīyamānaṃ ratyanukaraṇam | mugdhabuddhe [10] kāraṇān-

[1] *yat sa ity anukaraṇatayā* Mc, p. 69 (Hc in a note) : *sadanukaraṇatayā* G, M : *yad ratyanukaraṇatayā* Hc : *yad anukaraṇatayā* P, p. 417 || [2] *romāñcaka*⁰ G, M : *romāñca*⁰ Hc || [3] ⁰*calana*⁰ Hc : ⁰*valana*⁰ G,M || [4] *cittavṛttirūpatayā* G, M : *cittavṛttirūpāyā* Hc || [5] *bhinnendriyagrāhyatvena* represented in Hc, is possibly a later addition, and it is, as such, bracketed both in G and M (in a second hand) || [6] *ca* is omitted by Hc || [7] Perhaps the original reading was *mukhyāvalokane* only, and ⁰*amukhya*⁰, bracketed both in G and M and absent in Hc, is a later addition || [8] *kāraṇarūpā* G,M : omitted by Hc || [9] *te vibhāvādayo* Hc : *te hi vibhāvādayo* G,M || [10] *mugdhabuddhe* : *ratyanukaraṇabuddheḥ kāraṇam* G, M : *mugdha*[illegible] *ddheḥ* Hc ||

taraprabhave hi kārye suśikṣitena [1] tathājñāne vastvantarasyānumānaṃ tāvad yuktam | asuśikṣitena [2] tu tasyaiva prasiddhasya kāraṇasya | yathā [3] vṛścikaviśeṣād gomayasyaivānumānaṃ vṛścikasyaiva [4] tat paraṃ mithyājñānam | yatrāpi liṅgajñānaṃ mithyā tatrāpi na tadābhāsānumānaṃ yuktam [5] | na hi bāṣpād dhūmatvena jñātād anukārapratibhāsamānād api liṅgāt tadanukārānumānaṃ yuktam | dhūmānukāratvena hi jñāyamānān nīhārān nāgnyanukārajapāpuñjapratītir [6] dṛṣṭā | * nanv akruddho 'pi naṭaḥ kruddha iva bhāti | satyam, A. Bh., I, p. 277 kruddhena sadṛśaḥ | sādṛśyaṃ ca bhrukuṭyādibhir gor [7] iva gavayena mukhādibhir iti naitāvatānukāraḥ kaścit | na cāpi sāmājikānāṃ sādṛśyamatir asti | sāmājikānāṃ ca na bhāvaśūnyā nartake pratipattir ity ucyate | atha ca tadanukārapratibhāsa iti riktā vācoyuktiḥ | yac coktaṃ rāmo 'yam ity asti pratipattiḥ, tad api yadi tadātve' [8] tiniścitaṃ taduttarakālabhāvibādhakavaidhuryābhāve kathaṃ na tattvajñānaṃ syāt | bādhakasadbhāve vā kathaṃ na mithyājñānam | vāstavena ca vṛttena bādhakānudaye 'pi mithyājñānam eva syāt | tena " viruddhabuddhyasaṃbhedād [9] " ity asat | nartakāntare 'pi ca [10] rāmo 'yam iti pratipattir asti | tataś ca rāmatvaṃ sāmānyarūpam ity āyātam | yac cocyate vibhāvāḥ kāvyād anusaṃdhīyante tad api na vidmaḥ | na hi mameyaṃ sītā kācid iti svātmīyatvena pratipattir naṭasya | atha sāmājikasya tathā pratītiyogyāḥ kriyanta ity

[1] °*prabhave hi kārye suśikṣitena tathā jñāne* Hc (but *jñāte* for *jñāne*) : °*prabhaveṣu hi kāryeṣu śikṣitena na tathā jñāne* G, M || [2] *asuśikṣitena* Hc, G : *astuśikṣitena* M || [3] *yathā* G, Hc : *tathā* M || [4] *vṛścikasyaiva* G : *vṛścikasyaiva vā* Hc : *vṛścikaś caiva* M || [5] *na...yuktam* : *ayuktam* Hc : *na...ayuktam* G,M || [6] °*japāpuñja*° Hc : °*japāpuṣpa*° G,M || [7] *gor* Hc : *gaur* G,M || [8] *tadātve 'tiniścitam* (the avagraha added by me) M,G (*tadatveti* (*vi*) *niscitam*) : *tadātve niścitam* Hc || [9] °*buddhyasaṃbhedāt* Hc : °*buddhisaṃbhedāt* G,M || [10] *'pi ca* G,M : *ca* omitted by Hc ||

etad[1] evānusaṃdhānam ucyate, tarhi sthāyini sutarām anusaṃdhānaṃ syāt | tasyaiva hi mukhyatvena asminn ayam iti sāmājikānāṃ pratipattiḥ | yas tu[2] vāg vācikam ityādinā bhedābhidhānasaṃrambhagarbho[3] mahīyān abhinayarūpatāvivekaḥ kṛtaḥ sa uttaratra svāvasare carcayiṣyate | tasmāt sāmājikapratītyanusāreṇa sthāyyanukaraṇaṃ rasa[4] ity asat |

2) na cāpi naṭasyetthaṃ pratipattiḥ rāmaṃ taccittavṛttiṃ vānukaromīti | sadṛśakaraṇam hi tāvad anukaraṇam anupalabdhaprakṛtinā[5] na śakyaṃ kartum | atha paścātkaraṇam anukaraṇam, tal loke 'py anukaraṇātmatātiprasaktā | atha na niyatasya kasyacid anukāraḥ, api tūttamaprakṛteḥ śokam anukaromīti,[6] tarhi keneti cintyam | na tāvac chokena tasya tadabhāvāt | na cāśrupātādinā śokasyānukāraḥ, tadvailakṣaṇyād ity uktam | iyat tu[7] syāt, uttamaprakṛter ye śokānubhāvās tān anukaromīti | tatrāpi kasyottamaprakṛteḥ | yasya kasyacid iti cet, so'pi viśiṣṭatāṃ vinā kathaṃ buddhāv āropayituṃ śakyaḥ | ya evam roditīti cet, svātmāpi madhye naṭasyānupraviṣṭa iti galito 'nukāryānukartṛbhāvaḥ | kiṃ ca naṭaḥ śikṣāvaśāt svavibhāvasmaraṇāc cittavṛttisādhāraṇībhāvena hṛdayasaṃvādāt kevalam[8] anubhāvān pradarśayan kāvyam ucita[9] kākuprabhṛtyupaskāreṇa paṭhaṃś ceṣṭata ity etāvanmātre 'sya[10] pratītir[11] na tv anukāraṃ vedayate | kāntaveṣānukāravad dhi na rāmaceṣṭitasyānukāraḥ | etac ca prathamādhyāye 'pi darśitam asmābhiḥ[12] |

[1] *etad* G,M : *etāvad* Hc || [2] *yas tu* : *yat tu* G,M || [3] °*garbho* : °*garbha*° G,M || [4] *rasa* G,M : *rasā* Hc || [5] °*prakṛtinā* G,Hc : °*prakṛtīnām* M || [6] *anukāromīti* Hc : *anukaroti* G,M || [7] *iyat tu* G,M : *yat tu* Hc || [8] *kevalam* G,M : *kevalān* Hc || [9] *ucita* °Hc, M : *upacita*° G || [10] *etāvanmātre 'sya* G,M : *etāvanmātrasya* Hc || [11] *pratītir* G, Hc : *pratītim* M || [12] Cf. *ABh*, I, p. 37 (*infra*, App. I, p. 98) ||

3) nāpi vastuvṛttānusāreṇa [1] tadanukāratvam, asaṃvedyamānasya [2] vastuvṛttatvānupapatteḥ | yac ca vastuvṛttaṃ tad darśayiṣyāmaḥ [3] |

4) na ca munivacanam evaṃvidham asti kvacit sthāyyanukaraṇaṃ rasā iti | * nāpi liṅgam atrārthe muner upalabhyate | pratyuta dhruvāgānatālavaicitryalāsyāṅgopajīvanaṃ nirūpaṇādi viparyaye liṅgam iti saṃdhyaṅgādhyāyānte vitaniṣyāmaḥ [4] | " saptadvīpānukaraṇam [5] " ityādi tv anyathāpi śakyagamanikam iti | tadanukāre 'pi ca kva nāmāntaraṃ kāntaveṣagatyanukaraṇād [6] |

A. Bh., I, p. 278

yac cocyate varṇakair haritālādibhiḥ saṃyujyamāna eva gaur ityādi, tatra yady abhivyajyamāna ity artho 'bhipretas tad asat | na hi sindūrādibhiḥ pāramārthiko gaur abhivyajyate pradīpādibhir iva, kiṃ tu tatsadṛśaḥ samūhaviśeṣo nirvartyate | ta eva [7] hi sindūrādayo gavāvayavasaṃniveśasadṛśena saṃniveśaviśeṣeṇāvasthitā gosadṛg iti pratibhāsasya viṣayo naivaṃ vibhāvādisamūho ratisadṛśatāpratipattigrāhyaḥ | tasmāt bhāvānukaraṇaṃ rasā ity asat |

yena tv abhyadhāyi sukhaduḥkhajananaśaktiyuktā viṣayasāmagrī bāhyaiva sāṃkhyadṛśā sukhaduḥkhasvabhāvo rasaḥ | tasyāṃ ca sāmagryāṃ dalasthānīyā vibhāvāḥ, saṃskārakā anubhāvavyabhicāriṇaḥ, sthāyinas tu tatsāmagrījanyā āntarāḥ sukhaduḥkhasvabhāvā iti | tena " sthāyibhāvān rasatvam upaneṣyāma [8] " ityādāv upacāram aṅgīkurvatā granthavirodhaṃ svayam eva budhyamānena dūṣaṇāviṣkaraṇamaukharyāt [9] prāmāṇiko janaḥ [10] parirakṣita iti kim asyocyate | yat tv

[1] *vastuvṛttānusāreṇa* G,Hc : *vastutvānusāreṇa* M || [2] *asaṃvedyamānasya* Hc: *anusaṃvedyamānasya* G,M. || [3] Cf. *infra*, p. 00 || [4] *Cf. ABh*, III, ch. XIX || [5] *NŚ*, I, v. 120 || [6] °*nukaraṇād* : °*nukaraṇādau* G,M || [7] *ta eva* Hc : *ata eva* G, M || [8] *NŚ*, prose after v. 45 || [9] °*maukharyāt* Hc: °*maurkhyāt* G, M || [10] *prāmāṇiko janaḥ* G,M : *pramāṇikajanaḥ* Hc ||

anyat[1] tatpratītivaiṣamyaprasaṅgādi tat kiyad[2] atrocyatām | bhaṭṭanāyakas tv āha | raso na pratīyate, notpadyate, nābhivyajyate | svagatatvena hi pratītau karuṇe duḥkhitvaṃ syāt | na ca sā pratītir yuktā sītāder avibhāvatvāt, svakāntāsmṛtyasaṃvedanāt, devatādau sādhāraṇīkaraṇāyogyatvāt, samudrollaṅghanāder asādhāraṇyāt | na ca tadvato[3] rāmasya smṛtir anupalabdhatvāt | na ca śabdānumānādibhyas tatpratītau lokasya sarasatā yuktā[4] pratyakṣād iva | nāyakayugalakāvabhāse hi pratyuta lajjājugupsāspṛhādisvocitacittavṛttyantarodayavyagratayā kā sarasatvakathāpi syāt[5] | tan na pratītir[6] anubhavasmṛtyādirūpā rasasya yuktā | utpattāv api tulyam etad dūṣaṇam | śaktirūpatvena pūrvaṃ sthitasya paścād abhivyaktau viṣayārjanatāratamyāpattiḥ | svagata[7]-paragatatvādi ca pūrvavad vikalpyam | tasmāt kāvye doṣābhāvaguṇālaṃkāramayatvalakṣaṇena, nāṭye caturvidhābhinayarūpeṇa nibiḍanijamohasaṃkaṭatānivāraṇakāriṇā[8] vibhāvādisādhāraṇīkaraṇātmanābhidhāto dvitīyenāṃśena bhāvakatva- A. Bh., I, p. 279 vyāpāreṇa bhāvyamāno * raso 'nubhavasmṛtyādivilakṣaṇena rajastamo'nuvedhavaicitryabalād drutivistāra[9] vikāsātmanā sattvodrekaprakāśānandamayanijasaṃvidviśrāntilakṣaṇena parabrahmāsvādasavidhena bhogena paraṃ bhujyata iti[10] |

[1] *yat tv anyat tat*⁰ Hc : *yat tv atyantam naḥ* G.M || [2] *tat kiyad* Hc : *tat kiṃ yad* G,M || [3] *tadvato* G, M : *tattvato* Hc || [4] *sarasatā yuktā* Hc : *sarasatā prayuktā* G,M (for *sarasatā' pi yuktā* ?) || [5] *kā sarasatvakathāpi syāt* Hc : *kasarasatvamathāpisyāt* G,M || [6] Before *tan na pratītir*, etc. Hc adds the following sentence, *paragatatvena tu pratītau tāṭasthyam eva bhavet* || [7] *svagata*⁰ Hc, M : *svagatatva*⁰ G || [8] ⁰*saṃkaṭatānivāraṇakāriṇā* Hc : ⁰*saṃkaṭakāriṇā* G,M, equally possible || [9] ⁰*vistāra*⁰ G,M : ⁰*vistara*⁰ Hc || [10] After *bhujyata iti* Hc adds the words *yat sa evāha*, followed by two stanzas, surely borrowed from the lost *Hṛdayadarpaṇa*, *abhidhā bhāvanā cānyā tadbhogīkṛtir* (alia lectio, *tadbhogīkṛtam*) *eva ca* | *abhidhādhāmatāṃ yāte śabdārthālaṃkṛtī tataḥ* || *bhāvanābhāvya eṣo 'pi śṛṅgārādigaṇo mataḥ* (alia lectio, *hi yat*) | *tadbhogīkṛtarūpeṇa vyāpyate siddhimān naraḥ* ||

tatra pūrvapakṣo 'yaṃ bhaṭṭalollaṭapakṣānabhyupagamād eva nābhyupagata iti taddūṣaṇam anutthānopahatam eva | pratītyādivyatiriktaś ca saṃsāre ko bhoga iti na vidmaḥ | rasaneti cet, sāpi pratipattir eva, kevalam upāyavailakṣaṇyān nāmāntaraṃ pratipadyatām, darśanānumitiśrutyupamitipratibhānādināmāntaravat | niṣpādanābhivyaktidvayānabhyupagame ca nityo vā 'san [1] vā rasa iti na tṛtīyā gatiḥ syāt [2] | na cāpratītaṃ vastv asti vyavahāre yogyam [3] | athocyate pratītir asya [4] bhogīkaraṇam, tac ca drutyādisvarūpam [5] | tad astu, tathāpi na tāvanmātram | yāvanto hi rasās tāvatya eva rasanātmānaḥ [6] pratītayo bhogīkaraṇasvabhāvāḥ | guṇānāṃ [7] cāṅgāṅgivaicitryam anantaṃ kalpyam iti kā tritveneyattā |

bhāvanābhāvya eṣo 'pi śṛṅgārādigaṇo hi yat [8] |

iti tu yat [9] kāvyena bhāvyante rasā ity ucyate, tatra vibhāvādijanitacarvaṇātmakāsvādarūpapratyayagocaratāpādanam eva yadi bhāvanaṃ tad abhyupagamyata eva | yat tūktam |

bhāvasaṃyojanāvyaṅgyaparasaṃvittigocaraḥ |
āsvādanātmānubhavo rasaḥ kāvyārtha ucyate [10] ||

[1] *'san* Hc : *'sad* G,M || [2] *gatiḥ syāt* Hc : *gatir asyām* G : *gatim asyām* M || [3] *asti vyavahāre yogyam* G,M : *astitāvyavahārayogyam* Hc || [4] *pratītir asya* Hc : *pratītir iti tasya* G : *pratītir iti rasya* (for *rasasya* ?) M, which reading is equally possible || [5] *drutyādisvarūpam* Hc : *bhūtyādisvarūpam* G,M. || [6] *rasanātmānaḥ* G, M : *rasātmānaḥ* Hc || [7] *guṇānām* G,M : this is explained by Hc by *sattvādiguṇānām* || [8] °*gaṇo hi yat* Hc : °*gaṇo bhayat* G (corrected into *hi yat*), M || [9] *iti tu yat* Hc : *iti yat* G,M || [10] This stanza is quoted in this form in the *Vyaktiviveka*, p. 67 (read *parasaṃvitti*° for *parisaṃvitti*°). Both in G and M we read in the first pāda *saṃvedanākhya* (corrected into *saṃvedanākhyayā* in G), which is quite nonsensical. Hc quotes a different stanza : *saṃsargādir yathā śāstra ekatvāt phalayogataḥ | vākyārthas tadvad evātra śṛṅgārādī raso mataḥ || iti tad asmākam abhimatam eva* ||

iti tatra vyajyamānatayā vyaṅgyo rakṣyate[1] | anubhavena ca tadviṣaya iti mantavyam | nanv evaṃ kathaṃ rasatattvam | āstām, kiṃ kurmaḥ |

āmnāyasiddhe kim apūrvam etat
saṃvidvikāse 'dhigatāgamitvam |
itthaṃ svayaṃgrāhyamaharhahetu-
dvandvena kiṃ dūṣayitā na lokaḥ ||

I. Bh., I, p. 280

**ūrdhvordhvam āruhya yad arthatattvaṃ*
dhīḥ paśyati śrāntim avedayantī |
phalaṃ tad ādyaiḥ parikalpitānāṃ
vivekasopānaparaṃparāṇām ||
citraṃ nirālambanam eva manye
prameyasindhau[2] prathamāvatāram |
tanmārgalābhe sati setubandha-
purapratiṣṭhādi na vismayāya ||
tasmāt satām atra na dūṣitāni
matāni tāny eva tu śodhitāni |
pūrvapratiṣṭhāpitayojanāsu
mūlapratiṣṭhāphalam āmananti ||

tarhy ucyatāṃ pariśuddhatattvam[3] | uktam eva muninā, na tv apūrvaṃ kiṃcit | tathā hy āha " kāvyārthān bhāvayantīti bhāvāḥ[4] " iti tat kāvyārtho rasaḥ[5] | yathā hi " rātrim āsata[6] ", " tām agnau prādāt[7] " ityādāv arthitādilakṣitasyādhikāriṇaḥ pratipattimātrād atitīvraprarocitāt prathamapravṛttād anantaram adhikaivopāttakālatiraskāreṇaiva ' āsai[8] '

[1] *rakṣyate* G (in the first ed.) : *lakṣyate* G: *labhyate* M (corrected into *lakṣyate*) || [2] *prameyasindhau* : *prameyasiddhau* G, M || [3] *pariśuddhatattvam* G,M : *pariśuddhaṃ tattvam* Hc || [4] The entire quotation is *kāvyārthān bhāvayantīti bhāvāḥ* (*NŚ*, prose at the beginning of ch. VII) || [5] Hc paraphrases *tasmāt kāvyārtho rasaḥ* || [6] *rātrim āsata* G: *rātrīr āsate* M. Untraced source || [7] *Taittirīya Saṃhitā*, 2, 1, 1 || [8] *āsai* : *āste* G (corrected into *āse*), M ||

'pradadāni' ityādirūpā saṃkramaṇādisvabhāvā yathādarśanaṃ bhāvanā[1]vidhiniyogādibhāṣābhir vyavahṛtā pratipattiḥ, tathaiva kāvyātmakād api śabdād adhikāriṇo 'dhikāsti pratipattiḥ | adhikārī cātra vimalapratibhānaśālihṛdayaḥ | tasya ca "grīvābhaṅgābhirāmam[2]" iti "umāpi nīlālaka[3]" iti "haras tu kiṃcit[4]" ityādivākyebhyo vākyārthapratipatter anantaraṃ mānasī sākṣātkārātmikā apahastita[5] tattadvākyopāttakālādivibhāgā tāvat pratītir upajāyate | tasyāṃ ca yo mṛgapotakādir bhāti tasya viśeṣarūpatvābhāvād bhīta iti trāsakasyā[6] pāramārthikatvād bhayam eva paraṃ deśakālādyanāliṅgitam, tata eva bhīto 'haṃ bhīto 'yaṃ śatrur vayasyo madhyastho vetyādipratyayebhyo duḥkhasukhādikṛtahānādibuddhyantarodayaniyamavattayā vighnabahulebhyo vilakṣaṇaṃ nirvighnapratītigrāhyaṃ sākṣād iva hṛdaye niviśamānaṃ[7] cakṣuṣor iva viparivartamānaṃ bhayānako rasaḥ | tathāvidhe hi bhaye nātmātyantatiraskṛto[8] na viśeṣata ullikhitaḥ | evaṃ paro 'pi | tata eva na parimitam eva sādhāraṇyam api tu *vitatam, vyāptigraha *A. Bh. p. 281* iva dhūmāgnyor bhayakampayor eva vā | tad atra sākṣātkārāyamāṇatve paripoṣikā naṭādisāmagrī, yasyāṃ vastusatāṃ kāvyārpitānāṃ ca deśakālapramātrādīnāṃ niyamahetūnām anyonyapratibandhabalād atyantam apasaraṇe sa eva sādhāraṇībhāvaḥ sutarāṃ puṣyati | ata eva sarvasāmājikānāṃ[9] eka-

[1] *bhāvanā* : *pratibhāvanā* M (corrected in a second hand into *pratibhābhāvanā*) : *pratibhābhavanā* G. In my opinion *prati* is simply a note by some reader who has not understood the expression *yathādarśanam*, which was later incorporated in the text || [2] Kālidāsa, *Abhijñānaśakuntalā*, I, 2 || [3] Kālidāsa, *Kumārasaṃbhava*, III, 62 || [4] Kālidāsa, ibid., III, 67 || [5] *āpahastita°* Hc, M (but corrected in a second hand into *apahasita°*): *apahasita* G || [6] *trāsakasya* Hc, G: *grāhakasya* M || [7] *niviśamānam* Hc, G: *nidhīyamānam* M || [8] *atyantatiraskṛto* G,M : *atyanta* omitted by Hc || [9] *sarvasāmājikānām* G,M : *sāmājikānām* Hc ||

ghanatayaiva[1] pratipatteḥ[2] sutarāṃ rasaparipoṣāya sarveṣām anādivāsanāvicitrīkṛtacetasāṃ vāsanāsaṃvādāt | sā cāvighnā saṃvic camatkāraḥ | tajjo 'pi kampapulakollukasanādir vikāraś camatkāraḥ | yathā

ajja vi harī camakkai
kaha kaha vi ṇa maṃdareṇa daliāiṃ[3] |
caṃdakalākaṃdalasac-
chahāiṃ lacchīiṃ aṃgāiṃ ||

tathā hi sa ca tṛpti[4]vyatirekeṇācchinno bhogāveśa ity ucyate | bhuñjānasyādbhutabhogaspandāviṣṭasya camataḥ karaṇaṃ[5] camatkāra iti | sa ca sākṣātkārasvabhāvo mānasādhyavasāyo vā saṃkalpo vā smṛtir vā tathātvenāsphuraty[6] astu | yad āha |

ramyāṇi vīkṣya madhurāṃś ca niśamya śabdān
paryutsukībhavati yat sukhito 'pi jantuḥ |
tac cetasā smarati nūnam abodhapūrvaṃ
bhāvasthirāṇi jananāntarasauhṛdāni ||

ityādi | sarvathā tāvad eṣāsti pratītir, āsvādātmā yasyāṃ ratir eva bhāti | tata eva viśeṣāntarānupahitatvāt sā rasanīyā satī na laukikī na mithyā nānirvācyā na laukikatulyā na tadāropādirūpā | eṣaiva copacayāvasthāstu[7] deśādyaniyantraṇāt | anukāro 'py astu bhāvānugāmitayā[8] karaṇāt | viṣayasāmagry api bhavatu vijñānavādāvalambanāt | sarvathā rasanātmakavītavighnapratītigrāhyo bhāva eva rasaḥ | tatra vighnāpasārakā vibhāvaprabhṛtayaḥ | tathā hi loke sakalavighnavinirmuktā saṃvittir eva camatkāranirveśarasanāsvādanabhogasamā-

[1] *ekaghanatayaiva* G, M (corrected in a second hand from *ekaghanataiva*): *ekaghanataiva* Hc || [2] *pratipatteḥ* Hc, M: G suggests *pratipattiḥ* || [3] *daliāim* G,M: *kaliāim* Hc || [4] *sa ca tṛpti*° (*sa vā tṛpti*° ?): *sa cātṛpti*° G,M || [5] *camataḥ karaṇam* : *ca manaḥkaraṇam* G, M || [6] *tathātvenāsphuraty* M : *tathātvena sphuraty* G : *tathātvenāsphuranty* Hc || [7] °*vasthāstu* Hc : °*vasthāsu* G,M || [8] *bhāvānugamitayā* G,M: *anugāmitayā* Hc ||

pattilayaviśrāntyādiśabdair abhidhīyate | vighnāś cāsyām 1) pratipattāv ayogyatā * saṃbhāvanāviraho nāma 2) svagatatva[1]-paragatatvaniyamena deśakālaviśeṣāveśaḥ 3) nijasukhādivivaśībhāvaḥ 4) pratītyupāyavaikalyam 5) sphuṭatvābhāvaḥ 6) apradhānatā 7) saṃśayayogaś ca | tathā hi A. Bh., I, p. 282

1) saṃvedyam asaṃbhāvayamānaḥ saṃvedye saṃvidaṃ niveśayitum[2] eva na śaknoti | kā tatra viśrāntir iti prathamo vighnaḥ | tadapasāraṇe hṛdayasaṃvādo lokasāmānyavastuviṣayaḥ | alokasāmānyeṣu tu[3] ceṣṭiteṣv akhaṇḍitaprasiddhijanitagāḍhārūḍhapratyaya[4]prasarakārī prakhyātarāmādināmadheyaparigrahaḥ | ata eva niḥsāmānyotkarṣopadeśavyutpattiprayojane nāṭakādau prakhyātavastuviṣayatvādi niyamena nirūpayiṣyate[5] | na tu prahasanādāv iti[6] | tac ca svāvasara eva vakṣyāma ity āstāṃ tāvat |

2) svaikagatānāṃ ca sukhaduḥkhasaṃvidāṃ āsvāde yathāsaṃbhavaṃ tadapagamabhīrutayā vā tatparirakṣāvyagratayā vā tatsadṛśārjijīṣayā vā tajjihāsayā vā tatpracikhyāpayiṣayā vā tadgopanecchayā vā prakārāntareṇa vā saṃvedanāntarasamudgama eva paramo vighnaḥ | paragatatvaniyamabhājām api sukhaduḥkhānāṃ saṃvedane niyamena svātmani sukhaduḥkhamohamādhyasthyādisaṃvidantarodgamanasaṃbhāvanād avaśyaṃbhāvī vighnaḥ | tadapasāraṇe[7] "kāryo nātiprasaṅgo 'tra[8]" ityādinā pūrvaraṅgānigūhanena[9] prastāvanāvalokanena[10] ca yo naṭarūpatādhigamas tatpuraḥsaraḥ[11] pratiśīrṣakādinā tat-

[1] *svagatatva*° G,M : *svagata*° Hc || [2] *niveśayitum* Hc, M: *viniveśayitum* G || [3] *tu* G, Hc : omitted by M || [4] °*rūḍhapratyaya*° G,M: °*rūḍhacitipratyaya*° Hc || [5] *nirūpayiṣyate* G,M (*ABh*, II, ch. XVIII) : *nirūpyate* Hc || [6] *iti* Hc : *iva* G,M || [7] *tadapasāraṇe* Hc : *tadapakāraṇe* G : *tadapakaraṇe* M || [8] *NŚ*, V, v. 165 || [9] Before *pūrvaraṅgānigūhanena* Hc adds *pūrvaraṅgavidhim prati*, which looks like a pāda of the *NŚ* || [10] Before *prastāvanāvalokanena* Hc adds *naṭī vidūṣako vāpi* (*NŚ*, XX, v. 30 ff.) *iti lakṣita*° || [11] *tatpuraḥsaraḥ* G,M: *tatpuraḥsara*° Hc ||

pracchādanaprakāro 'bhyupāyo 'laukikabhāṣādibhedalāsyāṅgaraṅgapīṭhamaṇḍapagatakakṣyādiparigrahanāṭyadharmīsahitaḥ | tasmin hy[1] asyaivātraivaitarhy eva ca sukhaṃ duḥkhaṃ veti na bhavati pratītiḥ | svarūpasva nihnavād rūpāntarasya cāropitasya pratibhāsasaṃvidviśrāntivaikalyena svarūpe viśrāntyabhāvāt satyatadīyarūpanihnavamātra eva paryavasānāt | tathā hy āsīnapāṭhyapuṣpagaṇḍikādi loke na dṛṣṭaṃ | na ca tan na kiṃcit, kathaṃcit saṃbhāvyatvād iti sa eṣa sarvo muninā sādhāraṇībhāvasiddhyā rasacarvaṇopayogitvena parikarabandhaḥ samāśrita iti tatraiva sphuṭībhaviṣyatīti tad iha tāvan nodyamanīyam | tataḥ sa eṣa svaparaniyatatāvighnāpasāraṇaprakāro vyākhyātaḥ |

3) nijasukhādivivaśībhūtaś ca kathaṃ vastvantare saṃvidaṃ viśramayed iti tatpratyūhavyapohanāya pratipadārthaniṣṭhaiḥ sādhāraṇyamahimnā sakalabhogyatvasa*hiṣṇubhiḥ
A. Bh., I, p. 285 śabdādiviṣayamayair[2] ātodyagānavicitramaṇḍapapada[3]vidagdhagaṇikādibhir uparañjanaṃ samāśritaṃ yenāhṛdayo 'pi hṛdayavaimalyaprāptyā sahṛdayīkriyate | uktaṃ hi "dṛśyaṃ śravyaṃ ca[4]" iti |

4) kiṃ ca pratītyupāyānām abhāve kathaṃ pratītiḥ |

5) asphuṭapratītikāriśabdaliṅgasaṃbhave 'pi na pratītir viśrāmyati sphuṭapratītirūpapratyakṣocitapratyayasākāṅkṣatvāt | yathāhuḥ "sarvā ceyaṃ pramitiḥ pratyakṣaparā[5]" iti | svasākṣātkṛta āgamānumānaśatair apy ananyathābhāvasya svasaṃvedanāt | alātacakrādau sākṣātkārāntareṇaiva balavatā tatavadhāraṇād[6] iti laukikas tāvad ayaṃ kramaḥ | tasmāt tadubhayavighnavighāte 'bhinayā lokadharmīvṛttipravṛttyupas-

[1] *tasmin hy* G,M : *tasmin hi saty* Hc || [2] °*mayair* Hc : °*mayībhir* G (corrected into °*mayair*), M || [3] °*pada*° G,M : omitted by Hc || [4] *NŚ*, I, v. 11 || [5] *Nyāyasūtra*, *Vātsyāyanabhāṣya*, I, 1, 3 (the edited text gives *sā* for *sarvā*) || [6] *tadavadhāraṇāt* G, M: *tatpramityapasāraṇāt* Hc ||

kṛtāḥ samabhiṣicyante | abhinayanaṃ hi saśabdaliṅgavyāpāravisadṛśam eva pratyakṣavyāpārakalpam iti niśceṣyāmaḥ[1] |

6) apradhāne ca vastuni kasya saṃvid viśrāmyati | tasyaiva pratyayasya[2] pradhānāntaraṃ praty anudhāvataḥ svātmany aviśrāntatvāt | ato 'pradhānatvaṃ jaḍe vibhāvānubhāvavarge vyabhicārinicaye ca saṃvidātmake 'pi niyamenānyamukhaprekṣiṇi[3] saṃbhavatīti tadatiriktaḥ sthāyyeva tathā[4] carvaṇāpātram | tatra puruṣārthaniṣṭhāḥ kāścit saṃvida iti pradhānam | tad yathā ratiḥ kāma[5]tadanuṣaṅgidharmārthaniṣṭhā, krodhas tatpradhāneṣv arthaniṣṭhaḥ kāmadharmaparyavasito 'pi, utsāhaḥ samastadharmādiparyavasitas, tattvajñānajanitanirvedaprāyo 'pi bhāvo[6] mokṣopāya iti tāvad eṣāṃ prādhānyam | yady api caiṣāṃ apy anyonyaṃ guṇabhāvo 'sti tathāpi tatpradhāne[7] rūpake tattatpradhānaṃ[8] bhavatīti rūpakabhedaparyāyeṇa sarveṣāṃ prādhānyam eṣāṃ lakṣyate | adūrabhāgābhiniviṣṭadṛśas[9] tv ekasminn api rūpake pṛthak prādhānyam | tatra sarve 'mī sukhapradhānāḥ svasaṃviccarvaṇarūpasyaikaghanasya prakāśasyānandasāratvāt | tathā hy ekaghanaśokasaṃviccarvaṇe 'pi loke strīlokasya[10] hṛdayaviśrāntir antarāyaśūnyaviśrāntiśarīratvāt | aviśrāntirūpataiva ca duḥkham | tata eva kāpilair duḥkhasya cāñcālyam eva prāṇatvenoktaṃ rajovṛttitāṃ vadadbhir ity ānandarūpatā sarvarasānām | kiṃ tūparañjakaviṣayavaśāt keṣām api kaṭukimnāsti sparśo vīrasyeva[11] | sa hi kleśasahiṣṇutādiprāṇa eva | evaṃ ratyādīnāṃ prādhānyam | hāsādīnāṃ tu sātiśayaṃ sakalalokasulabhavibhāvata-

[1] *ABh*, II, chapp. VIII ff. || [2] *pratyayasya* G,M: *prat[illegible]asya* Hc || [3] °*prekṣiṇi* Hc, M: °*saṃprekṣiṇi* G || [4] *tathā* G,M : omitted by Hc || [5] *kāma*° : *kāmaḥ* G,M (in M *ḥ* bracketed in a second hand) : *kāme* Hc || [6] °*prāyo' pi bhāvo* (see V. Raghavan, *Bhoja*, p. 00) : °*prāyo vibhāvo* G,M : *śamaś ca* Hc || [7] *tatpradhāne* M: *tattatpradhāne* G, Hc || [8] *tattatpradhānam* G,M: *tatpradhānam* Hc || [9] °*dṛśas* G,M : °*dṛśā* Hc || [10] *strīlokasya* G,Hc: *'sti lokasya* M || [11] *vīrasyeva* Hc: *vīrasya* G.M ||

yoparañjakatvam iti prādhānyam[1] | ata evānuttamaprakṛtiṣu (Bh., I, p. 234) bāhulyena hāsādayo bhavanti | pāmaraprāyaḥ * sarvo 'pi hasati śocati bibheti paranindām ādriyate alpa[2]subhāṣitatvena ca sarvatra vismayate | ratyādyaṅgatayā tu pumarthopayogitvam api syād eṣām | etadguṇapradhānabhāvakṛta eva ca daśarūpakādibheda iti vakṣyāmaḥ | sthāyitvaṃ caitāvatām eva | jāta eva hi jantur iyatībhiḥ saṃvidbhiḥ parīto bhavati | tathā hi

duḥkhasaṃśleṣavidveṣī sukhāsvādanasādaraḥ[3] |

iti nyāyena sarvo riraṃsayā vyāptaḥ svātmany utkarṣamānitayā param upahasann abhīṣṭaviyogasaṃtaptas taddhetuṣu kopaparavaśo 'śaktau ca tato bhīruḥ kiṃcid ārjijīṣur[4] apy anucita[5]vastuviṣayavaimukhyātmakatayākrāntaḥ kiṃcid anabhīṣṭatayābhimanyamānas tattatsvakartavya[6]darśanasamuditavismayaḥ kiṃcic ca jihāsur eva jāyate | na hy etaccittavṛttivāsanāśūnyaḥ prāṇī bhavati | kevalaṃ kasyacit kācid adhikā cittavṛttiḥ kācid ūnā, kasyacid ucitaviṣayaniyantritā kasyacid anyathā | tat kācid eva puruṣārthopayoginīty upadeśyā | tadvibhāgakṛtaś[7] cottamaprakṛtyādivyavahāraḥ | ye punar amī glāniśaṅkāprabhṛtayaś[8] cittavṛttiviśeṣās te samucitavibhāvābhāvāj janmamadhye 'pi[9] na bhavanty eva | tathā hi rasāyanam upayuktavato muner[10] glānyālasyaśramaprabhṛtayo nottiṣṭhanti[11] | yasyāpi vā bhavanti vibhāvabalāt tasyāpi hetuprakṣaye kṣīyamāṇāḥ saṃskāraśeṣatāṃ tāvan[12] nāvaśyam anubadhnanti | utsāhādayas[13] tu saṃpāditasvakartavyatayā pralīnakalpā api saṃskāraśeṣatāṃ

[1] *prādhānyam* Hc, M : (*na*) *prādhānyam* G || [2] *alpa*° G,M : *svalpa*° Hc || [3] Untraced source || [4] *ārjijīṣur* G,M : possibly, *ujjigīṣur* || [5] *anucita*° G : *cita*° M || [6] °*svakartavya*° G,M : °*svaparākartavya*° Hc || [7] *tadvibhāga*° Hc: *tadvibhāva* G (corrected into *tadvibhāga*°), M || [8] *glāniśaṅkāprabhṛtayaś* G,M: *dhṛtyādayaś* Hc || [9] *'pi* G,M : omitted by Hc || [10] *muneḥ* G,M : omitted by Hc || [11] *nottiṣṭhanti* G,M: *na bhavanti* Hc || [12] *tāvan* G,M : omitted by Hc || [13] *utsāhādayas* G,M : *ratyādayas* Hc ||

nātivartante kartavyāntaraviṣayasyotsāhāder [1] akhaṇḍanāt | yathāha patañjaliḥ "na hi caitra ekasyāṃ striyāṃ rakta ity anyāsu viraktaḥ [2]" ityādi | tasmāt sthāyirūpacittavṛttisūtrasyūtā evāmī vyabhicāriṇaḥ svātmānam udayāstamayavaicitryaśatasahasradharmāṇaṃ pratilabhamānā raktanīlādisūtrasyūtaviralabhāvombhana[3]saṃbhāvitabhaṅgīsahasragarbhasphaṭikakācabhrāmaka[4]padmarāgamarakatamahānīlādimayagolakavat tasmin sūtre svasaṃskāravaicitryam aniveśayanto 'pi tatsūtrakṛtam upakārasaṃdarbhaṃ bibhrataḥ svayaṃ ca vicitrārthāḥ[5]sthāyisūtraṃ ca vicitrayanto 'ntarāntarāśuddham api sthāyisūtraṃ pratibhāsāvakāśam upanayanto 'pi pūrvāparavyabhicāriratnacchāyāśabalimānam avaśyam ānayantaḥ pratibhāsanta iti vyabhicāriṇa ucyante | tathā hi glāno'yam ity ukte kuta iti hetupraśnenāsthāyitāsya sūtryate [6] | na tu rāma utsāhaśaktimān ity atra hetupraśnam āhuḥ | ata * eva vibhāvās tatrodbodhakāḥ santaḥ svarūpoparañjakatvaṃ vidadhānā ratyutsāhāder ucitānucitatvamātram āvahanti | na tu tadabhāve sarvathaiva te nirupākhyāḥ, vāsanātmanā sarvajantūnāṃ tanmayatvenoktatvāt | vyabhicāriṇāṃ tu svavibhāvābhāve nāmāpi nāstīti vitaniṣyate caitad yathāyogaṃ vyākhyāvasare [7] | evam apradhānatvanirāsaḥ sthāyinirūpaṇayā [8] "sthāyibhāvān rasatvam [9]" ityanayā sāmānyalakṣaṇaśeṣabhūtayā viśeṣalakṣaṇaniṣṭhayā ca kṛtaḥ [10] |

A. Bh., I, p. 285

7) tatrānubhāvānāṃ vibhāvānāṃ vyabhicāriṇāṃ ca pṛthak sthāyini niyamo nāsti, bāṣpāder ānandākṣirogādijatvadarśanād

[1] *kartavyāntaraviṣayasyotsāhāder* G,M : *vastvantaraviṣayasya ratyāder* Hc || [2] *Yogasūtra*, *Vyāsabhāṣya*, 2, 4 || [3] °*vīralabhāvombhana*° (see, on this passage, R. Gnoli, *Further Observations*, p. 102) : °*viralabhavo(go) palambhana* [G : *viralabhāvo bhana* M || [4] °*bhrāmaka*° G : *bhramaka* M || [5] *vicitrārthāḥ* : *vicitrārtha*° G,M || [6] °*sthāyitāsya sūtryate* Hc : *sthāyī tasya sūcyate* [G : *sthāyī tasya sūtryante* || [7] *Abh*, ch. VII || [8] °*nirūpaṇayā* Hc, M: °*nirūpaṇāyām* G || [9] Cf. supra, p. 9, l. 23 || [10] *kṛtaḥ* G,M: *muninā kṛtaḥ* Hc ||

vyāghrādeś ca krodhabhayādihetutvāt śramacintāder utsāhabhayādyanekasahacaratvāvalokanāt[1] | sāmagrī tu na vyabhicāriṇī | tathā hi bandhuvināśo yatra vibhāvaḥ paridevitāśrupātādis tv[2] anubhāvaś cintādainyādiś ca vyabhicārī, so 'vaśyaṃ śoka eveti[3] | evaṃ saṃśayodaye śaṅkātmakavighnaśamanāya saṃyoga upāttaḥ |

tatra lokavyavahāre kāryakāraṇasahacarātmakaliṅgadarśane[4] sthāyyātmaparacittavṛttyanumānābhyāsapāṭavād adhunā tair evodyānakaṭākṣadhṛtyādibhir[5] laukikīṃ kāraṇatvādibhuvam atikrāntair vibhāvanānubhāvanāsamuparañjakatvamātraprāṇair ata evālaukikavibhāvādivyapadeśabhāgbhiḥ prācyakāraṇādirūpasaṃskāropajīvanakhyāpanāya vibhāvādināmadheyavyapadeśyair bhāvādhyāye 'pi vakṣyamāṇasvarūpabhedair[6] guṇapradhānatāparyāyeṇa sāmājikadhiyi samyagyogaṃ sambandham aikāgryaṃ vā[7]sāditavadbhir alaukikanirvighnasaṃvedanātmakacarvaṇāgocaratāṃ nīto 'rthaś carvyamāṇataikasāro na tu siddhasvabhāvas tātkālika eva na tu carvaṇātiriktakālāvalambī sthāyivilakṣaṇa eva rasaḥ | na tu[8] yathā śaṅkukādibhir abhyadhīyata " sthāyyeva vibhāvādipratyāyyo rasyamānatvād rasa ucyata " iti[9] | evaṃ hi loke 'pi kiṃ na rasaḥ, asato 'pi hi yatra rasanīyatā syāt[10] tatra vastusataḥ kathaṃ na bhaviṣyati | tena sthāyipratītir anumitirūpā vācyā,[11] na rasaḥ | ata eva sūtre sthāyigrahaṇaṃ na kṛtam | tat pratyuta śalyabhūtaṃ syāt | kevalam aucityād evam ucyate sthāyī rasībhūta iti | aucityaṃ tu tatsthāyigatatvena kāraṇāditayā prasiddhānām

[1] °*valokanāt* | *sāmagrīti na vyabhicāriṇī* Hc : °*valokana*. . .*vyabhicāriṇi* G,M || [2] *tv* G,M. : *ca* Hc || [3] *śoka eveti* Hc, M: *śoka eve* (*va ve*) *ty* G || [4] °*darśane* G,M : °*darśanaja*° Hc || [5] °*dhṛtyādibhir* Hc : °*vīkṣādibhir* G,M || [6] *ABh*, ch. VII || [7] *vā*° G,M : *ca* Hc || [8] *na tu* Hc : *nanu* G (corrected into *na tu*), M || [9] *iti* G,M : omitted by Hc || [10] *syāt* G,M. (deleted in a second hand) : omitted by Hc || [11] *vācyā* Hc : *prācyā* (corrected into *prāpyā*) G : *prāpyā* (corrected into *prācyā*) M ||

adhunā carvaṇopayogitayā vibhāvāditvāvalambanāt | tathā hi laukikacittavṛttyanumāne kā rasatā | * tenālaukikacamatkārātmā A. Bh. I, p. 286 rasāsvādaḥ smṛtyanumānalaukikasvasaṃvedanavilakṣaṇa eva | tathā hi laukikenānumānena saṃskṛtaḥ pramadādi na tāṭasthyena pratipadyate, api tu hṛdayasaṃvādātmakasahṛdayatvabalāt pūrṇībhaviṣyadrasāsvādāṅkurībhāvenānumānasmṛtyādisopānam anāruhyaiva[1] tanmayībhāvocitacarvaṇāprāṇatayā | na ca sā carvaṇā prāṅmānāntarād yenādhunā smṛtiḥ syāt | na cātra laukikapratyakṣādipramāṇavyāpāraḥ | kiṃ tv[2] alaukikavibhāvādisaṃyogabalopanataiveyaṃ carvaṇā | sā ca pratyakṣānumānāgamopamānādilaukikapramāṇajanitaratyādyavabodhatas tathā yogipratyakṣajataṭasthaparasaṃvittijñānāt sakalavaiṣayikoparāgaśūnyaśuddhaparayogigatasvānandaikaghanānubhavāc ca viśiṣyate, eteṣāṃ[3] yathāyogam arjanādivighnāntarodaya[4]tāṭasthyāsphuṭatvaviṣayāveśavaivaśyakṛtasaundaryavirahāt | atra tu svātmaikagatatvaniyamāsaṃbhavān svānupraveśāt paragatatvaniyamābhāvāt[5] tadvibhāvādisādhāraṇyavaśasaṃprabuddhocitanijaratyādivāsanāveśavaśāc ca na vighnāntarādīnāṃ saṃbhava ity avocāma bahuśaḥ | ata eva vibhāvādayo na niṣpattihetavo rasasya, tadbodhāpagame 'pi rasasaṃbhavaprasaṅgāt | nāpi jñaptihetavaḥ, yena pramāṇamadhye pateyuḥ, siddhasya kasyacit prameyabhūtasya rasasyābhāvāt | kiṃ tarhy etad[6] vibhāvādaya iti | alaukika evāyam carvaṇopayogī vibhāvādivyavahāraḥ | kvānyatretthaṃ dṛṣṭam iti ced bhūṣaṇam etad asmākam[7] alaukikatvasiddhau[8] | pānakarasāsvādo 'pi kiṃ

[1] *anāruhya* Hc (see infra, p. 00, l. 0 also) : *āruhya* G,M || [2] *kiṃtv* Hc, G : *kiṃ ca*[0] M (corrected into *kiṃtv* in a second hand) || [3] *eteṣāṃ* G,Hc : *etāsāṃ* M || [4] [0]*daya*[0] : [0]*dayāt* G,M. This passage has been paraphrased by Hc in the following way : *yathāyogam arjanādivighnāntarodayena tāṭasthyahetukasphuṭatvena viṣayāveśavaivaśyena ca saundaryavirahāt* || [5] Hc adds *na viṣayāveśavaivaśyam* after [0]*saṃbhavāt* and *tāṭasthyāsphuṭatvam* after *paragatatvaniyamābhāvāt* || [6] *etad* Hc : *etad dhi* G,M || [7] *etad asmākam* G,M : *asmākam etad* Hc || [8] [0]*siddhau* G, Hc : [0]*siddheḥ* M ||

guḍamaricādiṣu dṛṣṭa iti samānam etat | nanv evaṃ raso 'prameyaḥ syāt, evaṃ yuktaṃ bhavitum arhati, rasyataikaprāṇo hy asau na prameyādisvabhāvaḥ | tarhi sūtre niṣpattir iti katham | neyaṃ rasasya, api tu tadviṣaya[1]rasanāyāḥ | tanniṣpattyā tu yadi tadekāyattajīvitasya rasasya niṣpattir ucyate na kaścid[2] atra doṣaḥ | sā ca rasanā na pramāṇavyāpāro na kārakavyāpāraḥ, svayaṃ tu nāprāmāṇikī svasaṃvedanasiddhatvāt | rasanā ca bodharūpaiva, kiṃ tu bodhāntarebhyo laukikebhyo vilakṣaṇaiva, upāyānāṃ vibhāvādīnāṃ laukikavailakṣaṇyāt | tena vibhāvādisaṃyogād rasanā yato niṣpadyate tatas tathāvidharasanāgocaro lokottaro 'rtho rasa iti tātparyaṃ sūtrasya |

A. Bh., I, p. 288 *ayam atra saṃkṣepaḥ | mukuṭapratiśīrṣakādinā tāvan naṭabuddhir ācchādyate | gāḍhaprāktanasaṃvitsaṃskārāc ca kāvyabalānīyamānāpi na tatra rāmadhīr viśrāmyati | ata evo[3]bhayadeśakālatyāgaḥ | romāñcādayaś ca bhūyasā ratipratītikāritayā dṛṣṭās tatrāvalokitā deśakālāniyamena ratiṃ[4] gamayanti | yasyāṃ svātmāpi tadvāsanāvattvād anupraviṣṭaḥ | ata eva na taṭasthatayā ratyavagamaḥ | na ca niyatakāraṇatayā, yenārjanābhiṣvaṅgādisaṃbhāvanā | na ca niyataparātmaikagatatayā, yena duḥkhadveṣādyudayaḥ | tena sādhāraṇībhūtā saṃtānavṛtter ekasyā eva vā saṃvido gocarībhūtā[5] ratiḥ śṛṅgāraḥ | sādhāraṇībhāvanā ca vibhāvādibhir iti |

[1] *tadviṣaya*° G,M : *tadviṣayāyā* Hc || [2] *na kaścid* G,M : *tan na kaścid* Hc || [3] *ata eva* G,M : *tata eva* Hc || [4] *ratiṃ* Hc, M : *tatra ratiṃ* G || [5] *gocarībhūtā* Hc,M : *gocarabhūtā* G ||

TRANSLATION

TRANSLATION

Bharata's sūtra

1. After explaining the reason for the foregoing succession[1], Bharata states the *sūtra* defining the nature of Rasa : " Out of the combination (*saṃyoga*) of the Determinants (*vibhāva*), the Consequents (*anubhāva*) and the Transitory Mental States (*vyabhicārin*), the birth of Rasa takes place ".

The interpretation of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, etc.

2. This sūtra has been explained by Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, etc., in the following way :—The birth of Rasa takes place out of the combination of the permanent mental state—implicit in the sūtra—with the determinants, etc. More precisely, the determinants are the cause of the birth of the feeling, which constitutes the permanent state of mind. The consequents intended by Bharata are not, obviously, those which arise from the rasas—for they cannot be considered as causes of rasa[2]—, but the consequents of the states of mind only. Even if the transitory states of mind, in so far as they are feelings, cannot accompany simultaneously the permanent mental state, still, according to Bharata, this is not absent, but remains in a state of

1) *N. Ś.*, vi, vv. 1-33.

2) Rasa will also produce certain effects in the spectators—it will make them mutter in fear, make their hair stand on end etc. These effects (lit., consequents, *anubhāva*) cannot, of course, be considered as the causes of Rasa. The causes of Rasa can only be the effects of the permanent mental states.

latent impression[1]. In the example[2] too, some flavourings appear in a latent state, like the permanent state, and others in an emergent state, like the transitory states. Rasa, therefore, is simply a permanent state, intensified by the determinants, the consequents, etc.; but, had it not been intensified, it is only a permanent state. This state is present both in the person reproduced and in the reproducing actor, by virtue of the power of realization (*anusaṃdhāna*)[3].

1) It is a general principle of Indian thought that two forms of cognition cannot occur simultaneously (cf. *Nyāyasūtra*, I, I, 16). To avoid a contradiction of this rule, Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa remarks that there is nothing to prevent the assumption that the permanent mental state is presented in the state of a latent impression (*saṃskāra*, *vāsanā*). The word *saṃskāra* " means the impressions (which exist sub-consciously in the mind) of the objects experienced. All our experiences whether cognitive, emotional or conative exist in a sub-conscious state and may under suitable conditions be reproduced as memory (*smṛti*). The word *vāsanā* (*Yogasūtra*, IV, 24) seems to be a later word. . .It comes from the root " *vas* " to stay. It is often loosely used in a sense of *saṃskāra*, and in *Vyāsabhāṣya* they are identified in IV, 9. But *vāsanā* generally refers to the tendencies of past lives most of which lie dormant in the mind. Only those appear which can find scope in this life. But *saṃskāras* are the subconscious states which are being constantly generated by experience. *Vāsanās* are innate *saṃskāras* not acquired in this life " (Dasgupta, *H. I. Ph.*, I, p. 263).

2) The example occurs in *N. Ś.*, just after the mentioned sūtra. " Is there any example ? Yes, it is said that as taste, *rasa*, results from a combination of various spices, vegetables and other articles, and as six tastes, *rasa*, are produced by articles such as raw sugar, spices and vegetables, so the permanent states, when they come together with various other states, attain the quality of rasa (*i. e.*, become rasa) ". I have here adopted, with some changes, the translation of Manomohan Ghosh, *The Nāṭyaśāstra*, Calcutta 1951.

3) Cf. the Introd., p. XVIII. The text of Hemacandra is here somewhat enlarged ; it runs as follows : " This state is present in both the person

This view, again, is the same as that of the ancients. Daṇḍin, for example, in his definition of the ornaments[1], said that in association with a number of other elements, the feeling of delight is transformed into the Erotic Rasa (*śṛṅgāra*) ", and " on reaching its extreme height, the feeling of anger is transformed into the Furious Rasa (*raudra*) ", etc.

The interpretation of Śaṅkuka and his criticisms of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa's view.

3. This interpretation, says Śaṅkuka, is unsound. Why ?— *a*) Because, without the determinants, etc., the permanent mental state cannot be known, for the determinants, etc., are the characteristic signs, i.e., the logical reasons (*liṅga*) by means of which knowledge of it is made possible[2]. *b*) Because, if the

reproduced and in the reproducing actor, in the person reproduced (Rāma, etc.) in the primary sense (*mukhyayā vṛttyā*) and in the reproducing actor by virtue of a recollection of the nature of Rāma, etc."

To sum up, according to Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa Rasa is a perception of the permanent mental state of the character represented by the actor. This *sthāyibhāva*, intensified by the Determinants, etc. is presented to the spectator in the form of a Rasa. The same thesis of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa is met with in the *Agnipurāṇa* ; cf., for example, ch. 339, sl. 4 :

abhimānād ratis sā ca paripoṣam upeyuṣī |
vyabhicāryādisāmānyāt śṛṅgāra iti gīyate ||

1) Cp. The Introduction, p. XVII. The ornaments, *alaṃkāra*, are figures of speech.

2) Here Hc. adds : *na hi dhūmaṃ vinā dharādharāntaḥstho vahnir avagamyate* || " If there were no smoke, the fire which is within a mountain could not be perceived ". Hence the interpretation of Lollaṭa, who intended the sūtra, as if Bharata had said : " Out of the combination of the permanent mental state with the determinants ", etc., does not stand to reason.

thesis of Lollaṭa is right, Bharata should first have expounded the permanent states and only afterwards the Rasas[1]. c) Because, the second definition of the determinants, etc. in their state of full development, (put forward by Bharata in connexion with Rasas, which according to Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, are nothing but permanent mental states), would become a useless waste of words[2]. *d*) Because, every feeling would come to be subdivided into an infinity of different gradations, weak, weaker, weakest, indifference, etc[3]. *e*) Because, there would no longer be six varieties of Comic Rasa (*hāsya*)[4]. *f*) Because, in the ten states of love (*kāma*) there would be an infinite number of mental

1) If it were true that the permanent mental states exist before the Rasa, why is it that Bharata explained first Rasa (*N. Ś.*, Chap. VI) and afterwards (*N. Ś.*, chap. VII) the mental states ?

2) If, as Lollaṭa says, Rasa is no more than an intensified permanent mental state, why should Bharata have taken the trouble to explain the Determinants of this mental state twice over, once in connexion with it in its non-intensified state (*N. Ś.* chap. VII) and once again in connexion with it in its intensified state (*N. Ś.* chap. VI) ? It is illogical to explain the causes of the same thing twice over, once when it is not far from its nascent state and once when it has reached its full development. H.C. clarifies : *na cotpattau padārthānāṃ kāraṇam abhidhāya puṣyatāṃ punas tadutpattikāraṇam abhidhātavyam, vaiyarthyāpatteḥ* ||

3) In other words, if, as Lollaṭa says, the Rasa is nothing but a feeling intensified, "then, as intensity admits of many degrees, similarly there ought to be different grades in the Rasa realized " (Sankaran, *The Theories of Rasa and Dhvani*, Madras, 1929, p. 99).

4) " Or if it is urged that only when the utmost intensity is reached is Rasa realized, then the division of the Comic Rasa into six varieties, made by Bharata, would be wrong (*ibid.*, p. 99). As to the six qualities of laughter cp. Bharata, VI, pp. 314-16. They are slight smile (*smita*), smile (*hasita*), gentle laughter (*vihasita*), laughter of ridicule (*upahasita*), vulgar laughter (*apahasita*) and excessive laughter (*atihasita*). The renderings adopted are those of Manomohan Ghosh, op. cit.

states and of Rasas[1]. *g*) Because we see that what happens is just the contrary, in the sense that sorrow (*śoka*) is at first intense and is seen to grow weaker with time, and that in the feelings of anger (*krodha*), heroism (*utsāha*) and delight (*rati*) a diminution is met with when the indignation (*amarṣa*), firmness (*sthairya*) and sexual enjoyment (*sevā*) are absent.

Therefore, Rasa is simply a permanent state of mind, and, more precisely, the reproduction (*anukaraṇa*) of the permanent state of mind proper to the person reproduced—Rāma, etc.; and just because it is a reproduction, it is called by a different word, that is Rasa. This reproduced mental state is perceived by means of three kinds of elements, viz., causes, here called by the name of determinants, effects, that is, the consequents, and accompanying elements, constituted by the transitory states of mind. Though these causes, etc., are brought into existence by the conscious effort (*prayatna*) (of the actor), and are thus artificial and unreal (*kṛtrima*), yet they are not realised to be so. This permanent state is perceived (and this perception is aroused by the characteristic signs already referred to) as lying in the reproducing actor.

The determinants, indeed, can be realized (*anusaṃdhā*) through the power (*bala*) of poetry, the consequents through the skill (*śikṣā*) of the actor, and the transitory mental states through the actor's ability to present his own artificial consequents. But

1) In the Erotic Rasa there are, according to Bharata, (XX, vv. 154-6) ten stages ; now, if each of them should have different grades according to their intensity, there would then be endless varieties under that Rasa and feeling alone. Cp. Sankaran, op. cit., pp. 99. The aforementioned ten stages of love (*kāma*) are: longing (*abhilāṣa*), anxiety (*arthacintā*), recollection (*anusmṛti*), enumeration of the loved one's merits (*guṇakīrtana*), distress (*udvega*), raving (*vilāpa*), insanity (*unmāda*), fever (*vyādhi*), stupor (*jaḍatā*), and death (*maraṇa*). Cf. *Daśarūpa*, Haas, p. 132.

the permanent state cannot be realized, even through the power of poetry[1]. The words " delight ", " sorrow ", etc., as it is to be expected from expressing words, are, indeed, only able to turn the feeling of delight, etc., to which they refer into an expressed thing, but they are not able to communicate (*avagam*) it [in its fullness], as if they were forms of verbal representation (*vācikābhinaya*). For verbal representation does not consist merely in words, but rather in what effect the words produce; in the same way gesticular representation (*āṅgikābhinaya*) does not consist merely in the movement of the limbs but in the effect which this movement produces. In the following stanzas, the feeling of sorrow is not an object of representation but simply of verbal expression :

" Great, deep, wide, and unbounded, the ocean is nevertheless drunk by underwater fires: in the same way, sorrow is drunk by anger[2] "

Again :

" He is paralysed by sorrow, motionless in this state, so that he is begged imploringly to move by his companions, who, filled with the fear that tears their hearts, increase their lamentations "[3].

Examples may be multiplied. But the following stanza : " This multitude of droplets, fine rain of tears falling

1) The meaning appears to be that the permanent state can be ascertained only indirectly, through an inferential process. The determinants, etc., on the other hand, are realized, ascertained, directly. That is why the word " permanent state " (*sthāyibhāva*) is not mentioned in the sūtra.

2) Unidentified stanza.

3) Unidentified stanza. In both stanzas the word " sorrow " occurs. Thus, in them sorrow is in the state of verbal expression.

while she painted, produces on my body the effect of a perspiration born from the touch of her hand[1]",

at the same time that it expresses what is its own sense[2], represents, rather than expresses verbally[3], the permanent mental state of delight consisting in a form of pleasure (*sukha*) proper to Udayana[4]. Representation (*abhinayana*), indeed, is nothing but a power of communication (*avagamanaśakti*)—this power differing from the one of verbal expression. Precisely for such reasons, Bharata did not mention at all the word "permanent mental state" in the sūtra, not even in a different grammatical case[5]. Thus the Erotic Rasa is simply the permanent mental state of delight imitated; so that [what Bharata said, namely] that Rasas are made up of the permanent feelings and are born of them is quite appropriate to[6]. It is found furthermore, that even mistaken cognition is, sometimes, not without causal efficiency (*arthakriyā*[7]).

1) Harṣa, *Ratnāvalī*, II, 11.

2) I.e., its literal meaning.

3) The word "delight" does not occur in this stanza.

4) The chief character of the *Ratnāvalī*.

5) In the genitive, cf. *supra*, p. 25.

6) According to Bharata, the erotic and the pathetic Rasas are born (°*prabhava*) of the sentiments of delight and sorrow respectively; while, instead, the other Rasas are made up of them (°*ātmaka*). Cf. AG, p. 312.

7) To corroborate this statement, Hemacandra quotes here a famous stanza of Dharmakīrti, *PV*, II, 57 : "Between two people approaching two lights, the one produced by a jewel, the other by a lamp [without being conscious of what they really are, but] with the idea that it is a jewel, there exists a difference in respect of causal efficiency, but not a difference of mistaken cognition. This stanza is also quoted by Mahimabhaṭṭa, *Vyaktiviveka*, p. 78. Casual efficiency, the capacity to produce effects (*arthakriyā, arthakriyākāritva*) is the basic criterion of every form of right cognition, and, therefore, of the real existence of a thing. When, for example, a man

Furthermore, here there is none of the following perceptions :—" The actor is really happy ", " Rāma is really that man ", " That man is not happy ", " Is this Rāma or not ?", " This is similar to Rāma ",—but rather the perception : " This is that Rāma who was happy[1]". Śaṅkuka himself said : "(Here) there is neither doubt, nor truth, nor error ; the notion which appears is, " This is that", not " This is really that ". What sort of an argument could disprove an experience evident in and by itself—an experience wherein, being it devoid of any contradictory idea, one cannot distinguish any error ?"

sees a mirage and, on going near it, does not find the water which he expected to find (and cannot, therefore, drink, wash himself, etc.), his perception is a mistaken one; the water which he has seen is not capable of appeasing his desires, of carrying out the functions proper to real water. In some cases, however, even the mistaken perception is endowed with causal efficiency. In the present case, for instance, it allows the observing subject to find a jewel which is real ; in other terms, it does not delude the expectations of the perceiving subjects. Even a mistake, observes Dharmakīrti, if it does not delude the perceiving subject, is a source of right knowledge. Now, if even a mistaken cognition, observes Śaṅkuka, can be gifted with causal efficiency, then it is all the more reason for a reproduced cognition, i.e., the aesthetic cognition, to be gifted with it. The spectators do not, in fact, remain deluded by this, but find in the spectacle the fulfilment of their desires.

1) Here Mammaṭa quotes and clarifies at the same time AG. "The perception we have ", he says, " takes the form : " This is Rāma ". Like the experience one has when observing a horse in a picture, the afore-mentioned perception is neither valid perception, nor error, nor doubt, nor similitude. These, indeed, take respectively the forms : "This is really Rāma", " Rāma is really this ", " This is Rāma " (being, vitiated, in a second time, by the perception : " This is not Rāma "), " Is this Rāma or not ", " This is similar to Rāma ".

Abhinavagupta, following his master Bhaṭṭa Tota, criticises the theory of reproduction, supported by Śaṅkuka.

4. This thesis too, my masters say[1], is without intrinsic value and is incapable of resisting a close criticism. Specifically, from what point of view, may we ask, was Śaṅkuka saying that Rasa has the nature of a reproduction ? 1. From the point of view of the spectators' perception, 2. or that of actor, 3. or that of the critics (*vyākhyātṛ*) who analyse the real nature (*vastuvṛtta*) (of dramatic presentation)—for it has been said that " it is in fact, the critics who analyse in this way[2]—4. or, finally, following the opinion of Bharata himself ?

1) The expression " my masters ", observes Hc., alludes to Bhaṭṭa Tota (or Tauta), who was the direct master of A.G. and, therefore, lived in Kashmir during the second half of the 10th century. Bhaṭṭa Tota wrote a work of poetry, the *Kāvyakautuka*, on which A.G. wrote a commentary (*vivaraṇa*) which has not yet been found. The confutation of Śaṅkuka, given in the following pages, goes back, therefore, to Bhaṭṭa Tota.

2) This quotation is taken from the *svavṛtti* of Dharmakīrti to the *svārthānumānaparicchedu* of the *Pramāṇavārtika* (cf. *supra*, p. 5; ed. Gnoli, p. 39) : *vyākhyātāraḥ khalv evaṃ vivecayanti na vyavahartāraḥ | te tu svālambanam evārthakriyāyogyaṃ manyamānā dṛśyavikalpyāv arthāv ekīkṛtya pravartante |* Practical life (*vyavahāra*) is based, according to Dharmakīrti, on the identification of the thing *in se* (*svalakṣaṇa*) with its mental image. The mind super-imposes (*ārop*) on the thing itself the image that it has of it and the subject believes that he is faced with reality. The difference between the thing itself, which is real, and the illusory character of the mental image which has been super-imposed upon it, is a theoretical distinction created by the ' critics ' and ' philosophers ' (*vyākhyātṛ, tattvacintaka*). In confuting this concept, A. G. asserts that it is impossible to explain a thing in the theoretical moment by an explanation which contradicts one's awareness of it in the practical moment. In other words, the spectators, while they are immersed in the Rasa aroused by the spectacle, do not know that they are faced with an imitation. The fact automatically confutes those who sustain the theory that there is an imitation. Cf. *infra*, pp. 40, 41.

1. The first alternative cannot be upheld. Reproduction, indeed, can be said to be only something perceived by a means of cognition[1], as, for example, in the case of a person drinking some milk (this action being directly perceived by the spectators), and saying "Thus did so-and-so drink the wine". In this case, the action of milk-drinking reproduces the action of wine-drinking. But here what is it that is perceived in the actor, which might seem to be a reproduction of some feeling, as, for instance, delight? This is the problem. His body, the headwear that crowns it, his horripilations, his faltering words, the raising of his arms, the waving of them, his frowns, his expressive glances, etc., certainly cannot be regarded by anyone as the reproduction of delight, which is a feeling. They, indeed, being insentient[2], being perceived by different organs of sense[3], and having different substrata[4] are thus as unlike feelings as it is possible to imagine. Consciousness of a reproduction presupposes, furthermore, perception both of the original and of the copy; but none of the spectators has ever in his life perceived the delight of the hero, say, Rāma. So the possibility that the actor is reproducing Rāma is excluded.

"But (someone might say) what is called erotic Rasa, the reproduction of delight, is simply the feeling of the actor, which, as perceived by the spectators, appears to them in this very

1) The explanation is given a few lines below.

2) I. e. they are not of a mental or spiritual nature.

3) Mental movements are perceived by the internal sense, *manaḥ*, mind. All the acts, etc. listed, however, are perceived by the external senses such as sight, etc.

4) The body, etc. The mental states are based on the mind. M. C., p. 69, comments : *tathā hi naṭavapurādīnāṃ jaḍatvaṃ cakṣurgrāhyatvam, rater ajaḍatvam manogrāhyatvam ca | pratiśīrṣakādīnāṃ vapur adhikaraṇam, rates tu mano 'dhikaraṇam iti |*

form". To this opinion, however, we object : Of what, when perceived, does this feeling appear to consist ? This is the problem. It may be urged that the actor's feeling appears to the spectators to consist of just those characteristic signs (causes, such as women, etc., effects, such as expressive glances, etc., concomitant elements, such as contentment, etc.) which serve to render perceptible an ordinary feeling. But lo (we reply), if this were the case, the feeling of the actor would be perceived simply in the form of delight[1], so that for your idea of a reproduction of delight there would be no more place. "But (you can perhaps urge) the determinants, etc., are real in the reproduced characters and here, in the actors, unreal". True. But, even if these determinants, etc., are not the real causes, effects, and concomitant elements of the feeling of the actor, even if, that is to say, they are fashioned solely by the power of the poem, the skill of the actor, etc., and are thus artificial, are they so perceived by the specators or are they perceived as real ? And, if they are perceived as artificial, how would it be possible, through them, to perceive the feeling of delight ? If you say that for this very reason what is perceived is not delight but the reproduction of delight, this answer, we reply, could only be made by a man of dull wits[2].

1) I.e., there would be a perception of ordinary nature, not aesthetic cognition.

2) Bhaṭṭa Tota's reply (set out in the following lines) may be summarized : Assuming that the Determinants, etc., are perceived as unreal or artificial (*kṛtrima*), they cannot legitimize the inference of either Delight or an imitation of Delight. From a mistaken or apparent logical reason (e. g., a cone-shaped cloud mistaken for a pillar of smoke; the cone-shaped cloud does not stand in any cause-effect relation to fire, and is thus a mistaken logical reason) we cannot infer fire (in this case, mistaken cognition would occur) nor, still less, anything imitating fire (e. g., as A.G. says, a

For a thing different from the usual one can be inferred from more apparently similar effects, only if the effect, from which it is inferred is really derived from a different cause and is recognized as such by a person of experience. An inexperienced person can infer from them the usual cause only. From some particular scorpions, for instance, it is legitimate to infer that their cause is cow dung ; and the inference, from them, of another scorpion, as their cause, would be nothing but a false cognition. But, when the cognition of the logical reason—e.g., smoke—is erroneous, the inference based on this apparent logical reason will itself be invalid. The inference from mist (whether it be supposed by the observer to be smoke, or whether the latter is aware of its being only a reproduction of the true logical reason) of something which is a reproduction of fire, is, no doubt, unsound. Indeed, a veil of mist—something which reproduces smoke and is recognized as a reproduction—does not legitimate the inference of a heap of red roses, namely something that reproduces fire.

heap of red roses). A person of experience can undoubtedly infer from two things, which to the laymen are apparently the same, the respective causes of each of them (example : the scorpions. According to tradition there are two kinds of scorpions, one kind being born from other scorpions and the other kind from dung) ; but in the present case the logical reason is nevertheless mistaken or apparent (the determinants, etc., are perceived as *kṛtrima*) and as such an effect is neither of delight nor of an imitation of delight. Thus, for a person of experience the inference of something which imitates delight is impossible. The inference of delight made by an inexperienced person is a form of mistaken cognition. Hc. explains : *ayaṃ bhāvaḥ prasiddhād ratilakṣaṇāt kāraṇād ratyanukaraṇaṃ nāma kāraṇāntaraṃ tatprabhavās ced anubhāvāḥ syuḥ | tathaiva ca viśeṣavidā yadi jñāyeran tadā ratyanukaraṇalakṣaṇasya vastvantarasyānumānaṃ samañjasaṃ syāt | na caivam, tat katham iva ratyanukaraṇapratītiḥ | aviśeṣavidā ca tathāvidhānubhāvadarśane ratir evānumīyate tac ca mithyājñānaṃ eveti |*

" Even if the actor (it may be urged) is not himself enraged, still he seems so ". True enough, we answer, he is like someone who is enraged. But this resemblance is due to a contraction of the eyebrows, etc.—in the same way, that is, that the resemblance between a real ox and another ox-like species is due to the shape of the muzzle and so on, without that, by this, any reproduction be involved. Again, the spectators are not conscious of this resemblance; the perception of the spectators, while they perceive the actor—it is said—is not without the mental state which he appears to have[1]. Therefore, the thesis according to which what appears is a reproduction is a vain discourse only[2].

Further, to say that the audience has the perception : " That is Rāma ", is not correct. For if this perception, devoid of every doubt during the play is not stultified later by some subsequent cognition which invalidates it (*bādhaka*), why is it not a true cognition[3] ? And, if it is stultified, why is it not a false cognition ? In fact, however, even if no invalidating cognition does appear, it will be always a form of false cognition[4]. Thus, Śaṅkuka's contention, namely, that this is " an experience wherein, being it devoid of any contradictory

1) In other words the spectators are not aware of a resemblance between the actor and the character he represents, but only of the fact that the actor is immersed in a certain state of consciousness shared also by them.

2) M. C., p. 71 replaces " *iti riktā vācoyuktiḥ* " by " *iti svavacanavirodhaḥ.*"

3) M. C., p. 71 simplifies : *yác coktam rāmo 'yam ity asti pratītiḥ, tatrāpi yadi na bādhakodayaḥ tat kathaṃ na samyagjñānam, bādhakodayaś cet kathaṃ na mithyā.* ||

4) According to Śaṅkuka the aesthetic experience consists of an imitation ; therefore, he maintains implicitly that it is unreal.

idea, one cannot distinguish any error", is untrue[1]. Furthermore this same perception, namely "This is Rāma" is had in other actors also and hence of Rāma we have only his universal aspect[2]. Nor can his other assertion, "The determinants can be recognised through the power of poetry", be successfully explained. Indeed, the actor does not have the perception, "Sītā is the woman I love", as if, that is to say, Sītā were a part of his own real life[3]. If it is replied that this is the meaning of the word realization, i.e., that this is how the determinants are made perceptible to the spectators, then we answer that there ought more reasonably to be, instead, a realization of the permanent state. Indeed, the perception of the spectators is concerned, in a primary sense, principally with this and is presented in the form: "That man (is) in this (feeling)". The pompous analysis of the nature of representation made by Śaṅkuka by the expression, "Word. . .verbal representation", etc.,—where he emphasizes the diversity [both of verbal representation and of the simple verbal expression]—will be discussed later at the appropriate time and place[4]. Therefore, it is wrong to say that from the point of view of the spectators, Rasa is a reproduction of the permanent mental state.

2. Nor again does the actor have this notion, "I am reproducing Rāma or his feeling". For a reproduction, that

1) Cf. *supra*, p. 32.

2) See Sankaran, op. cit., p. 101 : "and hence the conception of Rāma is only in his universal aspect of a great hero".

3) The actor does not identify or unite the determinants taken from the poem with the things which are "causes" in his own real life. In other words, he does not have the perception that they form part of his real life.

4) Ch. IX of the *N. Ś.*, in which A.G. discussed it, has unfortunately not yet come to light. Cf. also *N. Ś.*, chp. XIV.

is, a production of actions similar (*sadṛśakaraṇam*) to those of someone whose nature we have never perceived[1], is not possible. And if you say that the meaning of the term reproduction is after-production (*paścātkaraṇam*), such reproduction, we reply, would extend to ordinary life also[2]. It may be said, perhaps, that the actor does not reproduce a particular being (*niyata*), and that he has only this notion, " I am reproducing the sorrow of some noble person (*uttamaprakṛti*). But then, we reply, by what is this reproduction performed ? This is the problem. Certainly not by sorrow, since this is absent in the actor. It is undoubtedly not done by tears, etc., for these, as has already been said, are of a nature other than that of sorrow[3]. Well, it may be replied, then let us say that, in the actor, the following perception occurs : " I am reproducing the consequents of the sorrow of a noble person ". But in this case again, we observe, which noble person ? If you say " any noble person, no matter which ", then we reply that no person can be brought into the mind without a definite idea (*viśiṣṭatām vinā*)[4]. If, on other hand, you say that the actor is reproducing a person who should have wept in the manner he does, then his personality (*svātmā*) also intervenes, so that the relation of reproduced-reproducing no longer exists.[5] Besides, the actor

1) It has not been perceived before. Every imitation presupposes a previous perception.

2) In other words, if imitation is felt in this way, there is an imitation every time someone does something which has already been done by someone else.

3) Cf. *supra*, p. 34.

4) Cf. infra, App. I, p. 95.

5) M.C., p. 71 paraphrases : *ya evaṃ roditīti* **cet,** *tarhi svātmānam api naṭo 'nukarotīty āyātam tasyāpi rodanasadbhārād iti galito 'nukāryānukartṛbhāraḥ* || " If, they say, there is the notion ' he who weeps thus ', then, we reply, we must assume that the actor is reproducing himself as well (for the actor

has no consciousness of carrying out a reproduction. The actor's performance, indeed, takes place only through three causes : his skill in art, his memory of his own determinants, and the consent of his heart, aroused by the state of generality of the feelings; and in virtue of this, he displays the corresponding consequents and reads the poem with suitable accompanying intonations (*kāku*) of voice. Accordingly, he is conscious of this only and not of reproducing someone. Indeed, reproduction of the deeds of Rāma is different from reproduction of the attire of the beloved being[1]. But all this we explained before in the first chapter[2].

3. Not can it be said that there is a reproduction from the point of view of the nature of things (*vastuvṛtta*); for it is impossible that a thing of which one is not conscious, has a real nature[3] . We shall explain further in what the nature of things consists[4].

4. Nor did Bharata ever say in any passage : " Rasa is the reproduction of a permanent mental state ". Such an assertion was never made by him even indirectly by means of an indication. On the contrary, the various sub-divisions of women's dance (*lāsya*), the various musical tempi (*tāla*) and the

himself would have to be really grieving). Thus the reproduced-reproducing relation would no longer hold ".

1) Cf. *A. Bh.*, p. 37 A person in love, according to the Indian rhetors, is sometimes impelled to imitate or repeat every gesture and attitude, etc., of his beloved. The aesthetic act has nothing to do with this imitation. Hc., p. 424 : *vāgveṣaceṣṭitaiḥ priyasyānukṛtir līlā.*

2) *A. Bh.*, ch. I, p. 37.

3) I.e., from the point of view of the analysing mind. Cf. *I. P. V.*, II, p. 179 : *saṃvedanatiraskāriṇī kā khalu yuktir nāma anupapattiś ca bhāsamānasya kānyā bhaviṣyati.*

4) In the statement of his own thesis.

dhruvā songs described by Bharata are an indication of precisely the opposite[1]. All this will be explained later at the end of the chapter on the sub-divisions of the junctures (*saṃdhyaṅga*)[2]. The expression met with in Bharata every now and again, " Drama is an imitation (of all the forms of existence in) the seven islands ", etc., can have also other explanations[3]. And, if even that was a reproduction, then what would be the difference between it and the reproduction of the attire, the walk, etc., of the beloved one[4] ?

Other theories

5. Some people say : " The pigments—orpiment, etc.—undoubtedly compose (*saṃyuj*) a cow[5] ". Now if the word " compose " is understood in the sense of " manifest (*abhivyaj*)", these people are also in error. For we cannot say that minium, etc., manifest a real (*pāramārthika*) cow like the one which might be manifested by a lamp, etc. All they do is to produce

1) They do not imitate anything in ordinary life.

2) *N. Ś.*, XIX. *Daśarūpa*, Haas, 11 : " The Junctures are the structural divisions of the drama, which correspond to the elements of the plot and the stages in the hero's realization of his purpose ". The Junctures are divided into sixty-four sub-divisions (*aṅga*). Cf. *Ind. Th.*, p. 140, etc.

3) *N. Ś.*, I, v. 120 : *saptadvīpānukaraṇaṃ nāṭyam etad bhaviṣyati* |. In other words, drama can be an " imitation " of all the forms of existence in the world (the expression " the seven islands ", refers to the world with its oceans, continents, etc.,; cf. *A.Bh.*, I, p. 42 : *saptadvīpabhāvānukaraṇa-rūpe nāṭye. . .*). The term 'imitation' must be interpreted as a " re-telling " (*anukīrtana*) and therefore as a " re-perception " (*anuvyavasāya*).

4) Text and translation both doubtful.

5) A cow painted by a painter is considered concretely as a composition of different colours mixed together and applied to a given surface.

(*nirvṛt*) a particular aggregate (*samūha*) similar to a cow. The only object of the image, "It is like a cow", is simply this minium, etc., applied so as to constitute a particular arrangement (*saṃniveśa*) similar to the arrangement of the limbs of a cow. In the case of the aggregate of the determinants, etc., the situation is different : this—as we have said—cannot be perceived as similar to delight[1]. Thus, it is not true that Rasa is the reproduction of mental states.

Again, other people say[2] :— Rasa, which is made up of pleasure and pain, is nothing but an external combination (*sāmagrī*) of various elements[3]—a combination possessing the power of generating pleasure and pain. This thesis agrees with Sāṃkhya's doctrine[4]. In this combination, the determinants take the place of petals; and the consequents and the transitory mental states do duty for that which garnishes it. Out of it, again, are born the permanent mental states. These,

1) The visual arts are regarded in this passage as being of a different order from poetry : the pigments, etc., are material things which imitate a material thing. Very well then, says A.G. ; all the same, it is impossible that the poetic expression (consisting of determinants, etc., i.e., of material elements) could imitate a mental movement, which is of a spiritual nature.

2) The followers of this view (their names are unknown to us) based themselves, according to A. G. (*A.Bh.*, p. 312) on a wrong interpretation of one stanza of Bharata (VI, 46).

3) The determinants, etc., are external (i.e., they are not psychic states). The elements in question are the determinants, the consequents, and the transitory states ; the latter are also regarded as external in the present passage.

4) According to the Sāṃkhya, external objects are a modification of *prakṛti*, which is made up of pleasure, pain and stupor. The external objects are, thus, also themselves made up of pleasure, pain, etc. This conception is emphatically confuted by Dharmakīrti, *P. V.*, II, 268 ff.

made up of pleasure and pain, are internal. The supporters of this thesis maintain that expressions such as, "We shall bring to the state of Rasa the permanent mental states," etc., must be understood metaphorically, i.e., they are themselves aware that they are in flagrant contradiction with Bharata's text. Thus the student is preserved from falling into error by the fact that the mere statement of this thesis displays garrulously *ex ore suo* its unsoundness[1]. What use is there in replying to such people ? Let us rather state the essential points of the other hypothesis, etc., arising out of this difficult problem, i.e., what is the nature of aesthetic perception.

The view of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka

6. Again, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka says :—Rasa is neither perceived (*pratī*), nor produced (*utpad*), nor manifested (*abhivyaj*). For if it were perceived by the spectator as really present in himself, in the pathetic Rasa he would necessarily experience pain[2]. Again, such a perception does not stand to reason, because Sītā, etc., does not play the role of a determinant [as regards the spectator][3] ; because no memory of his own beloved one does arise in the spectator's consciousness (while he looks at Sītā)[4]; because [the representation of] deities, etc., cannot

1) According to this theory there is no longer any difference between Rasas and permanent mental states. Its supporters are therefore forced to give a metaphorical interpretation to all the passages in which Bharata distinguishes Rasas from permanent mental states.

2) Thus no one would go to see plays on pathetic, etc., subjects any more.

3) The spectators are not Rāma, etc., so that it is impossible to suppose that the fortunes of Sītā can play the role of determinant in their case.

4) At the same time, there is no identification of the image of Sītā with that of his own beloved.

logically arouse (in the spectator) the state of generality (*sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*) [required for the aesthetic experience][1]; because ocean-crossings, etc., [are extraordinary undertakings, and thus] fall short of generality (*sādhāraṇya*)[2]. Not it can be said that what occurs is simply the memory of Rāma, as endowed of such-and-such quality[3], in so far as the spectator has had no such previous experience. Moreover, even if it is supposed that he is perceived through verbal testimony (*śabda*), inference (*anumāna*), etc., logically there cannot be any occurrence of Rasa in the audience—just as it is not aroused by a thing perceived through direct knowledge[4]. For on the appearance of a pair of lovers united together, the mind of anyone present rather becomes the prey of conflicting feelings (shame, disgust, envy, and so on); and we surely cannot say that the onlooker in such a scene is in a state of Rasa! If, on the other hand, it is supposed that Rasa is perceived as present in a third party, the spectator should be in a state of indifference. Therefore, it is not possible to suppose that Rasa can be perceived—whether this perception be a form of direct experience or of memory. The same errors may be imputed to the thesis which maintains that Rasa is produced. If it is supposed that Rasa first preexists in a potential form (*śaktirūpatvena*) and is later manifested, then the determinants must necessarily

1) In this passage Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka maintains that when the determinants etc., are deities, etc., they cannot be perceived as 'general'; the deeds of gods are too different (from human affairs)

2) Supra, Intr., pp. XXI, XXII. This assertion is confuted by A.G., *infra*, p. 58.

3) Heroism, etc.

4) In other words, if Rasa could arise from a simple inference, all the more should it arise from a direct perception.

illuminate it little by little.[1] Besides, the difficulties already encountered would recur: is Rasa manifested as really present in our own self or as present in a third party? Therefore, (our thesis is as follows :) Rasa is revealed (*bhāvyamāna*) by a special power assumed by words in poetry and drama, the power of revelation (*bhāvanā*)—to be distinguished from power of denotation (*abhidhā*)—consisting of the action of generalizing the determinants, etc. This power has the faculty of suppressing the thick layer of mental stupor (*moha*) occupying our own consciousness: in poetry it is characterized by the absence of defects (*doṣa*) and the presence of qualities (*guṇa*) and ornaments (*alaṃkāra*)[2]; in drama by the four kinds of representation. Rasa, revealed by this power, is then enjoyed (*bhuj*) with a kind

1) This objection repeats, *mutatis mutandis*, the objection of the Buddhists and of the *mīmāṃsaka* against the concept of *sphoṭa*, which, according to the grammarians (*vaiyākaraṇa*), is a vocality, eternal and without parts, distinct from the letters and manifested (*vyaj*) by these. This eternal vocality causes the cognition of the meaning. This objection is as follows : is *sphoṭa* manifested entirely by the first letter of a word or not? *a*) If *sphoṭa* is manifested in its entirety, the letters which come after are unnecessary. In other words, the first letter would be capable of rendering perceptible the meaning of the whole world. *b*) If *sphoṭa* is manifested gradually, then it could no longer be without parts. This second alternative is, therefore, in contradiction to the very nature of *sphoṭa*. The same reasoning is applied by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka to Rasa and to the words by which it is manifested.

This gradual manifestation of the Rasa has also been criticized by Śaṅkuka, cf. *supra*, p. 28.

2) One classical definition of poetry (Hc., p. 33) says : *adoṣau saguṇau sālaṃkārau ca śabdārthau kāvyam* || "Poetry is word and content without defects, possessing qualities and also (but not necessarily) ornaments".

of enjoyment (*bhoga*), different from direct experience, memory, etc. This enjoyment, by virtue of the different forms of contact between *sattva* and *rajaḥ* and *tamaḥ*,[1] is consisting of the

1 *a*) The light of the self, of the consciousness, does not reveal itself, in the *sāṃsārika* existence, in immaculate purity, but is conditioned by the three constituent elements (*guṇa*) of mental substance (*buddhi*), *sattva*, light, luminous and pleasant, *rajaḥ*, mobile, dynamic and painful, *tamaḥ*, inert, obstructive and stupid. These three constituent elements are never present in isolation, but mingled together in unequal proportions. The state of emergence of the element *sattva*, limpid and mirror-like, coincides with a manifestation, always more distinct and evident, of the light and beatitude proper to the Self—these indeed reflect themselves in *sattva*. *I.P.V.V.*, I, p. 150 : *sattvaṃ prakāśarūpaṃ nirmalanabhaḥprakhyaṃ sarvato jaladapaṭalena iva vāraṇātmanā tamasā samāvṛtam āste* | *tatra ca mārutasthānīyaṃ pravṛttisvabhāvaṃ rajaḥ kriyātmakatayā krameṇa tamojaladam apasārayati nyagbhāvayati* || "*Sattva*, which is made up of light and is like the immaculate ether, is completely enshrouded by *tamaḥ*, the principle of obstruction, as by a blanket of cloud, *Rajaḥ*, which is made up of action and is, therefore, imbued with activity, serves as a wind, which, little by little, brushes away, dissipates, the cloud-bank of *tamaḥ*". The three constituent elements, *sattva*, *rajaḥ* and *tamaḥ* are associated with three states of consciousness called, respectively, expansion (*vikāsa*), provoked by an absolute predominance of *sattva*, fluidity (*druti*), determined by a contact of *sattva* with *rajaḥ*, and dilatation (*vistara*) determined by a contact of *sattva* with *tamaḥ*.

The conception of the three *guṇas*, belonging, in particular, to the *sāṃkhya* and *yoga* systems, is accepted, without notable modifications, by the whole of Indian thought.

b) *Druti*, *vistara*, and *vikāsa* are each connected with certain Rasas by later Indian theorists. *Druti* is the proper state of consciousness of *śṛṅgāra*, *karuṇa* and *śānta* ; *vistara* of *vīra*, *raudra* and *bībhatsa* ; *vikāsa*, of *hāsya*, *adbhuta* and *bhayānaka*. Cf. *Dh. Ā.L.*, comm., p. 206. *Rajaḥ* predominates in *druti*, *tamaḥ* in *vistara* and *sattva* in *vikāsa*. M.C., p. 74 : *yadā hi rajaso guṇasya drutiḥ tamaso vistaraḥ sattvasyātivikāsaḥ tadānīṃ bhogaḥ svarūpaṃ labhate*| " It is when *rajaḥ* is in fluidity, *tamaḥ* in dilatation, and *sattva* in full expansion that fruition is realized ".

states of fluidity (*druti*) enlargement (*vistara*) and expansion (*vikāsa*), is characterized by a resting (*viśrānti*) on one's own consciousness (*saṃvit*), which due to the emergent state of *sattva*, is pervaded by beatitude (*ānanda*) and light (*prakāśa*)[1],

1 *a*) The expression *sattvodreka* is reproduced almost without change by Mammaṭa, p. 74 : *sattvodrekaprakāśānandamayasaṃvidviśrāntisatattvena*. It has been commented upon in several ways. I have followed, in the translation, the commentary of Vidyācakravartin (*K. P.*, Trivandrum Sankrit Series, LXXXVII) : *sattvodrekāt yau prakāśānandau tanmayyāṃ saṃvidi samādhivṛttirūpāyāṃ yā yogināṃ viśrāntir vigalitasakalaśramā nistaraṅgeṇāvasthitis tatsadṛśena.* M. C., p. 74, comments on : *sattvodrekeṇa prakāśaḥ prakaṭo ya ānandas tanmayī yā saṃvit tasyāṃ viśrāntiḥ, sā satattvaṃ paramārtho yasya sa tathā.* Referring to Rasa A.G. says in *Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 183, that it is *rajastamovaicitryānuviddhasattvamayanijacitsvabhāvanirvṛtiviśrāntilakṣaṇaḥ.* The famous definition of the aesthetic experience given by Viśvanātha in his *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, adds nothing to the conception of A.G. and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka. Viśvanātha says :

sattvodrekād akhaṇḍasvaprakāśānandacinmayaḥ |
vedyāntarasparśaśūnyo brahmāsvādasahodaraḥ ||
lokottaracamatkāraprāṇaḥ kaiścit pramātṛbhiḥ |
svākāravad abhinnatvenāyam āsvādyate rasaḥ ||

" Rasa is tasted by the qualified persons (i.e., *qui rationem artis intelligunt*). It is tasted by virtue of the emergence of *sattva*. It is made up of a full Intelligence, Beatitude and Self-Luminosity. It is void of contact with any other knowable thing, twin brother to the tasting of *brahman*. It is animated by a *camatkāra* of a non-ordinary nature. It is tasted as if it were our very being, in indivisibility ". Cf. the translation of A. K. Coomaraswamy, *The Transformation of Nature in Art*, Harvard, 1934, pp.48ff. Coomaraswamy translates *camatkāra* with "lighting-flash ". According to Viśvanātha, *sattva* is nothing but the mind or inner sense (*manaḥ*) devoid of any contact with *rajaḥ* and *tamaḥ*.

b) The terminology used by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and referred to by A.G. is exactly analogous to that used by Bhoja, in his definition of the *sānandasamādhi* : *yadā tu rajastamoleśānuviddhaṃ antaḥkaraṇasattvaṃ bhāvyate tadā guṇabhāvāc citiśakteḥ śubhaprakāśamayasya sattvasya bhāvyamānasyodrekāt sānan-*

and is similar to the tasting (*āsvāda*) of the supreme *brahman*[1].

daḥ samādhir bhavet || (*Bhojavṛtti*, I, 17). " When the matter of concentration (*bhāvanā* is commented on by Bhoja *bhāvanā bhāvyasya viṣayāntaraparihāreṇa cetasi punaḥ punar niveśanam*) is the *sattva* tinged by *the rajaḥ* and *tamaḥ* proper to the inner sense, then by virtue both of the subordinate state of the self, and of the emergence of *sattva*, which is made up of bliss and light and is the matter of concentration, that which is called *sānandasamādhi* occurs ". This passage is also quoted by Pandey, *I. Aes.*, p. 189.

1) Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka was perhaps the first to associate aesthetic experience with mystical experience. The aesthetic state of consciousness is no longer associated with the limited " I " ; during the aesthetic experience the subject is completely absorbed in the object contemplated, and the whole of the reality which surrounds him disappears from his view. The same thing, *mutatis mutandis* occurs in mystical experience ; in this sense, aesthetic experience is similar (*savidha, sabrahmacārin, sahodara*) to experience of the Absolute or of the *brahman*. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and A. G. (A. G. also accepts Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's opinion ; *Dh. Ā.L.*, p. 190 : *parabrahmāsvādasabrahmacāritvaṃ cāstav asya rasāsvādasya*), however, do not fail to emphasize the unmistakable characteristics of each. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka says (*Dh. Ā.L.* p. 91) :

vāgdhenur dugdha etaṃ hi rasaṃ yad balatṛṣṇayā |
tena nāsya samaḥ sa syād duhyate yogibhir hi yaḥ |

" This Rasa (aesthetic pleasure) is poured forth spontaneously by the word which is like a cow, for love of her children ; for this reason it is different from that which is (laboriously) milked by yogins ". Cf. also *A.Bh.*, p. 5. On the opinion of A.G., *infra*. pp. 82-84. Two stanzas which reflect the same idea and which are certainly from Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, are quoted by Mahimabhaṭṭa (*Vyaktiviveka*), p. 94 (see the translation in the Introd. p. XXVI) :

pāṭhyād atha dhruvāgānāt tataḥ saṃpūrite rase |
tadāsvādabharaikāgro hṛṣyaty antarmukhaḥ kṣaṇam ||
tato nirviṣayasyāsya svarūpāvasthitau nijaḥ |
vyajyate hlādaniṣyando yena tṛpyanti yoginaḥ ||

The association between these two states also appears in the affinities of the terms which designate them : *viśrānti, nirvṛti, laya, nirveśa, samāpatti, camatkāra*, etc.,

In this exposition, the thesis confuted by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka are accepted even by us—simply because we do not accept the thesis of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa. Thus the errors confuted by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka have been defiinitely put to death.[1]

As for the rest we do not see what kind of enjoyment distinguishable from perception, etc., can exist in the world. If, as you say it is tasting (*rasanā*), we reply that this too is a perception[2], and is only called by another name on account of the particular means (*upāya*)[3] by which it is called into existence. The same thing happens in the case of direct perception (*darśana*), reasoning (*anumāna*), the revealed word (*śruti*), analogy (*upamiti*), intuition, (*pratibhāna*),[4] etc., each of which takes a different name. Besides, if we do not admit that Rasa is produced or manifested, we shall be forced to conclude that it is either eternal or non-existent : no third possibility exists. Again, the existence of an unperceived thing cannot be affirmed. The supporters of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka will perhaps reply that the perception of Rasa is just what they call the power of

1) Cf. *Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 187. The thesis confuted by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka do not admit the concept of generality; they distinguish between one's own perception and somebody else's. Cf. *supra*, introd., pp. XX ff.

2) See below, App. III, p. 112.

3) The determinants, etc.

4) The term *pratibhā, pratibhāna*, is used in several senses (cf. Intr., pp. XLVIII ff. In the present passage, it has the sense of " an inexplicable intuition as to what may occur in the future, for example, 'Tomorrow my brother will come ". It also includes the power of understanding all kinds of sounds without effort, all that may be communicated by any animal in the world and also the power of having heavenly visions " (Dasgupta, *H.I. Ph.*, V, 127). This particular form of consciousness is discussed by Jayanta, *Nyāyamañjarī* (Benares 1936), pp. 97 ff.

bringing about enjoyment (*bhogīkaraṇa*)[1]—consisting in the states of fluidity, etc. Very well, then! But it is impossible that it should consist solely in these three states. For there exist just as many forms of perception—whose nature, according to you, lies in this very power of bringing about fruition—consisting of a relish, as there are kinds of Rasa. Besides, the constituent elements, *sattva*, etc., can be found set out in an infinite number of different ways: one may predominate at one time and another at another. Thus it is absurd to limit the forms of relish to only three.

However, if the word "revelation" in the expression "the Rasas are revealed by the poem" (what Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka says is: "The various Rasas—the erotic, etc., are revealed by the power of revelation"), is used in the sense that the poem becomes the matter of a perception, which consists of a tasting made up of gustation, and which is generated by the determinants, etc., it may be accepted without any question.

Again, in the stanza, "Rasa is, it is said, the aim of poetry (*kāvyārtha*)[2] it is an experience (*anubhava*) consisting of a tasting

1) If, says A. G., the expression "enjoyment" is understood in the sense of perception (so that the power of generating enjoyment becomes the power of generating the aesthetic perception, the Tasting), it may certainly be accepted. In this sense, the power of generating enjoyment becomes the same as that which followers of the *dhvani* school call the power of evocation (*dhvananavyāpāra*). Cf. *infra*, App. III, p. 113.

2 *a*) The expression *kāvyārtha* is borrowed from Bharata, *N. Ś.*, VII, p. 342: *kāvyārthān bhāvayantīti bhāvāḥ*". [The mental states] are called *bhāva* because they bring into existence (*bhāv*) the aims of the poem". *Artha*, A.G. comments (*A.Bh.*, p. 344), in this expression does not carry the meaning of sense, something expressed (*abhidheya*) but means the final cause, the aim of the poem (*arthyante prādhānyenety arthāḥ na tv arthaśabdo 'bhidheyavācī*); in other words, Rasa.

and is the matter of cognition by a not ordinary form of consciousness (*parasaṃvitti*), manifested (*vyaṅgya*) by the union of the determinants, etc.," Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka apparently considers Rasa as manifested—so that the theory of manifestation is rather maintained than discarded[1]. By the word " experience " we must really understand the object of it[2].

But, being it so, what is then the true nature of Rasa ? That is enough ! Well, what shall we do[3] ?

Four stanzas of intermezzo

7) Why repeat truths disclosed already in the thought of our predecessor and thus behave as no one has behaved before ? This double, serious and evident error will certainly be imputed to me by the audience.

Tireless, the mind of man climbs ever higher to gaze on truth. Behold ! This is just the fruit of the doctrines which have succeeded each other on the ladder of thought.

In the beginning, the crossing of the river of the knowable is, I know, agitated and supportless: but as we advance

h) Aesthetic experience is associated with the experience of *brahman*, with the supreme consciousness, cf. supra p. XXIV.

1) The existence of *dhvani* is explicitly denied by *Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka* (cf. the passage quoted by Jacobi, ZDMG, 62, p. 296, Pandey, p. 246 ff.). In some passages, A.G. points out, he seems, nevertheless, to admit its existence implicitly. In this stanza, *Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka* uses, for example, the verb *vyaj* and therefore admits implicitly the theory of *dhvani*, the sense manifested i.e., not expressed, that words assume in poetry.

2) That is to say, that Rasa is the object of the afore-mentioned experience.

3) At this point A. G. interrupts his examination of rejected doctrines with the four following stanzas, which serve as a sort of prelude to the exposition of his own thesis.

doggedly along this road, we cease to be amazed by built bridges, city foundations, or anything else.

A rich and fruitful harvest may be culled by posterity from the inheritance of thought left to it by its predecessors. Thus the doctrines of the sages of antiquity will only be refined by us here and not refuted.

The correct view

8. Let us then state what is the true nature of Rasa purified of previous mistakes. It has already been stated by Bharata, and we shall add nothing new. For he has said : " The mental states are called feelings because they make us feel the aims of poetry "[1]. Therefore, Rasa is simply the aim of poetry. For instance, immediately after the first perception of the literal sense of the following expressions, " They lay by night ", " He gave it (*scil.*, the omentum) to the fire[2]" there occurs (in a qualified person (*adhikārin*) characterized by a certain pragmatic requirement (*arthitā*) and so on, and possessed of a keen interest in the object of perception involved) a second perception eliminating the temporal data, etc., contained in the first.[3] This second perception consists in a transfer (*saṃkramaṇā*), etc., of the literal sense and is presented in the form: " I will lay," " I will give ", etc. According to the various schools, this perception is called propulsion (*bhāvanā*), command (*vidhi*), order (*niyoga*), etc[4]. Now, a similar thing may be said

1) See the literal translation of this quotation at p. 50, n. 2 *a*.

2) Two quotations taken from revelation (*śruti*).

3) The past tense of the two expressions in question.

4) In other words, some scriptural sentences (e. g., thôse quoted) awaken in the believer the need to give the omentum to the fire himself,

to happen in the case of poetry : there occurs in a qualified person a perception transcending the words of the poem. The qualified person is in this case any person whose heart possesses a spotless power of intuition (*pratibhāna*). In such

etc. In this sense, their literal meaning undergoes a transformation : the past tense and the third person, etc., used in these sentences are turned into the present tense, etc. There arises in the heart of the believer the form of consciousness (*pratipatti*), "I will give the omentum to the fire", etc. This passing from one sense to another is given the names of propulsion (*bhāvanā*), order and command (*vidhi*, *niyoga*). The terms *bhāvanā*, *vidhi*, and *niyoga* are proper to the liturgical speculations of *mīmāṃsā* (the term *bhāvāna* used by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka was probably taken from the terminology of the *pūrvamīmāṃsā*). The terms *vidhi* and *niyoga*, observes J., *T.Ā.*, I, p. 167, are used above all by the followers of Prabhākara ; Kumārila's disciples prefer instead the word *bhāvanā*. The shift of sense involved, of course, presupposes the adherence of the subject to the sacred writings, his desire to attain certain ends, etc. This shift of sense is clearly explained in three *ślokas* quoted by H. C., p. 98 (no doubt taken from a work on poetics existing prior to A. G., perhaps the *Hṛdayadarpaṇa* of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka) :

ārogyam āptavān śāmbaḥ stutvā devam aharpatim |
syād arthāvagatiḥ pūrvam ityādivacane yathā ||
tataś copāttakālādinyakkāreṇopajāyate |
pratipattur manasy evam pratipattir na saṃśayaḥ ||
yaḥ ko 'pi bhāskaraṃ stauti sa sarvo'py agado bhavet |
tasmād aham api staumi roganirmuktaye ravim ||

"In the sentence 'Śāmba regained his health when he praised the Sun God', etc. there occurs at first the perception of its literal sense, and then (and on this there is no matter of doubt) there arises in the mind of the perceiving subject a perception which eliminates the temporal data, etc., assumed by the sentence in question. This perception is presented in the following form : "Everyone who praises the Sun regains his health ; so I too will praise the Sun, so as to free myself from disease". Cf. *I.P.V.V.*, I, p. 24 ; *I.P.V.*, I, p. 27.

a person hearing the following phrases, " There he (*scil.*, the deer) is now, gracefully by the bending of his neck...[1], " Even Umā, dropping the golden *karṇikāra*...[2], " The firmness of Hara...[3], there appears, immediately after the perception of their literal sense, a perception of a different order (an inner [*mānasī*] perception, consisting in a direct experience [*sākṣātkāra*[4]] which completely eliminates the temporal dis-

1) Kālidāsa, *Abhijñānaśakuntalā*, I, 2 : " There he (*scil.* the deer) is now, gracefully by the bending of his neck casting a glance ever and anon at the chariot which pursues him, by [the contraction of] the hinder half (of his body) repeatedly drawing himself into the fore [part of his] body through fear of the descent of the arrow; strewing the road with grass half-chewed which drops from his mouth kept open from exhaustion. See ! by reason of his lofty boundings he goes chiefly in the air, and little on the ground " (Monier Williams, *Śakuntalā*, Hertford, 1853, p. 9).

2) Kālidāsa, *Kumārasaṃbhava*, III, 62 : " Even Umā, dropping the golden *karṇikāra* flowers which glowed among her black tresses, deeply bowed her head (while the flowers which adorned them fell from her ears) before Śiva ".

3) Op. cit., III, 67 : " The firmness of Hara, even, was somewhat shaken—like the sea when the moon is just about to rise; he cast his eyes in desire towards the face of Umā, towards her lips, red as the fruit of the *bimba* ".

4) Like to sensations of pleasure, pain, etc., the aesthetic experience is an inner or mental perception (*mānasapratyakṣa*), i.e., it is perceived through the mind or inner sense. Such a perception is self-knowing (*svasaṃvedanasiddha*). In the *A.Bh.*, p. 291, A. G. observes that the fact of tasting (*āsvādana* ; aesthetic perception being conceived as a particular form of tasting) is of a mental order : it differs from the fact of eating, which is a purely material act (*rasanavyāpārād bhojanād adhiko yo mānaso vyāpāraḥ sa evāsvādanam*). The mind of him who tastes must be *ekāgra*, absorbed in the object of the tasting to the exclusion of all else. On the contrary, he who eats may be also *anyacitta*: he can also think of other things, etc. Aesthetic tasting is of a non-ordinary nature (*alaukika*), *sui generis*,

tinction, etc., assumed by these sentences. Besides, the young deer, etc., which appears in this perception is devoid of its particularity (*viśeṣa*), and at the same time, the actor, who [playing the role of the deer], frightens [the spectators] (*trāsaka*. . .showing to be afraid, is unreal (*apāramārthika*). As a result, what there appears is simply and solely fear—fear in itself, uncircumscribed by time, space, etc.[1] This perception of fear is of a different order from the ordinary perceptions (" I am afraid, he—my enemy, my friend, anybody—is afraid"); for these are necessarily affected by the appearance of fresh mental movements (of shunning, etc.)[2], consisting of pleasure, pain, etc, and just for this reason are full of obstacles (*vighna*). The sensation of the fear above mentioned, on

The mind is the organ of tasting ; during the tasting the mind must be free of all obstacles, devoid, that is to say, of any other sensory perceptions, etc. The subject is immersed in a *camatkāra* set apart from any distinction of " self " or " others ". Aesthetic tasting is a ' generalised ' perception and free, therefore, of obstacles (in the *A.Bh.*, I, p. 291 the expression *āsvādayanti manasā N.Ś.*, VI, v. 36, is commented upon in the following manner : *ā samantāt sādhāraṇībhāvena nirvighnapratipattivaśān manasā indriyāntaravighnasaṃbhāvanāśūnyena svādayanti svaparavivekaśūnyasvādacamatkāraparavaśā*. . .).

1) In other words, the spectator (and hence the state of consciousness by which he is pervaded) is not in the real time and space either of the deer or of the actor as such. In the aesthetic experience, these two temporal and spatial orders cancel each other out. On the one hand, therefore, the deer, etc, is without any temporal or spatial determination (viz. it is not felt as an element of ordinary life but is perceived in a generalized form); similarly, the actor, and hence the impression of fear which he suggests, is not perceived as a constituent element of practical life. The state of consciousness which does occur is, therefore, unaffected by space and time; it is a generalized permanent mental state, a Rasa.

2) " Shunning, etc ", i.e., shunning, accepting and disregarding.

the contrary, is the matter of cognition by a perception devoid of obstacles (*nirvighna*), and may be said to enter directly (*niviś*) into our hearts, to dance (*viparivṛt*)[1] before our eyes : this is the terrible Rasa. In such a fear, one's own self is neither completely immersed (*tiraskṛ*) nor in a state of particular emergence (*ullikh*)[2], and the same thing happens with the other selves. As a result of this, the state of generality involved is not limited (*parimita*), but extended (*vitata*)—as happens at the moment in which is formed the idea of the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) between smoke and fire or, in fact, between trembling and fear[3]. Therefore, this idea to be confronted

1) *Viparivṛt*—means to move, to revolve, etc. The use of the word is ancient. It is to be found in Bhartṛhari (I, 125, *ṭīkā*, p. 125 (ed. of Lahore) : *buddhau viparivartate*. In the same sense (that is, with *buddhau*) it is used by Dharmakīrti and Kumārila also. A.G. comments on the word *viparivartamānasya* in the following way (*Ī.P.V.*, II, p. 140) : *vicitratvena viśvasya bhedābhedātmanā parivartamānasya spandanena sphurato* . . .

2) In the first case there would be no aesthetic cognition, but mystical cognition, characterized by the total absence of discursive thought and distinct apprehensions (*vikalpa*). In the second case, ordinary discursive cognition would occur. In both these cases, then, the *ubhayadeśakālatyāgaḥ* required by the aesthetic experience would be absent. Cf. the *Nāṭyadarpaṇa* by Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra, Baroda, 1929, p. 161. For the antithesis between *ātman* and *para* cf. *PTV*, pp. 71-72 : *atra hi madhyamapāde ātmaiva saṃśṛṇute nāparah* . . . *ātmana eva śravaṇaṃ syāt na parasya*. . .

3) The best explanation of this passage is to be found in *Ī.P.V.*, II, 4, 12 : *iha tu darśane vyāptigrahaṇāvasthāyāṃ yāvantas taddeśasaṃbhāvyamānasadbhāvaḥ pramātāras tāvatām eko'sau dhūmābhāsaś ca vahnyābhāsaś ca bahyanaye iva, tāvati teṣām parameśvareṇaikyaṃ nirmitam*/K. Ch. Pandey, *Bhāskarī*, vol. III, p. 178. translates : " But, according to this system, at the time of forming the idea of invariable concomitance, the images of smoke and fire are common to all perceivers, who can possibly have their existence at that place [i.e., in the kitchen, etc.], as according to those who admit the existence of an external objective world. For, in relation to these images, the Lord [i.e., Iśvara, the unlimited Ego, etc.] has made the subjects one "

with a real experience[1] is nourished by the combination of

A.G. observes that the pleasure given by a spectacle increases when there are a large number of spectators. In other words, when each spectator is conscious that the spectacle is being seen at the same time by a number of other people. *T. Ā.*, X, v. 85 ff. :

tathā hy ekāgrasakalasāmājikajanekṣitam |
nṛttaṃ gītaṃ sudhāsārasāgaratvena manyate ||
tata evocyate mallanaṭaprekṣopadeśane |
sarvapramātṛtādātmyaṃ pūrṇarūpānubhāvakam ||
tāvanmātrārthasaṃvittituṣṭāḥ pratyekaśo yadi |
kaḥ saṃbhūya guṇas teṣām pramātraikyaṃ bhavec ca kiṃ ||
yadā tu tattadvedyatvadharmasaṃdarbhagarbhitam |
tadvastu śuṣkād prāgrūpād anyad yuktam idaṃ tadā ||

" The spectators who watch, absorbed, a performance of dancing, of singing, etc., feel that it is a real sea of nectar (J. comments : " anyone, in fact, can observe that spectacles seen by many people at the same time generate a greater pleasure than those which are seen by a single individual). It is for this reason that those who teach the true nature of performances of wrestling and acting, say that, in these, a real state of identity of all knowing subjects takes place ; this state generates a perception of a full and perfect beatitude (J. comments : *pūrṇarūpeti iyad eva hi pūrṇaṃ rūpaṃ yad vigalitavedyāntaratayā tatraivānanyākāṅkṣatvena parāmarśanaṃ nāma*). If the mere consciousness of what they see on the stage (without, that is, the realization that the performance is seen by other people) were sufficient to satisfy the spectators taken one by one, how then can the different state of consciousness, which arises when they are together, be explained ? And how could it still be sustained that a state of identity of knowing subjects exists ? When, instead, the spectator is aware that the spectacle is seen at the same time by all others also, one can say with reason that it appears in a different form from the arid aspect it had before (this spectacle, then, observes J., takes on another nature which generates a very high *camatkāra*) ". See on all that the Introd., pp. XXXVII ff. In A.G. the expression *vitatavyāpti*, etc., occurs elsewhere also, and not always in a technical sense (see f.i., *Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 378 ; *Bh. G.A.S.*, pp. 110, 136).

1) The aesthetic perception, which is not dependent on the concepts of reality and unreality, cannot be spoken of as a real experience (that is,

actors, etc. In this combination, indeed—in that the real limiting causes (*niyamahetu*), (time, space, the particularized cognizing subject, etc.) on one side, and those afforded by the poem on the other, neutralize each other and then completely disappear—the afore-mentioned state of generality is readily nourished; so that by virtue of the very uniformity (*ekaghanatā*[1]) of the spectator's perception, it being so nourished, readily nourishes the Rasa in all of them: and this occurs, because the latent impressions of their minds concord with each other, the minds being varied by beginningless latent impressions.[2]

the direct experience, perception of something real, *pratyakṣa, sākṣātkāra*) but, A.G. says, it is " like " a real experience (*sākṣātkārāyamāṇa=sākṣātkāra-kalpa, pratyakṣakalpa*). See *A.Bh*, I, p. 43 : the drama is *pratyakṣakalpānu-vyavasāyaviṣayo lokaprasiddhasatyāsatyādivilakṣaṇatvāt*. In other terms, the aesthetic experience is a direct perception *sui generis*, free of every relation with practical reality, etc.

1) The word *ekaghanatā* derives from *ghana*. " *Ghana*, from *ghan*, to strike, hinder, etc., has a primary sense of " dense mass ", implying a condensation of multiple factors without extension in space " (A. K. Coomaraswamy, *The Transformation of Nature in Art*, Harvard 1934 p. 209). Hence *ekaghana* comes to mean " dense ", " compact ", " uniform ", etc., in the sense of a state of consciousness which does not allow the interference of " obstacles " (*vighna*).

2) A.G. replies with this argument to the objection of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, according to whom the spectator can identify himself only with a person similar to himself but not with a being of a non-ordinary nature, as Rāma, deity, etc. The identification and therefore the state of generality required for the aesthetic experience postulates an affinity of nature (latent impressions, tendencies, instincts, etc.) between the spectator and the person represented. A.G. replies to this objection saying that no being (animal or deity) exists with which man has no affinity of nature. The *saṃsāra* is

This (form of) consciousness without obstacles is called *camatkāra*[1]; the physical effects of it, that is to say, trembling, horripilation, joyful motions of limbs (*ullukasana*[2]), etc., are also *camatkāra*[3]. For example : " Viṣṇu is still today in a state of *camatkāra* : how, oh how is it that the limbs of Lakṣmī, which are as beautiful as a piece of the moon, have not been taken to pieces by mount Mandara[4] ?" Indeed, *camatkāra* may be likewise defined as an immersion in an enjoyment (*bhogāveśaḥ*) which can never satiate and is thus uninterrupted (*tṛptivyatirekeṇācchinnaḥ*). The word *camatkāra*, indeed, properly means the action being done by a tasting subject (*camataḥ karaṇam*), in other words, by the enjoying

beginningless and every man, before being that which he actually is, has been all the other beings as well. The consciousness of the spectator thus possesses (in other words, is varied by. . .) the latent impressions of all the possible beings and he is therefore susceptible of identifying himself with each of them. The same concept is expounded in the *Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 187 ; see below, App. III, p. 112.

1) See the Intr., pp. XLV-XLVI.

2) The term *ullukásana* is explained by A. G. (*A. Bh.*, I, p. 330) *gātrasyordhvam sāhlādam dhūnanam*.

3) *A.Bh.*, III, ch. XXII, p. 152 : *iha cittavṛttir eva saṃvedánabhūmau saṃkrāntā deham api vyāpnoti* || " The mental movements, which are phenomena of consciousness, are also transmitted to the body and pervade it "

4) Unidentified stanza. This is an allusion to the churning of the ocean. The gods and demons took Mount Mandara for a churning stick and various precious objects were churned from the deep, amongst which the moon and Śrī (Lakṣmī), the goddess of beauty. The aesthetic experience of *camatkāra* reappears in the consciousness every time the determinants, etc. (the poetic expression), by which it is aroused, are evoked. Cf. *A.Bh.*, I, p. 37 (App. II). The example offered by A.G. (of Viṣṇu who is still under the influence of a *camatkāra*) exemplifies this very character of aesthetic pleasure.

subject, he who is immersed in the vibration (*spanda*)[1] of a marvellous enjoyment (*adbhutabhoga*)[2]. It may be thought of either as a form of mental cognition (*mānasādhyavasāya*) consisting of a direct experience[3], or of imagination (*saṃkalpa*) or of remembrance, which nevertheless, is manifested in a different manner to its ordinary nature. For as Kālidāsa said : " Often a man, though happy, becomes uneasy of mind on seeing beautiful objects and hearing sweet musics. Surely, he remembers in his soul, though vaguely, associations of former births deeply implanted in him[4]". In any case, however, it is a form of perception—a perception in which what

1) *Spanda* means movement, vibration, energy, etc. According to the *Śaiva* schools of Kashmir, consciousness is vibration, the ceaseless force from which springs all that exists. The modes of discursive thought are the fruits of the solidification of this first, incandescent principle. This force manifests itself in the instinctive motions of consciousness (fear, joy, etc.). It is the energy that consents to go from word to word, from thought to thought. It is the first moment of will (*icchā*), the initial motion of the spirit, which is presupposed by any form of consciousness. The terms 'heart' (*hṛdaya*), thought (*vimarśa*), bliss (*ānanda*), vibration, (*sphurattā*, *ghrūṇi*), etc., express the same concept. On consciousness as movement, etc., see, above all, the *Spandakārikā* by Kallaṭa, *passim* ; Somānanda, *Śivadṛṣṭi*, p. 11; *I.P.V.V.*, I, 5, v. 14. In the present case, *spanda* is the movement, the inner rhythm of the aesthetic experience. The aesthetic experience is an inner perception like pleasure, pain, etc., and, in this sense, is not of a discursive order (*vikalpaka*).

2) Cf. *supra* Intr., p. XXXIII.

3) I.e., it is a mental or inner perception.

4) Kālidāsa, *Śakuntalā*, V, 96. This stanza is quoted by A.G., also in *I.P.V.V.*, III, p. 252. The disquiet, to which Kālidāsa alludes, is, observes A.G., an unobjectified desire ; it corresponds to what is, metaphysically, the desire which induces consciousness to deny its original fullness

appears (is just a feeling, for instance) delight, consisting of a tasting[1]. For this reason, i.e., because it is not conditioned by further specifications[2], this perception is apt to become the object of a relish, and, as such, it is neither a form of ordinary cognition, nor is it erroneous, nor ineffable, nor like ordinary perception[3], nor does it consist of a super-imposition[4]. To

and to crumble in time and space, i.e., the *āṇavamala*. *Ī.P.V.V.*, III, 252 : *camatkāritā hi bhuñjānarūpatā svātmaviśrāntilakṣaṇā sarvatra icchā | kvacit tu svātmaviśrāntir bhāvāntaram anāgūritaviśeṣam apekṣya utthāpyate yatra sā icchā rāga ity ucyate, āgūritaviśeṣatāyām tu kāma iti | ādigrahaṇād abhilāṣamalo yatra bhāvāntaram sāmānyākāram api vāsanāvaśeṣamātreṇāste yathāha " bhāvasthirāṇi jananāntarasauhṛdāni " iti* : " The fact of being in a state of *camatkāra*, of being on the point of enjoying something (characterized by a rest in one's own Self) is, without any exception, a form of will [the will is the first moment of Consciousness, before it crystallizes in the forms of the discursive cognition]. Sometimes such a rest in one's own self appears in connexion with an object in general, without any further determinations ; in this case, the will is called ' attachment '. At other times it appears in connexion with a determined object and, in this case, there is what is called ' love '. By the word, ' etc '., Utpaladeva hints at the maculation of the desire (the *āṇavamala*, etc.; cf. *supra*) ; it is obtained when the objectiveness considered is not only idenfinite, but in a state of latent impression (that is, when it is not yet developed and appears in a state of potentiality ; the *āṇavamala* is therefore an unobjectified desire, *akarmakam abhilāṣamātram*. *T.S.*, p. 75 : " The maculation is an eager agitation consisting in the presumption of one's own non-fullness, a mere desire without an object, a predisposition to the future limitations "]. For example : "... the associations of former births deeply implanted in him ".

1) In other words, a perception characterized by the presence of a generalized feeling (delight, anger, etc.)

2) By no temporal, spatial, individual, etc., specification. In other words, by no obstacle.

3) I.e., a reproduction of it (Śaṅkuka's doctrine).

4) " As when wrong knowledge follows after the right one is vitiated". See below, App. I, p. 93.

conclude we may say equally well that it consists of a state of intensification[1]—using this term to indicate that it is not limited by space, etc.; that it is a reproduction—using this word to mean that it is a production which repeats the feelings[2]; and that it is a combination of different elements—this conception being interpreted in the light of the doctrine of the *vijñānavādin*[3]. From whichever point of view it is examined, Rasa is, in any case, simply and solely a mental state which is the matter of cognition on the part of a perception without obstacles and consisting in a relish.

The obstacles to the realization of Rasa

9. In this connection, the elements which eliminate the obstacles are the determinants, etc. Also in the ordinary world, indeed, the different words *camatkāra*, immersion (*nirveśa*), relish (*rasanā*), tasting (*āsvādana*), enjoyment (*bhoga*), accomplishment (*samāpatti*), lysis (*laya*), rest (*viśrānti*), etc., mean nothing but a [form of] consciousness completely free from any obstacles whatever. Now, the obstacles to the perception in question are–*a*) the unsuitability, that is to say, the lack of verisimilitude; *b*) the immersion in temporal and spatial determinations perceived as exclusively one's own or exclusively those of another; *c*) the fact of being at the mercy of our own sensations of

1) Lollaṭa's doctrine.

2) Tentatively, I have so rendered the linguistic explanation of *anukāra* by *bhāvānugāmitayā karaṇāt*. Lit., " to mean that it is an operation temporally following the feelings ".

3) See above, p. 41. Well, says A.G. here, this theory is also true if it is interpreted in the light of the *vijñānavāda*, the idealistic Buddhism, according to which everything that exists is pure consciousness or perception.

pleasure, etc.; *d*) the defective state of the means of perception; *e*) the lack of evidence; *f*) the lack of some predominant factor; *g*) and the presence of doubt.

a) Indeed, if one considers the things presented as lacking in verisimilitude, he cannot obviously immerse (*viniviś*) his consciousness in them, so that no rest—no rest, I say, in them—can take place. This is the first obstacle. The means by which it is eliminated is the consent of the heart which takes place at the view of ordinary events[1]. When extraordinary incidents have to be portrayed, it is necessary to choose personages whose names are famous, like Rāma, etc., who make us give belief to their undertakings—a believing (*pratyaya*) indeed, deeply rooted in ourselves, aroused by the uninterrupted fame (*prasiddhi*) which they have enjoyed since antiquity[2]. Just for this reason, it will be said that *nāṭaka*[3], etc., whose purpose is the learning (*vyutpatti*) and teaching (*upadeśa*) of deeds transcending the ordinary life,necessarily requires to deal with famous events and so on. This requirement, however, is absent in the case of farces (*prahasana*). But all that will be explained

1) An event of an ordinary character finds a more ready response in the spectator's heart.

2) If the same extraordinary events (crossing of the ocean, etc.) which are, in fact, attributed to a legendary figure (Rāma, etc.) where referred to an ordinary man, they would arouse the incredulity of the spectators. *Dh. Ā.L.*, p. 331 : *rāmādes tu tathāvidham api caritaṃ pūrvaprasiddhiparamparopacitasampratyayopārūḍham asatyatayā na cakāsti* ||" But when such undertakings are referred to Rāma, etc., they lose all appearance of falsehood ; for they are rooted in the spectator's confidence, the cumulative result of the uninterrupted fame enjoyed from antiquity by the character in question ".

3) Cf. p. 64, n. 1.

at a suitable time and place[1]. For the time being this is enough.

b) One of the principal obstacles regularly occurs when the spectator is at the mercy of the tasting of pleasures, pains, etc., inhering in his own person. This obstacle consists in the appearance of other forms of consciousness, due variously to the fear of being abandoned by the sensations of pleasure, etc., to concern for their preservation, to a desire to procure other similar sensations, to the desire to get rid of them, give them open expression, hide them, etc. Even when someone perceives pleasures, pains, etc., as inhering exclusively in other persons, other forms of consciousness inevitably arise in him (pleasures, pains, mental stupor, indifference [*mādhyasthya*],

1) *A.Bh.*, ch. XVIII. The appropriate subjects for the ten kinds of play are described and commented upon in *N.Ś.*, XVIII. *Nāṭaka* are plays on elevated subjects. *Daśarūpa*, Haas, p. 4 : " The ten chief varieties (of drama) are : the *Nāṭaka*, the *Prakaraṇa*, the *Bhāṇa*, the *Prahasana*, the *Ḍima*, the *Vyāyoga*, the *Samavakāra*, the *Vīthi*, the *Aṅka* (=*Utsṛṣṭikāṅka*), and the *Īhāmṛga* ". Cf. *Ind. Th.*, p. 139 ff. In the *A.Bh.*, p. 27, A.G. makes the general remark : *na ca vartamānacaritānukāro yukto vineyānāṃ tatra rāgadveṣamadhyasthatādinā tanmayībhāvābhāve prīter abhāvena vyutpatter apy abhāvāt, vartamānacarite ca dharmādikarmaphalasaṃbandhasya pratyakṣatve prayoge vaiyarthyam* | "It is not fitting to imitate an event of actual life; for in this case the spectator would be affected by passions (hatred, partisanship, indifference, etc.) [extraneous to the aesthetic experience] and would thu be unable to identify himself with the event represented. Pleasure being thus absent, instruction would be absent as well. Besides, in the case of an actual event, the relation between the action (its merit etc.) and the fruits which result from it is discerned by direct experience ; it is, therefore, useless to set it on the stage ".

The word imitation (*anukāra*) must be understood in a broad sense. Teaching or knowledge is an accessory aim (*prayojana*) of art; its principal aim is aesthetic pleasure (*prīti*, *ānanda* etc.) Cf. App. III, p. 114.

etc.) which naturally constitute an obstacle. The means of eliminating this obstacle are the so-called theatrical conventions (*nāṭyadharmī*)[1], which include a number of things not to be found in ordinary life, as, for instance, the zones (*kakṣyā*) dividing the pavilion (*maṇḍapa*) the stage (*raṅgapīṭha*), the various types of women's dance, the various dialects (*bhāṣā*), used, etc.; and last but not least, also the different dress of the actors—the headwear, etc.—by which they hide their true identity. However, this is revealed to the spectators during the preliminaries (*pūrvaraṅga*), (see the stanza : " It is best not to insist too much on dance and song "), as well as in the initial presentation (*prastāvanā*), defined in the stanza: " The actress, or the jester...[2] " Indeed, the presence of the afore-mentioned elements eliminates the perception: this particular individual in this particular place, at this particular moment, feels pain, pleasure, etc. This eli-

1) The term *nāṭyadharmī* (*N.Ś.*, VI, v. 25 ; XIII, v. 70 ff.) refers to all the specific expedients, etc., of the theatre (scenery, costumes, traditional conventions, etc.). Cf. *Ind.Th.*, p. 15 and *Lokadharmī* and *Nāṭyadharmī*, by V. Raghavan, in *J.O.R.*, Madras, vol. VII, pp. 359-375, vol. VIII, pp. 57-74.

2) The " preliminaries " (*pūrvaraṅga*) include the whole body of rites, ceremonies, etc., celebrated at the beginning of the play. They end with the benediction stanza, *nāndī*. There is a risk of distracting or boring the audience by a long-drawn-out performance of these rites. Bharata himself recommends that they should not be too mueh insisted on (*N.Ś.*, V. 165-166;) " It is best not to insist too much on ritual dances and songs for the very reason that if the songs, the instrumental music and the dances are performed far too long, the actors as well as the spectators will get tired of them and, in this case, they will not be able to seize, with all their evidence, the Rasas and the mental states which will be represented "). The *nāndī* stanzas are immediately followed by the " prologue " (*prastāvanā*), giving the name of the play, of the author, etc. The prologue generally consists of a dialogue between the producer of the play and an assistant (*pāripārśvika*) ; the latter may be replaced by an actress, by the jester, etc.

mination takes place in so far as in the theatrical performance there is on the one hand the negation of the real being of the actor, and on the other—since the spectator's consciousness does not rest entirely on the represented images[1]—there is no rest on the real being of the superimposed personage[2]; so that, as a result of all this, there is eventually just a negation both of the real being of the actor and of the real being of the character he is playing. Indeed, even if dances such as *āsīnapāṭhya*, *puṣpagaṇḍikā*[3], etc., are not seen in ordinary life, it cannot be said that they do not exist at all—for it is undeniable that they exist in some way[4].

1) Here the reading is uncertain ; see the Crit. App. I read *pratibhāsasaṃvitviśrāntivaikalyena* and take *pratibhāsa* as image, etc., that is, the represented images.

2) In other words, the character of Rāma, etc., who is super-imposed to the real being of the actor.

3) *Daśarūpa*, Haas, 99 : " The tenfold enumeration of the sub-divisions (*aṅga*) in the Gentle Dance (*lāsya* ; I translate : women's dance) runs as follows : the *Geyapada* (Song), the *Sthitapāṭhya* (Recitation by one standing,) the *Āsīnapāṭhya* (Recitation by one seated), the *Puṣpagaṇḍikā*, the *Pracchedaka*, the *Trigūḍha*, the one called *Saindhava*, the *Dvigūḍha*, the *Uttamottamaka*, and the *Uktapratyukta* (Amoebean Song) ".

Each of these terms is defined by Bharata, *N. Ś.*, XIX, vv. 119-135. The dance, A.G. remarks, does not imitate anything in real life but is a self-subsistent creation, free from any practical aim. It is the natural expression, through the movements of the limbs, of a given state of mind. *A.Bh.*, I, p. 21 ; *nartanaṃ nṛttam gātrāṇām aṅgopāṅgānāṃ vilāsena kṣepo na tu kenacit kartavyāṃśena* | The dance of Śiva is the natural expression of his complete and perfect bliss, free of all obstacles (*nirvāra=nirvighna*) : *śaṅkarasyeva bhagavataḥ paripūrṇānandanirbharībhūtadehoccaladāntaranirvārasundarākārasya*. . ., *A.Bh.*, I, p. 21.

4) Thus, even if the character represented is a negation of the actor as such and of the real character represented by the actor, it cannot be said that he does not exist, that he is a nonentity ; his existence in fact is a datum of one's own consciousness.

To conclude, all this system of relative and connected matters has been adopted by Bharata, in so far as by virtue of the state of generality produced, it promotes the gustation of Rasa. All this will be clarified in the chapters which explain these dances, etc.[1] and so for the time being, it is of no use we strive after it. And thus we have explained the way to eliminate this obstacle, consisting of the perception of temporal, etc., data as inhering exclusively in one's own person or in others.

c) Again, how can any one who is overpowered by his own happiness, etc., make his consciousness rest on something else ? To avoid this obstacle there have been adopted various means to be used at suitable times and places, such as music, vocal and instrumental, well-decorated halls, well-accomplished courtesans, and so on[2]. In virtue of the afore-mentioned state of generality these expedients—phonic, etc.,—are such as to be enjoyed by all the spectators and possess such a charming power (*uparañj*) that even an unaesthetic person (*ahṛdaya*) reaches limpidity of heart and becomes " possessed of heart ". Indeed it has been said, " poetry is visible or audible[3] ".

d) Moreover, if the means of perception are absent, perception itself will also naturally be absent.

1) *N.Ś.*, XIX, ff.

2) The term *pada* after *maṇḍapa* is not clear to me, and it is not represented in the translation.

3) *N.Ś.*, I, v. 11. The empirical division of aesthetic beauty into visible and audible is not unfamiliar to Indian thought. Only sense-data taken through hearing and sight can be tasted independently of any association with the *ego*, in a generalized way (*sādhāraṇīkṛta*). The other senses " ferment solely in one's own Self (*svātmany evocchalanāt* ; *P.T.V.*, p. 48) ", i.e., are unable to break the barrier of the limited " I ".

e) Even if there may be such verbal testimonies and inferences, as to provoke an evident perception, perception, however, does not rest (in them), because there is, in it, the expectancy of the certainty proper to direct experience, which consists in an evident perception[1]. For as Vātsyāyana has said : " All valid knowledge depends upon direct experience[2] ". It is well-known, indeed, that a thing which has been directly perceived, cannot be proved to be otherwise by any number of inferences and verbal testimonies. In cases like the imaginary circle of fire created when a burning stick is swiftly revolved, our knowledge is disproved only by a more powerful direct perception. This is quite an ordinary process. Therefore, to remove these two obstacles, there are—consecrated by tradition—the four modes of representation, furnished with the styles (*vṛtti*)[3], the local usages

1) " Even though—thus A. Sankaran, op. cit., p. 106, paraphrases this passage—there may be clear and unmistakable verbal testimony and inference, we do not completely rest content with the knowledge derived therefrom ; for therein is lacking that perceptual cognition which alone makes for clear, direct and definite knowledge ". With A. Sankaran, I have read here, *sphuṭapratītikāriśabdaliṅgasaṃbhave 'pi*. Should I have preferred the reading *asphuṭa*, the translation would have been : " Even if there may be verbal testimonies and inferences—which, as a rule, do not provoke an evident perception—" etc.

2) *Nyāyasūtra*, *Vātsyāyanabhāṣya*, I, I, 3 : *sā* (A.G. reads *sarvā*) *iyam pramitiḥ pratyakṣaparā* |

3) The Styles (*vṛtti*) are four in number : *kaiśikī*, *sāttvatī*, *ārabhaṭī* and *bhāratī*. *Daśarūpa*, Haas, p. 74 : " The Gay Style (*kaiśikī*) (is to be used) in (expressing) the Erotic Rasa ; the Grandiose Style (*sāttvatī*) in (expressing) the Heroic Rasa ; the Horrific Style (*ārabhaṭī*), on the other hand, in (expressing) the Furious and Odious Rasa ; The Eloquent Style (bhāratī) everywhere ". On the *vṛtti* see *The Vṛttis*, by V. Raghavan, *J.O.R.*, Madras, vol. VI, pp. 346 ff. ; vol. VII, pp. 33 ff.

(*pravṛtti*)[1], and the realistic representation (*lokadharmī*)[2]. Re-

1) The local usages (*pravṛtti*) are four in number : *āvantī, dākṣiṇātyā, audramāgadhī, pāñcālī*, Cf. *N.Ś.*, VI, v. 26, 27 ; XIII, v. 37 and prose, pp. 205-207. *Ind.Th.*, p. 16 : "Local usages regarding costumes, languages, manners and professions differ in the different countries of the world. They are the *pravṛtti* or local colours in drama".

2) For the best explanation, see *A.Bh.*, I, 292 : *tatra ye svabhāvato nirmalamukurahṛdayās ta eva saṃsārocitakrodhamohābhilāṣaparavaśamanaso na bhavanti | teṣāṃ tathāvidhadaśarūpakākarṇanasamaye sādhāraṇarasanātmaka-carvaṇāgrāhyo rasasaṃcayo nāṭyalakṣaṇaḥ* (G : *°lakṣaṇa°*) *sphuṭa eva | ye tv atathābhūtās teṣāṃ pratyakṣocitatathāvidhacarvaṇālābhāya naṭādiprakriyā svagatakrodhaśokādisaṅkaṭahṛdayagranthibhañjanāya gītādiprakriyā ca muninā viracitā |* "In this connexion, the mind of those who have by nature hearts like an immaculate mirror is not at the mercy of the desires, anger, or stupor proper to *sāṃsārika* existence (that of everyday life). The mere fact of hearing the play read is sufficient (in itself, independently of any acting) to induce in them with the greatest clearness the perception of the various Rasas which animate it ; this perception consists in a Sampling animated by a generalized Tasting. To make this Tasting (which needs a direct perception) available to people who are deprived of this faculty, Bharata has, on the one hand, explained the discipline of the actors, etc., and, on the other—to cut the knots of the heart obscured by Anger, Sorrow, etc., inherent in one's own Self—has explained the discipline of vocal music, etc". Representation (and therefore drama in general which is founded upon Representation) consists of a form of direct perception, is an *adhya-vasāya* (mental cognition, etc. ; also *vyavasāya, anuvyavasāya*, cf. App. I) that is like the direct perception (*sākṣātkārakalpa, pratyakṣakalpa*). *A.Bh.*, XXII, 150 : *abhinayanam hi cittavṛttisādhāraṇatāpattiprāṇasākṣātkārakalpā-dhyavasāyasampādanam |* "Representation arouses a mental cognition which is like a direct perception; it consists in causing the generalization of mental movements". *A.Bh.*, XXII, 148 : *vighnasambhāvanāvihīnasakalasādhāraṇa-spaṣṭabhāvasākṣātkārakalpādhyavasāyasampattaye sarveṣāṃ prayoga ity uktam |* "It is said that the acting (*prayoga=parṣadi prakaṭīkaraṇam, A.Bh.*, I, 16) of the four forms of Representation aims just at arousing a mental cognition, which is like a direct perception. It consists of a generalized state of evi-

presentation, indeed, is a different operation from that of inference and verbal testimony; and, as we will expound later on, it is almost equal to direct perception.

f) Does there exist a man whose consciousness rests on anything of a secondary order (*apradhāna*) ? Indeed, such a perception would find no rest in itself and would thus run (*anudhāv*) automatically towards the predominant thing. This is the reason why the Permanent State only can be the object of Tasting : because, I say, the Determinants and the Consequents, which are insentient (*jaḍa*), and the Transitory Mental States, which, though not insentient, nevertheless are necessarily depending on the Permanent States, are all equally subordinate[1]. Now, among the various sentiments, some are conducive to the ends

dence common to all the spectators and devoid of every possible obstacle ". Drama is the object of cognition by an *anuvyavasāya* (about this word cf. App. I) which is like a direct perception, *A.Bh.*, I, 43.

1) Cf. *Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 177 : *taccarvaṇāpi cittavṛttiṣv eva paryavasatīti rasabhāvebhyo nādhikaṃ carvaṇīyam* | " The Tasting of the Determinants, etc., necessarily terminates in the mental movements; thus, apart from the *bhāva* (the matter of the Rasas) there is nothing else which can be tasted.

A.Bh., I, p. 268 : *sa ca yady apy anantavibhāvātmā tathāpi sarveṣāṃ jaḍānāṃ saṃvidi tasyāś ca bhoktari bhoktṛvargasya ca pradhāne bhoktari paryavasānān nāyakābhi.lhānabhoktṛviśeṣasthāyicittavṛttisvabhāvaḥ* | " Though [drama, etc.] is constituted by a infinite number of determinants, etc., all the elements, which compound it, rest, however, in the consciousness (the permanent mental state). This rests in the enjoying subject (the limited enjoying subject, the practical Self) and the whole of the enjoying subjects rest, in their turn, in the principal enjoying subject [the generalized knowing subject]. Therefore, we may say that drama consists in a permanent mental state of a particular enjoying subject, called an actor, etc. ". Such a mental state, continues A.G. is unique, generalized, devoid of the notions " own ", " of others ", etc. and, therefore, it pervades also the spectators : *ata eva sādhāraṇībhūtatayā sāmājikam api svātmasadbhāvena samāveśayantī* . . .

of life[1] : these are the predominant ones. To specify, delight is conducive to pleasure, and to the forms and profit connected (*anusaṅgi*) with it. Anger, in people in which it predominates, is conducive to profit—but can also end in pleasure and merit. Energy ends in all three, merit, etc. Eventually, another sentiment—consisting above all in the disgust aroused by the knowledge of reality[2]—is the means of liberation. These four sentiments only are the predominant ones. Even if they are not to be found in a predominant position all four together, and the emergence of one of them naturally postulates the subordination of the other three, nevertheless someone of them is always predominant in each drama, so that all of them are clearly recognised as being, in turn (that is, one in

1) According to a pan-Indian conception, human life is motivated by four purposes : *kāma*, *artha*, *dharma*, and *mokṣa*. *Kāma* is pleasure and love. *Artha* is material property (economics, politics, etc., are directed to the fulfilment of this end). *Dharma* embraces moral and religious duty. *Mokṣa* is the liberation or redemption of the soul from the flow of existence ; it is the *paramārtha*, the supreme purpose of man. For an excellent account of the four *artha*, see H. Zimmer, *Les Pihlosophies de l'Inde*, Payot, pp. 35 ff. The principal forms of consciousness (*sthāyibhāva*) are those which are necessary to the fulfilment of these purposes ; they are delight (*rati*), anger (*krodha*), energy (*utsāha*), and serenity (*śama*). The end of delight is pleasure ; however, through pleasure, it can bring us to the achievement of profit and right action (Bharata, *N.Ś.*, XVIII, v. 72 ff., distinguishes three kinds of Erotic Rasa, *kāmaśṛṅgāra, arthaśṛṅgāra*, and *dharmaśṛṅgāra*). Anger and Energy are associated with *artha* and *dharma* respectively, but both of them may also contribute to the realization of all three purposes (cf. *Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 309 : *vīraraudrayos tv atyantavirodho 'pi nāsti | samānaṃ rūpaṃ ca dharmārthakāmārjanopayogitvam*). Spiritual Freedom is the fruit of serenity.

2) The characteristics of this *sthāyivbhāva* are discussed by A.G. in the *A.Bh.*, pp. 333-42. Abhinava Gupta's text is edited with a commentary by V. Raghavan, *The Number of Rasas*, Adyar, 1940.

this drama and the other in another one), equally predominant. Moreover, if things are more closely examined, all four of them will be seen to be present in the same drama, in various passages, in a pre-eminent position.

In this connection, all these Rasas are dominated by pleasure (*sukha*), for the essence of the closely dense (*ekaghana*)[1] light consisting of the gustation of our own consciousness, is beatitude[2]. Indeed, in ordinary life also, women, even when they are immersed in the compact (*ekaghana*) gustation of the form of consciousness called sorrow, find rest in their own

1) Uniform, without obstacles (*vighna*).

2) The intimate essence of consciousness or the " I ", according to the *śaiva* is beatitude. The absence of beatitude and suffering are due to a need, privation, or desire for something separated from the Self. Beatitude is the absence of this desire, the resting in oneself to the exclusion of everything else. The " I " contains all things; everything that exists arises from its unconfined liberty. It cannot be the seat of any deprivation and can desire nothing but itself. Aesthetic experience is the tasting of one's own consciousness and, therefore, of one's own essential beatitude. In this sense, Rasa is single. This Tasting is coloured (*anurañjita, ruṣita*) by latent impressions (*vāsanā, saṃskāra*) of the mental process of Delight, etc., aroused by the determinants, etc., i.e., by poetic expression. From this point of view the plurality of the Rasas is due to the diversity of the *vibhāva* (*vibhāvabhedaṃ rasabhede hetutvena sūcayati. . .A.Bh.*, I, p. 290). Cf. *A.Bh.*, I, p. 292 : *asmanmate tu saṃvedanam evānandaghanam āsvādyate | tatra kā duḥkhaśaṅkā | kevalaṃ tasyaiva citratākaraṇe ratiśokādivāsanāvyāpāras tadudbodhane cābhinayādivyāpāraḥ |* " According to us, that which is tasted is consciousness alone which is saturated with beatitude. This fact excludes, therefore, any suspicion of pain. This consciousness which is single in itself, is nevertheless differentiated by the operation of the latent traces of delight, sorrow, etc., which are awakened by the operation of the Consequents, etc. (*abhinaya=anubhāva*). For the nature of this " colouring " infused into the consciousness by the feelings of delight, etc., cf. *infra.*, p. 82, n. 4.

heart, for this very sorrow consists of, and is animated by, a rest without obstacles[1]. Pain, indeed, is simply and solely an absence of rest. This is precisely the reason why the disciples of Kapila, in explaining the activity of *rajaḥ*, say that the soul of pain is mobility (*cāñcalya*)[2]. All the Rasas thus consist in beatitude. But some of them, on account of the objects by which they are coloured[3], are not free from a certain touch of bitterness; this happens, for example, in the Heroic Rasa. For this consists of, and is animated by, precisely the firm endurance of misfortunes.

Thus delight, etc., occupy a pre-eminent position. Laughter, etc., on the other hand, also occupy a pre-eminent position, on account of the fact that these—whose determinants are easily accessible to all type of people—possess an extremely high power of winning the heart (*uparañjakatvam*)[4]. For this very reason, laughter, etc., are mostly to be met with in people

1) The concept is as follows : women, even when they are being bitten, scratched, etc., by their lovers (and therefore experiencing pain) find in the pain itself the fulfilment, the realization of all their desire: " they rest in their hearts " or consciousness to the exclusion of everything else. Therefore, this pain is pleasure, beatitude. Pain occurs only when the consciousness finds no rest in what it contemplates, is not totally absorbed in the object of contemplation, *i.e.*, when it desires something different from the thing in which it is and from what it is. These desires, etc., which interrupt the homogeneity and compactness (*ekaghanatā*) of consciousness, are the *vighna*, the obstacles.

The same concept occurs in the *Pratāparudrīya* (Madras, 2nd, Ed., 1931), comm., p. 209 : *saṃbhogasamaye strīṇām adharadaṃśanādau kṛtrimaduḥkhānubhāvasītkāravad atrāpy upapattiḥ* ||

2) Cf. *S.Kā.*, 13.

3) The Determinants, etc.

4) I.e., they are widely diffused, easily make an impression on the consciousness.

of inferior nature (*anuttamaprakṛti*). Every man of low caste laughs, grieves, is afraid, tends to despise others, and is astonished at the poorest attempts at a fine saying. All the same, even these depend on delight, etc., and as such may be of help in attaining the ends of man[1]. The division between the ten types of drama is itself based on the different positions occupied by these mental states. All this will be explained later. The mental states of permanent nature are solely these nine. Indeed, every creature from its birth possesses these nine forms of consciousness. In fact, on the basis of the principle that all beings " hate to be in contact with pain and are eager to taste pleasure[2]", everyone is by nature pervaded by sexual desires [delight]; believes himself to be superior to others, whom he is thus led to deride [laughter]; grieves when he is forced to part from what he loves [sorrow]; gets angry at the causes of such separation [anger]; gets frightened when he finds himself powerless [fear]—but still is desirous of overcoming the danger which threatens him [heroism]; is attacked, when judging a thing to be displeasing, by a sense of revulsion directed just towards this ugly object [disgust]; wonders at the sight of extraordinary deeds done by himself or others [astonishment]; and, lastly, is desirous of abandoning certain things [serenity]. No living creature exists without the latent impression of these sentiments. All we can say is that some of them predominate in some people and others in others, and that in some people they originate from the usual causes and in others from causes different from the habitual. Thus, only some sentiments are able to promote the ends of

1) The Comic, Pathetic, Marvellous and Terrible Rasas depend on the Erotic, Furious, Heroic and Odious Rasas respectively.

2) Unidentified verse.

man[1], and, as such, they are rightly the object of teaching[2]. The current division of men into men of elevated nature, etc., is determined by the different position occupied by these sentiments. Other sentiments, as weakness, apprehension, etc.[3], on the other hand, can never possibly be manifested if the correspondent determinants do not exist : so, for example, a *muni* who practises *rasāyana*[4] is immune from weakness, indolence, weariness, etc. Even in one in whom, by virtue of the determinants[5], these are present, they regularly disappear without leaving any trace of themselves when the causes of manifestation cease[6]. Heroism, etc., on the contrary, even when they apparently disappear after their tasks are completed, do not cease to remain in the state of latent impressions—for other forms of heroism, concerning other tasks, remain intact. Indeed, as Patañjali has said, " The fact that Caitra is in love with one woman does not imply that he is out of love with the others ", etc.[7] Thus these transitory sentiments being, so to say, threaded on the thread of the permanent one, appear and dis-

1) Only the nine Permanent Mental States are able to contribute to the realization of the four ends of man. The Transitory Mental States do not have this faculty. Cf. H. C., *viveka*, p. 139 (no doubt a quotation from A.G.) : *ayaṃ ca nirvedaḥ svayaṃ puruṣārthasiddhaye vā utsāharatyādivat, atyantānurañjanāya hāsavismayādivan na prabhavatīty atyantamukhaprekṣitvād vyabhicāry eva* ||

2) The object of the play is to illustrate and teach the means of realization of the four ends of man.

3) The Transitory feelings.

4) *Rasāyana* (the science of art, of the rasas, or of vegetable juices, etc.) is, more or less, the Indian equivalent of alchemy.

5) I.e., by virtue of the presence of their causes.

6) I.e., without remaining in the state of latent impressions.

7) *Yogasūtra*, *Vyāsabhāṣya*, 2, 4. Caitra stands for any name whatever. The same quotation is used in the *I.P.V.V.*, II, p. 178 ; cf. *supra*, Intr., p. XLII.

appear an infinity of times. In some sense, they are like the beads of crystal, glass, magnet, topaz, emerald, sapphire, etc., which filling the thread on which they are threaded no matter if red, blue, etc.[1]—so as to be set rather far apart from each other and continuously changing their position, do not leave, it is true, trace of themselves on this thread, but, all the same, nourish the ornamental composition made by it[2]; and, being themselves various, and varying in turn the permanent thread, let it no doubt appear at intervals, in its nudity, though, at the same time, they affect it by their polychrome reflections—the reflections I mean of the transitory jewels : it is for this very reason that these sentiments are called " transitory ". When, that is to say, someone says, " This is a form of weakness ", it is natural to ask: by what is it provoked ? This question shows up precisely the instability of this mental movement. But in the case of the expression, " Rāma is full of heroism ", one does not ask for the cause. The determinants (the elements which awaken the mental states) are limited, therefore, to bringing to actuality the permanent sentiments (delight, heroism, etc.) corresponding respectively to their nature—

1) These still allow the thread of the permanent mental state to appear here and there. For a similar image, see *A.Bh.*, I, p. 340 : *viralombhitaratnāntarālanirbhāsamānasitatarasūtravat...* The colours (red, blue, etc.) of the thread allude to the *sthāyibhāva*. The various Rasas are each one associated by Bharata with a different colour (the Erotic with green, the Comic with white, the Pathetic with ash-grey, the Furious with red, the Heroic with orange, the Terrible with black, the Odious with dark blue, and the Marvellous with yellow).

2) In other words, they are the ornamental elements of the thread. *Bhṛ=puṣ*, nourish ; cf. the often-quoted stanza (e.g., *Kāvyapradīpa*, comm., p. 61) :

srakṣūtrabhāvād anyeṣām bhāvānām anugāmakaḥ |
na tirodhīyate sthāyī tair asau puṣyate paraṃ ||

and they do this by infusing into them their own colouring. Even when their corresponding determinants are absent, it cannot be said that the permanent sentiments are non-existent, for it has been said that these, in the state of latent impressions, are present in all beings. Of the transitory sentiments, however, when their corresponding Determinants are absent, not even the names remain—all this will be explained more extensively at the suitable time and place.[1]

Such a refutation of the subordinate elements has been made by Bharata also through the description of the permanent sentiments, introduced by the words : "We shall now bring the permanent sentiments to the state of Rasas[2]". This description follows on the definition of the general marks and concerns the particular ones.

g) The consequents, the determinants and the transitory sentiments considered separately are in no definite relation to any specific permanent sentiment; for, e.g., tears, etc.[3], may arise out of bliss, some disease in the eye, etc., a tiger[4], may arouse anger, fear etc., and, as we know, weariness [*śrama*], anxiety (*cintā*), etc.[5], may accompany many permanent feelings,

1) In the ch. VIII of the *A.Bh.* (which has not yet come to light).

2) *N.Ś.* VI, prose after v. 50 (in a note). In this sentence, Bharata says implicitly that only the *sthāyibhāva* (i.e., the elements of principal order) and not the *vibhāva* etc., are brought to the state of Rasa. The general definition (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) begins with the sutra : *vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārisaṃyogād rasaniṣpattiḥ*. The particular definition (*viśeṣalakṣaṇa*) consists of the description of the characters of each Rasa. Cf. *Ī.P.V.V.*, I, 57. *A.Bh.*, 300 : *ye sthāyino bhāvā loke cittavṛttyātmano bahuprakāraparišramaprasavanibandhanakartavyatāprabandhābhidhāyinas tān api nāma rasatvaṃ viśrāntyekāyatanatvenopadeśadiśānveṣyāmaḥ* |

3) Tears are consequents.

4) The tiger is an example of a determinant.

5) Weariness, etc., are the transitory mental states.

as f.i., heroism, fear, etc. But the combination of these elements has an unmistakable signification. Thus, where the death of a close relation is the determinant, wailing, shedding tears, etc., the consequent, and anxiety, depression (*dainya*), etc., the transitory feelings, then the permanent sentiment cannot be other than Sorrow. Therefore, considered (such a possible) arising of doubt, combination is used, just to remove this obstacle.

The nature of Rasa

10. Rasa, in this connexion, is just that reality (*artha*) by which the determinants, the consequents and the transitory feelings after having reached a perfect combination (*samyag yoga*), relation (*saṃbandha*), conspiration (*aikāgrya*)—where they will be in turn in a leading or subordinate position—in the mind of the spectator, make the matter of a gustation consisting of a form of consciousness free of obstacle and different from the ordinary ones. This Rasa differs from the permanent feelings, consists solely in this state of gustation and is not an objective thing (*siddhasvabhāva*)[1], lasts exactly as long as the gustation and does not lian on any time separate from it.[2] The determinants, etc., (which consist of garden, expressive glances, feelings of contentment (*dhṛti*), etc.), transcend on their side the state of causes, etc., as these are understood in ordinary life. Their function consists solely in the fact that they colour (the consciousness of the spectator); this function is called *vibhāvanā*,

1) I.e., it is not an already realized, self-subsistent thing which can exist independently of this tasting. Rasa is simply the particular form of perception called tasting. Cf. infra, p. 85.

2) Cf. *Dh.Ā.L.*, supra, Intr., p. XXXIV.

anubhāvanā, etc[1]. Thus, these take the name, of a non-ordinary character, of determinants, etc.[2] and this denomination aims at expressing their dependence on the latent traces left by the corresponding preceding causes, etc.[3] The particular nature of the various determinants will be explained later[4]. The operation of the determinants, etc., presupposes, of course, that the spectator, in the course of his ordinary life, has not neglected to make a close observation of the characteristic signs (effects, causes and concomitant elements) of other people's mental processes, in other words to deduce the one from the other. [But let us return to Rasa. This is, as we have said, different from the permanent sentiment] and it can-

1) The determinants, properly speaking, awaken in the spectator the latent traces of the mental movements corresponding to their nature. Aesthetic experience or Rasa is coloured by these latent traces. The exact meaning of *vibhāvanā*, etc., is explained by Viśvanātha as follows, *S.D.*, III : *vibhāvanaṃ ratyāder viśeṣeṇa āsvādāṅkuraṇayogyatānayanam* | *anubhāvanam evaṃbhūtasya ratyādeḥ samanantaram eva rasādirūpatayā bhāvanam* | *saṃcāraṇam tathābhūtasyaitasya samyak cāraṇam* | In other words, according to Viśvanātha, *vibhāvana* is the first manifestation of the germination of Rasa ; *anubhāvana* is the gradual corroboration of the Rasa which is on the point of appearing ; and *saṃcāraṇa* (which is not mentioned by A.G.) is the intensification or consolidation of the Rasa. *Saṃcāraṇa* according to Viśvanātha, is the specific operation of the *vyabhicāribhāva* (*saṃcāri=vyabhicāri*). The elaboration of these three stages is due, of course, to the necessity of allotting specific functions to the vibhāva, etc. Rasa is, in reality, single, and its manifestation does not have earlier and later stages. This division is of a purely didactic nature.

2) In so far as they are different from ordinary causes.

3) The determinants, etc. arouse the latent traces of the mental process of delight, etc., provoked by ordinary causes. They, thus, demand the presence of these traces and depend upon them.

4) *N.Ś.*, VII ; Abhinava Gupta's commentary on this chapter has not yet come to light.

not absolutely be maintained, as Śaṅkuka did, that what is called Rasa is simply a permanent sentiment, brought to our knowledge by the determinants, etc., and that, because this is the object of a relish, it takes the name of Rasa[1]. For, if things were so, why should Rasa not exist also in everyday life ? For if an unreal thing is capable of being the object of relish[2], a real thing has all the more reason to be capable of it. Thus, it is legitimate to say that the perception of a permanent mental state consists in an inference; but we certainly cannot rightly say that Rasa is also of this nature. This is the real reason[3] why Bharata has made no mention in the *sūtra* of the word " permanent sentiment "; on the contrary, the mention of it would have been a source of difficulties[4]. Such expressions as " The permanent sentiment becomes Rasa[5]", are due to

1) Rasa, says A. G., does not consist in the inference (in inferential cognition) of someone else's mental state (in which case it would be a cognition of a discursive order, *savikalpa*) but is a personal experience— the spectator identifies himself with this mental state and lives it himself. This observation is aimed at Śaṅkuka, who maintained that Rasa is simply a permanent mental state deduced by the spectators by means of the determinants, etc., and that the mental state perceived in this way is nothing but an imitation by the actor of the permanent mental state of the character he represents.

2) Therefore, the imitated permanent mental state is unreal.

3) I.e., Śaṅkuka's reason is not the real one ; cf. *supra*, p. 31.

4) Bharata did not say " The production of Rasa is provoked by the union of the permanent mental state (of someone else, i.e., the character represented), with the determinants, the consequents, and the transitory Mental Movements ". If he had, Rasa would simply be a perception of someone else's permanent mental movement.

5) Bharata says sometimes (cf. e.g., *N.Ś.*, VI, prose after v. 50 in a note) that the Permanent Mental State becomes Rasa ; such expressions, A.G. remarks, are only due to the " correspondence (analogy, etc.) ". Cf. the next note.

the correspondence (*aucitya*) only. This correspondence, to specify, is due to the fact that the very same things which were previously considered to be causes, etc., related to a given permanent sentiment, now serve to realize the gustation, and are thus presented in the form of determinants, etc[1]. What kind of a Rasa is there indeed, in the inference of an ordinary sentiment ? Therefore, the tasting of Rasa (which consists in a *camatkāra* different from any other kind of ordinary cognition) differs from both memory, inference and any form of ordinary self-consciousness[2]. Indeed, he who possesses the latent traces of the ordinary inferential processes, does not apprehend a young woman, etc.[3], as if he were indifferent to her[4], but, by virtue of his sensibility—which quality is consisting in a consent of heart—, he rather apprehends her, without mounting on the steps of memory, inference, etc., as if merged in a gustation, suitable to an identification (with this young woman, etc.), which is, so to say, the sprout of the tasting of Rasa, about to appear in all its fullness. This gustation, again, is not already born in the past, from some other means

1) *Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 89 : *śoke hi sthāyibhāve ye vibhāvānubhāvās tatsamucitā cittavṛttiś carvyamāṇātmā rasa ity aucityāt sthāyino rasatāpattir ity ucyate* | " Rasa is simply the tasting of the mental movement, corresponding, for example, to the determinants and the consequents of the mental state of sorrow. The expression: " the permanent mental state becomes Rasa ", arises solely, therefore, by correspondence ".

2) Forms of " ordinary self-consciousness " are, e.g., pleasure, pain, etc.

3) " A young woman " is a determinant ; "etc." here includes the consequents and the transitory mental states.

4) Impersonally, *Tāṭasthya* or *mādhyasthya*, indifference, is the exact opposite of *anupraveśa*, personal or active praticipation.

of knowledge, so that it is, now, a form of memory[1]; nor is it the fruit of the operation of ordinary means of cognition (direct perception, etc.); but it is aroused solely by the combination (*saṃyoga*) of the determinants, etc., which. as we have said, are of a non-ordinary nature.

This gustation is distinguished *a*) from perception of the ordinary sentiments (delight, etc.) aroused by the ordinary means of cognition (direct perception, inference, the revealed word, analogy, etc.); *b*) from cognition without active participation (*taṭastha*) of the thoughts of others, which is proper to the direct perception of the yogins[2]; *c*) and from the compact (*ekaghana*) experience of one's own beatitude, which is proper to *yogins* of higher orders (this perception is immaculate, free from all impressions [*uparāga*] deriving from external things).[3] Indeed, these three forms of cognition, being in due order (*yathāyogam*) subjected to the appearance of obstacles (practical desires, etc.), lacking evidence and at the mercy of the (adored) object[4], are deprived of beauty (*saundarya*).

1) Cf. *Dh. Ā. L.*, infra, App. II, p. 104.

2) Telepathy, the knowledge of other people's minds, is one of the *yogin* powers (*Yogasūtra,* III, 19: *pratyayasya paracittajñānam* ; this *sūtra* is quoted and commented by A.G. in *Ī.P.V.*, I, 2, 4, 5). This phenomenon, observes A.G., is of an order entirely different from the aesthetic experience. In it, in fact, the distinction between one's own self and the self of others (*svaparavibhāga*) continues to exist, while the aesthetic experience postulates the generalization of the mental states and therefore the suppression of every limited self.

3) Abhinava Gupta alludes, in this passage, to the highest degree of mystical experience which is free of any trace of ordinary things.

4) Mystical experience involves the annihilation of every pair of opposites ; everything is reabsorbed in its dissolving fire. Sun and moon,

Here, on the contrary, because of the absence [of sensations of pleasures, pain, etc.] as inhering exclusively in our own per-

night and day, beautiful and ugly, etc., no longer exist in it. The limited "I" is completely absorbed into Śiva or Bhairava, the adored object ; everything vanishes from the field of consciousness. Aesthetic experience, on the other hand, requires the presence of the latent traces of delight, etc., (aroused by the operation of the determinants, etc.). In other words, the aesthetic experience presupposes a pre-constituted knowledge on the part of the spectator, of the psychic reactions, etc., which are normally felt before a given situation. This knowledge is, in part, innate (it forms, that is, an integral part of human nature) and is, in part, acquired through the experience of one's own reactions and one's own observation of the reactions of others.

Aesthetic experience, Rasa, manifested by a poetical description of a beautiful woman, is, for example, coloured by the mental state of delight, which is aroused by the description itself. Such a mental state is supposed to preexist in the spectator in a latent state, in the form, that is, of *saṃskāra* or *vāsanā*. The Determinants which manifest aesthetic experience awaken, implicitly and of necessity, these latent traces also.

The beauty, the pleasantness proper to the aesthetic experience are due to the colouring of these mental processes ; cf. *A.Bh.* I, p. 290. *laukikāt pratyayād upārjanādivighnabahulād yogipratyayāc ca viṣayāsvādaśūnyatāparuṣād vilakṣaṇākārasukhaduḥkhādivicitravāsanānuvedhopanatahṛdyatātiśayasaṃviccarvaṇātmanā bhuñjate budhāḥ...* | "Aesthetic enjoyment consists in the tasting of one's own consciousness; this tasting is endowed with extreme pleasantness (beauty), which it obtains from a contact with the various latent traces of pleasure, pain, etc. It differs both from ordinary perception, which is full of obstacles (pragmatic requirements, etc.), and from the perception of the yogins, which is not free from harshness, on account of the total lack of any tasting of external objects ". Thus by comparison with the aesthetic experience, the compact homogeneity (*ekaghanatā*) of mystical experience possesses a certain harshness. Its pursuit, that is to say, calls for uncommon force and energy (cf. the concept of *vīra*, *hero*). Aesthetic experience, on the other hand, is easily attained. It is particularly suitable to people endowed

son, of an active participation in our own self (*svātmānupraveśāt*), of the absence [of the afore-mentioned sensations] as inhering exclusively in other persons, and the immersion (*āveśa*) in the latent traces of our own sentiments of delight, etc., reawakened by the corresponding determinants, etc., which are generalized— because, I say, of all these causes, the appearance of obstacles is impossible.[1] And all this has been said over and over again.

For this reason (*ata eva*) the determinants are not the causes of the production (*niṣpatti*) of Rasa; otherwise, Rasa should continue to exist even when they no longer fall under cognition. Nor are they the cause of its cognition (*jñapti*) (if

with a ' gentle mind ' (*sukumāramati*). In the *Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 51, A.G. defines Rasa in the following terms : *śabdasamarpyamāṇahṛdayasaṃvādasundaravibhāvānubhāvasamucitaprāgviniviṣṭaratyādivāsanānurāgasukumārasvasaṃvidānandacarvaṇāvyāpārarasanīyarūpo rasaḥ* | " Rasa is tasted through the act of tasting the beatitude of one's own consciousness. This tasting is pleasant (and not *paruṣa* as in mystical experience) in that the consciousness is coloured by the latent traces of the mental states of delight, etc., pre-existing (in the minds of the spectators). Such traces are aroused by the corresponding determinants and consequents, which—pleasant (beautiful, etc.,) by virtue of the consent of the heart—are afforded by the words ". Cf. *Dh.Ā.L.*,p. 81 : *anubhāvavibhāvāvabodhanottaram eva tanmayībhavanayuktyā tadvibhāvānubhāvocitacittavṛttivāsanānurañjitasvasaṃvidānandacarvaṇāgocaro 'rtho rasātmā sphuraty eva. . .* |

1) This passage has been somewhat modified and enlarged by Hemacandra (see the critical Apparatus) : " Here, on the contrary, because of the absence [of sensations of pleasure, pain, etc.] as inhering exclusively in our own person, we are not at the mercy of the [adored] object ; because of an active participation in our own self [and] the absence [of the afore-mentioned sensations] as inhering exclusively in other persons, there is no lack of evidence ; and because of the immersion in the latent traces of our own sentiments of delight, etc., reawakened by the corresponding determinants, etc., which are generalized, there is no possible appearance of obstacles ".

they were, they would have to be included among the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), because Rasa is not an objective thing (*siddha*), which could function as a knowable object. What is it, then, that is designated by the expressions, " determinants etc. ?" We reply to this question that the expressions " determinants etc. " do not designate any ordinary thing, but what serves to realize the gustation (*carvaṇopayogī*). Does any such thing appear elsewhere ? But the fact that it does not occur elsewhere, we reply, can do nothing but strengthen our thesis of their non-ordinary character. Does the taste of the *rasa* of *pānaka* perhaps occur in molasses, peppers, etc., (of which, however, it consists) ?[1] The case is perfectly analogous. " But (someone might say) in this way Rasa is not an object of cognition (*aprameya*) " That is what really occurs, we reply and suitably. Rasa, indeed, consists solely of a tasting and has not the nature of an object of cognition, etc. " But how then do you think that the expression which Bharata uses in the *sūtra* can be justified when he says : " The production of Rasa (*rasaniṣpatti*) " ? This expression, we reply, must be understood in the sense of a production not of the Rasa, but

1) See the *N.Ś.*, 287 ff. The example of *pānaka* is to be found fairly frequently in Indian philosophy. Cf. for example, *N.M.*, p. 341 : *evam padārthebhyo 'nya eva vākyārthaḥ pānakādivat, yathā pānakaṃ śarkarānāgakeśaramarīcādibhyo 'rthāntaram eva yathā ca sindūraharitālalākṣādibhyo 'rthāntaram eva citram, yathā vā ṣaḍjarṣabhagāndhāradhaivatādibhyo 'rthāntaram eva grāmarāgaḥ tathā padebhyo vākyam, padārthebhyo vākyārthaḥ* | " The meaning of a sentence differs from the meaning of the words (as happens with *pānaka*, etc.). Just as *pānaka* is different from sugar, spice, pepper, etc., just as a painting is different from minium, orpiment, lake etc., or as a piece of music is different from the various notes of which it is composed, so is the meaning of a phrase different from the meaning of the words ".

of the tasting which refers to the Rasa (*tadviṣayarasanā*). Likewise, if the expression " The production of Rasa " is understood in the sense of a production of a Rasa whose subsistence is exclusively depending on the said tasting, our thesis is not be set by any difficulty[1]. Besides, this tasting is neither the fruit of the operation of the means of cognition nor of the means of action. On the other hand, it can be said that, in itself, it is not ascertained by any means of aknowledge (*aprāmāṇika*), for its real existence is an inconfutable datum of our own consciousness (*svasaṃvedanasiddha*). This tasting, moreover, is, no doubt, solely a form of cognition, but a form of cognition different from any other ordinary perception. This difference is due to the fact that the means of it, that is, the determinants, etc., are of a non-ordinary character. To conclude : what is produced by the combination (*saṃyoga*) of the Determinants, etc., is the tasting (*rasanā*); and the Rasa is the non-ordinary reality, which is the matter of this tasting. This is the sense and purport of the sūtra.

All this may be summarized in the following way: in the first place, the identity of the actor as such is concealed by tiaras, headwear, etc.; in the second place, the idea that he is Rāma, etc., aroused by the power of the poem, nevertheless does not succeed in imposing itself upon the idea of the actor, for the latent traces of the said idea are strongly impressed on the spectator's minds. For this very reason, the spectator is no longer living either in the space and time of Rāma, etc.,

1) I.e., this expression might lend itself to interpretation in the sense that Rasa is something different from the act of cognition by which it is known, so that it would be an object of cognition. A.G.'s reply to this objection is that Rasa is the perception itself, and that the word Rasa does not denote anything distinct from the perception by which it is known.

nor in the space and time of the actor as such. Acts of horripilation, etc., which have repeatedly been seen by the spectator in the course of everyday life as indexes of delight, etc., serve, in this case, to make known a delight, etc., uncircumscribed by either time or space. In this delight, just because he possesses the latent traces of it in himself, the Self of the spectator also actively participates. For this very reason, this delight is perceived neither with indifference, from the outside, nor as if it were linked with a particular [ungeneralized] cause—for in this case, intrusion by pragmatic requirements, interests of gain, etc., would occur—, nor again as if it exclusively belonged to a defined third person—for, in this case, sensations of pleasure, hatred, etc. would occur in the spectator[1]. Thus, the Erotic Rasa is simply the feeling of delight—a feeling, however, which is both generalized and the object of a consciousness, which may be either single or develop consecutively[2]. The task of generalization is carried out by the determinants, etc.

1) Cf. supra, Intr., p. XXII, n. 1.

2) In the case of a play, long poem, etc. various moods of the soul occur n alternation with each other (Delight, Sorrow, etc.) ; in the case of a short poem there is generally speaking only one dominant motif.

Appendix I

Commentary on *N.Ś.*, I, st. 107 (*A. Bh.*, I, pp. 35-38).

nanu caivam apy asmatpṛṣṭhe kim etad yojitam ity āha

naikāntato 'tra bhavatāṃ devānāṃ cānubhāvanam |
trailokyasyāsya sarvasya nāṭyaṃ bhāvānukīrtanam ||

ayaṃ bhāvaḥ | na yuṣmatpṛṣṭhe kenacid etad yojitam | devāsurasya bahir yathāsvastham avasthānam | *atreti* nāṭyavede na devāsurāṇām ekāntenānubhāvanam | naiva te' nubhāvyante kenacit prakāreṇa | tathā hi teṣu na tattvena dhīḥ | na sādṛśyena yamalakavat | na bhrāntatvena rūpyasmṛtipūrvaka-śuktirūpyavat | nāropeṇa samyagjñānabādhānantara[1]mithyā-jñānarūpavat[2] | na tadadhyavasāyena gaur vahīka itivat[3] | notprekṣyamāṇatvena candramukhavat | na tatpratikṛtitvena citrapustavat | na tadanukāreṇa guruśiṣyavyākhyāhevākavat | na tātkālikanirmāṇenendrajālavat | na yuktiviracitatadābhāsa-tayā hastalāghavādimāyāvat | sarveṣv eteṣu pakṣeṣv asādhā-raṇatayā draṣṭur audāsīnye rasāsvādāyogāt | kaveś ca niya-tavarṇanīyaniścitatve kāvyasyaivāsampatter anaucityāvarjanā-yogāt | laukikamithunadṛśīva sāṃsārikaharṣakrodhānvayi-tāpatter[4] ubhayadarśanākulatayā[5] mukhyadṛṣṭau[6] prayoktṛdṛṣṭāv anusaṃdhisaṃpattyabhāvāt[7] | kiṃ tarhy etat | āha *trailo-kasyeti* | etad uktaṃ bhavati |

[1] °*nantara*° G : °*nantaram* M || [2] *mithyājñānarūpavat* : *mithyājñāna-rūpam* G : *mithyājñānarūpyam* M || [3] *gaur vahīka itivat* M : *gaur vāhīkavat* G || [4] °*nvayitāpatter* G : °*navyitayāpatter* M (corrected in a second hand into °*nvayitatāpatter* | [5] °*darśanākulatayā* : °*darśanaku* (corrected into *m* (sic) *latayā* G : °*darśanakūlatayā* M || [6] *mukhyadṛṣṭau* G : *mukhadṛṣṭau* M || [7] *anusaṃdhisaṃpattyabhāvāt* is a doubtful correction of mine : *taddhi saṃpattya* (corrected into *dvisaṃvittya*) *bhāvāt* G: *skandhisaṃpattyabhāvāt* M ||

etādṛśaṃ te rāmādayo na kadācana pramāṇapatham avātaran | te [1] yadāgamena varṇyante tadā tadviśeṣabuddhir [2] yady api rāmāyaṇaprāyād ekasmān mahāvākyād ullasati tathāpi vartamānatayaiva viśeṣāṇām saṃbhāvyamānārthakriyāsāmarthyātmakasvālakṣaṇya[3]paryavasānān na ca teṣāṃ vartamānatety upagatā [4] tāvad viseṣabuddiḥ | kāvyeṣv api [5] hṛdaya eva tāvat sādhāraṇībhāvo vibhāvādīnāṃ jātaḥ | tatrāpi kathāmātre sādhāraṇībhāvaḥ saṃbhavati yady api tathāpy 'evaṃ ye kurvanti teṣām etad bhavati' itivākyavad rañjanātiśayābhāvān na cittavṛttir [6] nirṇayagatā bhavati | kāvye tu guṇālaṃkāramanoharaśabdaśarīre lokottararasaprāṇake [7] hṛdayasaṃvādavaśān nimagnākārikā [8] tāvad bhavati cittavṛttiḥ | kiṃ tu sarvasya pratyakṣasākṣātkārakalpā tatra na dhīr udeti [9] | nāṭye tu pāramārthikaṃ kiṃcid adya me kṛtyaṃ bhaviṣyatītyevaṃbhūtābhisaṃdhisaṃskārābhāvāt sarvapariṣatsādhāraṇapramodasāraparyantavirasanādaraṇīyalokottaradarśanaśravaṇayogī bhaviṣyāmītyabhisaṃdhisaṃskārād ucitagītātodyacarvaṇāvismṛta[10]sāṃsārikabhāvatayā vimalamukurakalpībhūtanijahṛdayaḥ sūcyādyabhinayāvalokanodbhinnapramodaśokatanmayībhāvaḥ pāṭhyākarṇanapātrāntarapraveśavaśāt samutpanne deśakālaviśeṣāveśānāliṅgite samyaṅmithyāsaṃśayasaṃbhāvanādijñānavijñeyatvaparāmarśānāspade rāmarāvaṇādiviṣayādhyavasāye tatsaṃskārānuvṛttikāraṇabhūtatatsahacarahṛdyavasturūpagītātodyapramadānubhavasaṃskārasūcita-

[1] *avataran* | *te* : *avatāryante* G : *avatārayaste* M || [2] °*buddhir* G : °*siddhir* M || [3] °*svālakṣaṇya*° : °*sālakṣaṇya*° G : °*syalakṣaṇya*° M || [4] *upagatā* G : *avagata* (perhaps corrected into *apagatā*) M || [5] *kāvyeṣv api hṛdaya eva* (*hṛdaya eva* corrected from *hṛdayam eva*) G : *kavyeryavihṛdayadeva* M || [6] *cittavṛttir* (corrected from *cittavṛtter*) G : *cittavṛtter* M || [7] *lokottararasaprāṇake* G : *lokottararasam prāṇate* M || [8] *nimagnākārikā* G : *nimagnākāratān* M || [9] *udeti* G : *udayati* M || [10] °*carvaṇāvismṛta*° G : °*varṇanāc ca vismṛta* ° M |

samanugatataduktarūparāmādhyavasāyasaṃskāra eva bhavan pañcaṣair divasaiḥ sacamatkāras[1] tadīyacaritamadhyapraviṣṭasvātmarūpamatiḥ svātmadvāreṇa viśvaṃ tathā pasyan pratyekaṃ sāmājiko deśakālaviśeṣaṇāparāmarśena " evaṃkāriṇām idam " iti liṅātmaka[2]vidhisamarpaka[3]saṃvijjātīyam eva saṃvidviśeṣarañjakaṃ[4]prāṇavallabhāpratimaṃ[5] rasāsvāda[6]sahacararamyagītātodyādisaṃskāraṃ[7] rasānubhavavaśena[8] hṛdayābhyantaranikhātaṃ tata evotpuṃsana[9]śatair api mlānimātram apy abhajamānaṃ bhajaṃs tattacchubhāśubhaprepsājihāsāsatatasyūtavṛttitvād eva śubham ācaraty aśubhaṃ samujjhati |

idānīm upāyasaṃvedanālābhāt tad idam *anukīrtanam* anuvyavasāyaviśeṣo nāṭyāparaparyāyaḥ | nānukāra iti bhramitavyam anena | bhāṇḍena rājaputrasyānyasya vānukṛtāv[10] anyādibuddher abhāvāt tad vikaraṇam[11] iti prasiddhaṃ hāsamātraphalaṃ madhyasthānām | yadabhiprāyeṇa munir vakṣyati " paraceṣṭānukaraṇād dhāsas samupajāyate "[12] | tatpakṣyāṇāṃ[13] tu tad eva dveṣāsūyānuvṛttyā[14]diphalam | tadbuddhyaiva hi daityānāṃ hṛdayakṣobhaḥ evambhūtā vayam upahāsabhājanam iti | upahāsyatābhīravaś ca nivartante tataḥ | na tūpadeśena | nanv evam tāvatā niyatānukāro mā bhūt | anukāreṇa tu kim aparāddham | na kiṃcid asaṃbhavād ṛte | anukāra iti hi sadṛśakaraṇam | tat kasya |

[1] *sacamatkāras* : *sacamatkara°* G,M || [2] *liṅātmaka°* G (corrected from *līḍhātmaka°*) : *līḍhātmaka°* M || [3] *°samarpaka°* : *°samarpitam* G : *°samarpakam* M || [4] *°rañjakam* : *°rañjaka°* G,M | [5] *°pratimam* : *°pratima°* G,M || [6] *rasāsvāda°* G : *rasāsvāde* M || [7] *°saṃskāram* : *saṃskāra* G,M || [8] *rasānubhavaśena* G (corrected from *rasāvaśena*) : *rasā. . .vasena* M || [9] *tpuṃsana°* M : *°tpuṅkha°* G | [10] *nyasya vānukṛtāv* (corrected from *vānukṛte*) G : *nyāsyavāganukṛte* M || [11] *tad vikaraṇam* : *tad dhi vikaraṇam* (corrected from *vikāraṇam*) G : *tad dhi kāraṇam* M || [12] *N.Ś.*, VII, 10 | [13] *tatpakṣyāṇām* M : *tatpakṣīyāṇām* G || [14] *°nuvṛtty°* (corrected from *°nivṛtty°*) G : *°nivṛtty°* M ||

na tāvad rāmasya | tasyānanukāryatvāt | etena pramadādivibhāvānām anukaraṇam parākṛtam | na cittavṛttīnāṃ śokakrodhādirūpāṇām | na hi naṭo rāmasadṛśaṃ svātmanaḥ śokaṃ karoti | sarvathaiva tasya tatrābhāvāt | bhāve vānanukāratvāt | na cānyad vastv asti yac chokena sadṛśam syāt | anubhāvāṃs tu karoti | kiṃ tu sajātīyān [1] eva | na tu tatsadṛśān | sādhāraṇarūpasya kaḥ kena sadṛśyārthas trailokyavartinaḥ | sadṛśatvam tu na viśeṣātmanā yaugapadyenopapadyate kadācit | krameṇa niyata evānukṛtaḥ syāt | sāmānyātmakatve ko' nukārārthaḥ | tasmād aniyatānukāro [2] nāṭyam ity api na bhramitavyam | asmadupādhyāyakṛte kāvyakautuke 'py ayam evābhiprāyo mantavyaḥ | na tv aniyatānukāro 'pi | tenānuvyavasāya[3]viśeṣaviṣayīkāryaṃ nāṭyam | tathā hy āhāryaviśeṣādinā nivṛtte taddeśakālacaitramaitrādinaṭaviśeṣapratyakṣābhimāne viśeṣaleśopakrameṇa ca vinā pratyakṣāpravṛtter āpāte [4] rāmādiśabdasyātropayogāt prasiddhatadarthatayādaraṇīyacaritavācakasyāsambhāvanāmātranirākaraṇenānuvyavasāyasya pratyakṣakalpatā, [5] hṛdyagītādyanusyūtatayā camatkārasthānatvād dhṛdayānupraveśayogyatvam, abhinayacatuṣṭayena svarūpapracchādanam, prastāvanādinā naṭajñānajasaṃskārasācivyam, tena rañjakasāmagrīmadhyānupraviṣṭena pracchāditasvasvabhāvena prākpravṛttalaukikapratyakṣānumānādijanitasaṃskārasahāyena [6] naṭajñānasaṃskārasacivena hṛdayasaṃvādatanmayībhavanasahakāriṇā prayoktrā dṛśyamānena yo 'nuvyavasāyo janyate sukhaduḥkhādyākāratattaccittavṛttirūṣita[7]nijasaṃvidānandaprakāśamayo 'ta eva vicitro rasanāsvādanacamatkāracarvaṇa-

[1] *sajātīyān* G : *jātīyān* M || [2] *tasmād anityata*° G : *tasyāyata* M || [3] °*nuvyavasāya* : °*nuvyavasāyavat* G,M | [4] °*āpyāte* : °*āyāte* G, M | [5] *pratyakṣakalpatā* : *pratyakṣakalpanātye* G : *pratyakṣakalpanā* M || [6] °*tanmayībhavana*° : °*tanmayībhāvanā*° G,M || [7] °*rūṣita*° : °*rūparūṣita*° G : °*ruparūpita*° M ||

nirveśabhogādyaparaparyāyaḥ, tatra ya avabhāsate vastu[1] tan nāṭyam |

tac ca jñānākāramātram āropitam svarūpaṃ[2] sāmānyātmakaṃ tatkālanirmitarūpaṃ cānyad vā[3] kiṃcid astu | nātrāprastutalekhanenātmano darśanāntarakathāparicayaprakaṭanaphalena prakṛtavastunirūpaṇavighnam ācarantaḥ sahṛdayān khedayāmaḥ | tasmād anuvyavasāyātmakam kīrtanaṃ rūṣitavikalpasaṃvedanaṃ nāṭyam | tadvedanavedyatvāt | na tv anukaraṇarūpam | yadi tv evam mukhyalaukikakaraṇānusāritayā 'nukaraṇam ity ucyate tan na kaścid doṣaḥ | sthite vastuto bhede śabdapravṛtter avivādāspadatvāt | etac ca yathāvasaraṃ vitaniṣyata ity āstām tāvat | yataś cedam nānukaraṇaṃ tato yat kaiścic coditam tad anavakāśam |

[1] *vastu* G : *'stu* M || [2] *svarūpam* G : *svarūpam*. . .M || [3] *cānyad vā* G : *cānyathā*° M |

TRANSLATION

" But how is it that this burden (viz. the defeat) has been imposed on our back ?"[1] To this question the author replies :

Here, by no means, is there a representation of you and the gods (*N. Ś.*, I. v. 107 a).

The sense intended in this verse is that nobody has imposed such a burden on your back. Both the demons and the gods stay outside, at ease. Here, that is, in the Nāṭyaveda anyway, those who are seen are not the real demons and the gods. As to them, indeed, there arises neither the idea of reality, nor of similitude, as in the case of twins ; nor of illusion, as in the case of the illusion of a piece of mother-of-pearl, preceded by knowledge of a piece of silver ; nor of super-imposition, as when wrong knowledge follows after vitiating the right one ; nor of identity, as when one says 'this peasant is a cow' ; nor of a poetical fancy, as when the moon is fancied as the face of the night, etc.; nor of copy, as in the case of a painted model; nor of reproduction, as in the case of the counterfeit representation of the instruction imparted by a teacher to his students ; nor of sudden creation, as in magic; nor of an appearance effected by tricks, as in sleight of hand, etc. In all these cases, indeed, there is a lack of generalization so that the on-

1) According to *N.Ś.*, vv. 99-106, Drama has not been instituted by Brahmā to cast an unfavourable light on the demons (Daitya, Vighna etc.), but to represent impartially acts and ideas both of gods and demons. Demons have no reason to be afraid of it and to spoil the dramatic performance. Here the objector is a hypothetical *daitya* and the " burden" is the defeat of the demons by the gods, which was the argument of the first dramatical production. (see *N. Ś.*, vv. 54 ff).

looker, being consequently in a state of indifference, will not logically be able to be pervaded by the relish of Rasa. Again, if the poet aims at a too specific (*niyata*) subject-matter, poetry will not be accomplished, and he will not be able to avoid the fault of impropriety (*anaucitya*).[1] Further, as it happens at the sight of a pair of lovers united together, the mind of onlookers will rather became the prey of the ordinary, actual feelings of delight, rage, and so on.[2] Eventually, (we may here add) that whenever the mind of the spectators is troubled by the sight of two different individuals, viz. the represented personage and the actor, the (necessary) unification (*anusaṃdhi*) between them cannot take place.

What is then drama ? The author answers :

Drama is the re-narration of the things of all the three worlds (*N. Ś.*, I, v. 207 b).

The sense intended in this verse is as follows. These personages, i.e., Rāma, etc., have never come down into the path of our means of knowledge. Now, when they are described in the scriptures there is no doubt, it is true, that the Rāmāyaṇa-like narrations, that is to say, these unique great sentences,[3] give rise to the idea of the individual essence

1) See, on the idea of *aucitya*, V. Raghavan, *Some Concepts of the Alaṃkāra Śāstra*, Adyar, 1942, pp. 194-257. " Proportion and harmony"—says V. Raghavan, ib. p. 208—"form an aspect of Aucitya, which is propriety, adaptation, and other points of appropriateness. From the point of view of the perfect agreement between the parts and the chief element of Rasa, from the point of view of this proportion and harmony, I think, Aucitya can be rendered in English into another word also viz., ' Sympathy ', which as a word in art-criticism means ' mutual conformity of parts".

2) See supra, p. 44.

3) " The principal clause and the subordinate clauses which are mutually connected together by expectancy, consistency and proximity form a

(*viśeṣa*) of each of them. This idea, however, is not contrasting with the concept of generalization and its presence causes therefore no difficulty. The individual essences, indeed, amount to a real individuality (*svālakṣaṇya*), possessed of a corresponding causal efficiency (*arthakriyā*), only when they are contemporary with us—which contemporaneity, in this case, does not exist.[1] This state of generalization of the determinants, etc., arises even in poems proper and, in this case, it penetrates directly into the heart. Even then, although the generalization can occur in mere tales (*kathā*), nevertheless there

mahāvākya, when they serve a single purpose" (K. Kunjunni Raja, *Indian Theories of Meaning*, Adyar 1963, p. 161).

1) *a*) The perception of the particular names and shapes of Rāma, etc. (therefore of their qualifications of time, space, etc.); does not involve that they cannot be perceived in a generalized form. A personality, etc., inserts itself into our practical life (develops, so to say, its causal efficiency) only when it is contemporary with us, i.e., connected with the present and therefore with the practical interests, etc., of our own Ego. When these personalities are not contemporary, they cannot develop their natural causal efficiency. In the aesthetic perception, they are independent from the concepts both of reality and non-reality, and are thus perceived as "generalized". In this sense, their particularity (*viśeṣa*) is not contrasting with the concept of generality.

b) In this context, *svālakṣaṇya* is simply a synonym of *svarūpa*, one's own form or shape, one's own peculiar nature, hence individuality, etc. *Svālakṣaṇya* is commented on by A.G. in this way in the *Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 538. The causal efficiency (*arthakriyā* ; on this concept, cf. p. 31, n. 7) in the sense of practical or pragmatical functionality belongs to the real individuality (i.e., contemporary with the spectator) only. The generalized image of the aesthetic experience has no practical efficiency, i.e., does not insert itself in practical life. The concept of causal efficiency in connexion with the one of individuality (in the sense of a particular essence contrasting with the general essence, the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) has a Buddhist origin and, freely interpreted, became part of the common philosophical vocabulary.

lacking a great impressive feeling (*rañjanā*), as in the case of the sentence, ' Such and such a thing happens to them who do such and such a thing'), the corresponding state of mind is not well decided. In poetry, on the contrary (and let us remember here that the body of poetry is made up of words embellished by qualities and figures of speech, with Rasa as its life, the Rasa of a non-ordinary nature) every state of mind is, so to say, completely immerged,thanks to a consent of heart. This idea, to be confronted with a kind of direct perception or experience (*pratyakṣasākṣātkārakalpa*) does not arise, however, in every person [who is hearing or reading a poem].

In drama this difficulty does not arise.[1] The nature of it may be resumed as follows. Firstly, in drama there is the absence, within us, of the intention : ' Today I must do something practical' and the presence, in its place, of the intention : ' Today I am going to enjoy sights and sounds of a non-ordinary nature deserving of attention, which will arouse, at the end, no sensation of disgust[2] and whose essence is a generalized pleasure shared by all the spectators. The relish of suitable vocal and instrumental music makes then the spectator forget about his practical existence (*saṃsārikabhāva*), and, his heart consequently being turned as clear as a spotless mirror he becomes capable of identifying himself with the mental states

1) Some individuals whose aesthetic sensibility (consent of the heart, etc.) is poor, need visual illustration of what is suggested by the power of the poem; such visual illustration (consisting of the actors, etc.) contributes to bring about the immersion of the spectator in the events represented to the exclusion of everything else.

2) In other words, at the end of the performance and therefore of the state of pleasure caused by it, there is no such sensation of disgust, as accompanies all ordinary pleasures.

of sorrow, delight, etc., sprung from the sight of the gestures and of the other species of representation. Listening to the recitation makes the spectator enter into the life of a character different from himself, and, as a result, there grows up in him a cognition whose object is Rāma, Rāvaṇa and so on. This cognition is not circumscribed by any limitation of space and time, and is free from all those forms of thought concerning which is the matter of knowledge, which is either mistaken, or uncertain, or probable, etc. That is not all. The spectator is accompanied by the impressions of this cognition (whose object was Rāma, etc.) and then by a kind of *camatkāra* for several days.[1] These impressions are evidenced, in their turn, by other ones, deposited within him by the direct perception of the various pleasure-producing things—women, vocal and instrumental musics—which accompanied the performance. These last impressions are the very cause of the continuation of the first ones. But let us revert to the spectator. His own self continues to be merged in the represented exploits, and through it, he goes on seeing everything in this light. This impression of the vocal and instrumental musics and of the other delightful things—that, as we have seen, accompany the relish of Rasa, are not to be compared to [the pleasure given to us by the sight of] our beloved one, and colour the consciousness in a special way—gives birth, within him, to a kind of injunction suitable to be expressed by the optative mode, that is : ' Such and-such a thing (must happen) to those who do such-and-such a thing '. This injunction is free of every spatial and temporal specification. The afore-mentioned impression by virtue of

1) Cf. *Mṛcchakaṭikā*, III, 5 : *yat satyaṃ virate 'pi gītasamaye gacchām śṛṇvann iva* | " To tell the truth, although the song is ended, I seem to hear it as I walk ".

the Rasa-experience, remains deeply fixed in the heart, like an arrow, in such a way that by no possible effort can it be eased, let alone extracted.[1] Thanks to it, the desires of attaining the good and abandoning the bad are constantly present in the mind of the spectator, who accordingly does the good and avoids the bad.

Now then, as there is no awareness of (the actor being) a means, the meaning of the term re-narration, found in the stanza, is a particular re-perception (the word " drama " is but a synonym for it), and not a reproduction. We deserve not to be deceived by the latter. When, indeed, a prince or some other personage is reproduced in jest, the spectators do not have the idea that the actor is some one other, etc. Such a performance is known, indeed, as a " deformation ", and, as such, gives rise to nothing but laughter in the onlookers. This was just the purpose of Bharata, who said : ' Laughter arises from a reproduction of other people's actions (*N.Ś.*, VII, 10) '. In the reproduced personages, on the other hand, this mimicry gives rise to feelings of hatred, indignation and so on. The agitation of heart in the Demons was caused, indeed, by this very thought: ' We have thus become a vessel of derision[2].' Their abstention too [from spoiling the drama] is caused by this fear of becoming an object of derision and not by the teaching (of Brahmā).

' Well ', someone might say, ' let me even admit that drama is not a reproduction of specific things ; however, of which is

1) A similar expression is to be found in the *I.P.V.V.*, I, p. 37 : *prasiddhiśatapūrṇe jīvaloke kasyacit kācid eva prasiddhiḥ " līneva pratibimbiteva likhitevāntarnikhāteva ca* (*Mālatīmādhava*, v. 10) " *iti nyāyena hṛdayabhittau utpāṭanaśatair api hṛdayam anunmūlya nāpasarpati* ||

2) Cf. supra, p. 6.

reproduction *tout cour* guilty ?' To this question we answer that, surely, it is guilty of nothing, with the only exception of a logical impossibility. The word reproduction, indeed, means the production of similar things. But similar to whom ? Surely, not to Rāma, etc., because it is not possible to reproduce him. And, by this very argument, the reproduction, too, of his particular determinants (women, etc.) is refuted. Further, even his state of mind, as, f.i., sorrow, anger, etc. The actor, indeed, does not produce, within him, a sorrow similar to that of Rāma, because such a sorrow is totally absent in him; and, if it were actually in him, it would no more be a reproduction. Nor, again, is there some other thing which may be similar to the sorrow of Rāma. ' Perhaps ', some might say, ' the consequents he produces are similar to those of Rāma '. But to this question too we answer that they are not similar, but of the same species. As to a universal thing (*sādhāraṇa*), common to all the three worlds,[1] what is, in fact, the sense of this term ' similarity '—similarity to what [2] ? Similarity, indeed—similarity to a particular thing—cannot ever take place simultaneously; only a specific thing may be reproduced, and that also only gradually. What is then the sense of reproduction, as to a generic thing ? Therefore, we deserve not to be deceived by this theory viz., that drama is a reproduction of non specific things. This is what our master intended to say in his *Kāvyakautuka* too, and not, surely, that drama is a reproduction of non specific things.

Drama is then a matter of cognition by a special form of re-perception (*anuvyavasāya*). In the first place, indeed,

1) And therefore simultaneously present in all individuals.

2) Consequents are a universal reality, common to all people.

thanks to garments, make-up and the other forms of representation, the presumption to be confronted with the direct perception of a particular actor (Caitra, Maitra, etc.) and of his particular space and time ceases to exist ; in the second place, since direct perception cannot take place without at least a minimum of particularization, recourse is had to such names as Rāma, etc. The fact that these are the names of famous personages eliminates indeed the possibility that one who declaims their exploits deserving of attention might provoke in the spectators the hindrance of unverisimilitude. Owing to all this, this re-perception is like a form of direct perception. Further, because the scene represented, being accompanied by pleasure-giving vocal musics, etc., is a source of *camatkāra*, it is possessed of a natural suitability to penetrate into the heart. Again, the four forms of representation hide the true identity of the actor. Eventually, the prologue, etc., give to spectators the [constant] impression that they have to do with an actor. The actor, being seen, arouses, then, in the spectators, a re-perception (called, too, tasting, sampling, *camatkāra*, relish, immersion, enjoyment, etc.), which, though consisting in the light and bliss of our own consciousness, is still affected by various feelings, and is therefore varied. Drama is only what appears in this re-perception. In this connexion, the actor is immerged in the afore-said colouring combination (of determinants, etc.); his real identity is hidden; he possesses mental impressions arising from direct, inferential and other forms of ordinary perception which have occurred in the past; he is provided with mental impressions of the awareness of being an actor, and he partakes in creating the identification of the spectators with the representation, and that through their heart's consent. But let us revert to what appears in the aforementioned re-perception. This may equally be considered either as

an inner image of our own knowledge, or as a generic superimposed image, or again as a sudden creation, or even as some other thing. Anyway, we have no intention of boring here our sensible readers with these discussions, removed from the chief subject-matter. They, indeed, would only amount to showing off our acquaintance with other systems, and to be a hindrance to the subject under discussion.

To sum up, drama is only a ' narration ' (*kīrtana*), made up of a re-perception, a form of consciousness affected by discursive cognitions (*rūṣitavikalpasaṃvedana*)—it is, indeed, thus perceived—and not a form of reproduction. If, however, you say that it is a reproduction, in the sense that it follows the " production " of real, ordinary life, there is no fault. Once facts have been clearly determined, words do not deserve to be a source of disagreement. But we will expound that later. For the time being, this is sufficient.

Commentary on *Dh. Ā.*, I, 18.

As to poetry, which conveys the determinants and the consequents, there is no possible appearance of any element which could provoke the unsuitability of the primary meaning ; and, therefore, there is in this sense little room for metaphor [1]. " But "—someone might argue—what has it to do with unsuitability ? The nature of metaphor has indeed been defined as follows. " The metaphor is said to be the apprehension of a sense connected with the sense directly expressed [2]. Now in poetry, we see that the Rasas are connected with the determinants, the consequents etc., which are directly expressed; indeed, the determinants and the consequents are respectively the causes and the effects of Rasas, and the transitory states co-operate with them ". Your objection, I reply, does not stand to reason. If it be right, indeed, when, thanks to the word

1) See, on the nature of the metaphor, the study of K. Kunjunni Raja, *op. cit.*,pp. 229-273. " The three essential conditions—he says, pp. 231-32—generally accepted by the later Ālaṃkārikas as necessary in *lakṣaṇā* or transfer are (*a*) the inapplicability or the unsuitability of the primary meaning in the context, (*b*) some relation between the primary and the actual referent of the word, and (*c*) sanction for the transferred sense by popular usage, or a definite motive justifying the transfer. Of these three conditions the first two are accepted by all writers ; but the motive element justifying the use of a metaphor which has not received the sanction of established usage is not stressed by the earlier writers; even later writers belonging to the other school of thought are not interested in the motive element in *lakṣaṇā* ; it is only the literary critics who give great prominence to it ".

2) Kumārila, *Tantravārttika*, I, 4, 23. See on all that, R. Gnoli, *Udbhaṭa's Commentary on the Kāvyālaṃkāra of Bhāmaha*, Roma 1962, pp. XXXIV-XXXV.

'smoke', the smoke has been apprehended, there would arise also the idea of fire, just effected by the afore-said metaphor; and again, from fire, there would arise the idea of removing coldness, and so on, so that words could no more have any fixed meaning. On the other hand, if you answer to this, saying that, since the word 'smoke' is reposed in its own sense, its power cannot actually extend to fire and so on, then the consequence of your argumentation is one only, namely, that the seed of the metaphor is the unsuitability of the primary meaning, because, only if this is present, the afore-said repose of a word in its own sense can be lacking. Now, in the conveying of the determinants, etc., there is no element which can provoke the unsuitability of the primary meaning.

At this point, someone might perhaps urge that the apprehension of the feelings of delight, etc., immediately follows the apprehension of the determinants, etc., just as the idea of fire immediately follows the perception of smoke, and that, being it so, there is little room, in this case, for a power inherent in words. But, instead of answering to this objection, I will pose a question to this clever logician, who knows so well the nature of perception, and it is the following : Do you think that the apprehension of Rasa is merely the apprehension of the feelings of some other person ? You do not deserve to fall into such a mistake. In this case, indeed, the said apprehension would be but an inference of the feelings proper to such and such people ; what sort of a Rasa could it then possess ? But the tasting of Rasa, which is made up of a non-ordinary *camatkāra* and is animated by the gustation of the determinants, etc., proper to poetry, cannot certainly be so contemned as to be placed on the same level as the ordinary processes of memory, inference, etc. Rather, the truth is that he whose heart possesses the latent traces of the ordinary inferential process from the

effect to the cause, etc., does not apprehend the determinants and so on, as if he were indifferent; being instead at the mercy of his own sensibility—which quality is also called consent of heart—, he rather apprehends them without mounting on the path of memory, inference, etc., as if merged in a gustation, suitable to an identification (with the determinants, etc.), which is, so to say, the sprout of the tasting of Rasa, about to appear in all its fullness. This tasting, again, is not already born in the past, from some other means of knowledge, so that it is, now, a form of memory; nor is it arisen now from some other means of knowledge, for as to a non-ordinary thing, the direct perception, etc., are devoid of any power. Hence, the expressions 'determinant', etc., are of a non-ordinary nature; for as Bharata himself has said: "The word 'determinant' is used for the sake of clear knowledge" [1]. In everyday life, they are called causes, not determinants. The term 'consequent' is, it too, non-ordinary. 'Because the representation"—Bharata says—"by means of words, gestures and the temperament, makes one experience (the mental states) it is called "consequent" [2]. This experiencing, provoked by the consequents, is nothing but an identification with the said feelings. In everyday life, they are called effects, not consequents. Therefore, just with this view in mind, namely, that we do not apprehend a feeling of others, Bharata has made no mention of the permanent mental states in the sūtra: "Out of the union of the determinants, the consequents and the transitory mental states, the birth of Rasa takes place". On the contrary, the

1) *N.Ś.*, VII, prose after st. 3.
2) *N.Ś.*, VII, prose after st. 4.

mention of it would have been a source of difficulty. Such expressions as " The permanent mental state becomes Rasa " are due to correspondence only—because, that is to say, the gustation arises, beautiful as it is, thanks to the trace, latent within us, of the feeling correspondent to the determinants and the consequents ; and because in wordly life, in the stage, that is, of the knowledge of the feelings of others—a knowledge, let us say, truly indispensable as regards the consent of heart—we are able to apprehend the permanent feelings of delight, etc., from things as gardens, bristling of the hairs, and so on. The transitory mental state, is no doubt a feeling, but, since it is enjoyed in so far as it is entirely dependent on the principal one, it is reckoned by Bharata amongst the determinants and the consequents[1].

Therefore, the ' birth of Rasa ', mentioned in the sūtra, must be intended as the birth of a relishing[2] —which relishing is a sort of immersion in a gustation, appearing as superior to all the other ordinary feelings of delight, etc., that may be aroused by different causes, as, f.i., meeting with a friend, and appear to develop gradually. This gustation, therefore, is only a manifestation, not a revelation—which is the operation of the means of knowledge—, and not even a production—which is the operation of the means of action.

" But "—at this point someone might argue—" if this gustation is neither a cognition nor a production, then what is it ?" But we reply—have we not said that this Rasa is of a non-ordinary nature ? What are, then, these determinants ?

1) The mention of it, therefore, gives rise to no difficulty.

2) If we take literally the expression of the sūtra, the result would be that the Rasa is no more a non-ordinary reality. The birth indeed, requires some means of action, and these, as such, are of an ordinary nature.

Are they revealing causes or producing causes ? We reply to this question that they are neither revealing nor producing, but only something which serves to realize the gustation. Does any such thing appear elsewhere ? But for the very reason why it does not appear we say that it is of a non-ordinary nature. But (someone might say) in this way Rasa is not an object of cognition (*aprameya*). Let us admit it, we reply—and what of it ? For, since from its gustation, pleasure and instruction derive, what other do you desire ? But, you might say, it is not ascertained by any means of knowledge. This is untrue, we reply, because its real existence is an unconfutable datum of our own consciousness ; besides, this gustation is only a particular form of knowledge. And that is enough. Therefore, the said Rasa is of a non-ordinary nature—so that even alliterations of harsh or soft sounds can be suggestive of it; though they are of no use as to meaning. Here, then, there is not even the shadow of the metaphor.

APPENDIX III

Commentary on *Dh. Ā.*, II, 4.

Now, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka says [1].—If the Rasa were perceived as present in a third party, the spectator should be in a state of indifference. On the other hand, the poem—which, f.i., might describe the story of Rāma—does not make the reader to perceive it as really present in him, because that would imply this admission, namely that there is a birth of Rasa in his own self. Now this birth does not stand to reason, because Sītā does not play the role of a determinant as regards the spectator. " But " —someone may perhaps say—" that which causes her to be a determinant is the general idea of loverness, which, shared by her, is the cause of the awakening of the latent impressions. " But —I reply to this objection—how can that happen as regards a description of deities, etc ? Further, no memory of his own beloved one does arise in the spectator's consciousness (while he looks at Sītā). Again it is possible that the construction of a bridge on the ocean and the other determinants of this kind, proper to some extraordinary personages as Rāma and so on, may become general ? Nor it can be said that what occurs is simply the memory of Rāma, as endowed of heroism, etc., in so far as the spectator has had no such previous experience. Even assuming that he is perceived through verbal testimony (*śabda*), there cannot be any birth of Rasa, just as in the case of a pair of lovers united together, perceived through direct knowledge. Moreover, according to the thesis which maintains that Rasa is produced, the birth of the Pathetic

1) See, on the exposition of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's theory, supra, **Introd.**, p. XX, ff.

Rasa would make the perceiver to experience pain, and, consequently, he would go no more to pathetic representations. Therefore, that is not a production and not even a manifestation. Indeed, if it is supposed that a Rasa—f. i., the Erotic one—first pre-exists in a potential form and is later manifested, then (the determinants must necessarily) illuminate it little by little. Besides, the difficulties already met with would recur : is Rasa manifested as really present in our own self, or as present in a third party ? Therefore, Rasa is neither perceived, nor produced, nor manifested by the poem. The truth is that the poetic word is different from the other ones. This happens thanks to three distinct powers, which are so to speak, its parts (*aṃśa*) : that is to say, the power of denotation, which has, as its object, the expressed sense ; the power of revelation, which has, as its object, the Rasa; and the power of bringing about enjoyment, which has, as its object, the individuals who are possessed of heart. If in poetry there were, indeed, one power only, i.e., the power of denotation, without the other ones, what a difference would still remain between the various ornaments, as alliteration, etc., and the treatises illustrating them ? And together with the ornaments the various styles also would result useless. And, again, what would be the purpose of avoiding cacophony, etc ? Therefore, there is a second power, called 'revelation of Rasa', thanks to which the language of poetry is different from any other. This power, the so-called revelation, proper to poetry is nothing but the faculty of generalizing the determinants. Once the Rasa has been revealed, there is the enjoyment of it. This enjoyment, which is different from any other kind of perception, as direct knowledge and memory, consists of the states of fluidity, enlargement and expansion, is characterized by a resting, by a lysis, in our own consciousness, constituted by *sattva* and

intermixed with *rajaḥ* and *tamaḥ*, and is similar to the tasting of the supreme *brahman*. The chief member of poetry is only this, quite perfect. The so-called instruction has only a secondary place.

This is only one of the theories. The critics indeed do not agree about the true nature of Rasa. Indeed, some of them say that, in the first stage, we have only a permanent state of mind, which, being later nourished by the transitory states of mind, etc., is experienced as Rasa. This Rasa, they add, is perceived as really present in the reproduced personage only; and, being displayed in the theater, is called " theater-rasa "[1]. This theory is criticized by others in the following way. What is indeed, they say, the sense of this intensification of a state of mind by another one, as regards a mental state, which naturally develops in a succession ? Surely, neither astonishment, nor sorrow nor anger, etc., are seen to grow more intense with time ! Therefore, your thesis, viz. that Rasa is [perceived as really] present in the reproduced personage, does not stand to reason. If you, on the other hand, say it is in the reproducing actor, obviously he could not follow the tempo, etc.[2] If, finally, you say that[3] it is in the spectators, what a *camatkāra* would still subsist ? On the contrary, in front of a pathetic scene, the spectators would necessarily feel in pain. Therefore, this thesis is not sound. Which is then the right one ? Here, because of the infinitude of gradations, no reproduction of a defined (*niyata*) permanent feeling must be made[4] ; this, besides, would be purposeless, because at the sight of this excessive

1) This is Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa's theory. Cf. supra, Introd., pp. XVII ff.
2) Cf. supra, p. XVIII.
3) Namely, The Rasas and *bhāvas*.
4) That is, characterized by a particular stage.

particularity, the spectators would remain indifferent, so that there could not be any useful teaching. The true nature of Rasa is therefore the following. When the determinants, the consequents and the transitory states are joined together with reference to a permanent state of mind, devoid of any defined stage (*aniyatāvasthātmaka*), there arises a perception, different from memory, viz. " This is Rāma who was happy ". This perception has, as its object, the permanent feeling, is made up of a tasting, is ultimately founded on the reproducing actor and is to be found in theater only. Rasa is nothing but that. It does not require any separate support, but, on the contrary, the spectator is tasting it in the actor, who is considered as identical with the reproduced personage. This is, in brief, the nature of aesthetic experience. Therefore, Rasa lies in the theater [1] only, not in the represented personage, etc. [2].

Some others say : " The image of the permanent state of mind appearing in the reproducing actor is produced by the assemblage of the different forms of representation, etc., just as the image of a horse, appearing on a wall, is produced by the various pigments, as orpiment, etc. This image is tasted by a perception of a non-ordinary nature, named also sampling, and is therefore called Rasa. The meaning of the expression ' theater-Rasa ', is then ' the Rasas which are caused by the theater '.

According to others, Rasa is nothing but the whole of the determinants and the consequents, supplied by a particular assemblage, connected with determinate latent impressions suitable to the permanent state of mind—which is the object of the acting of the afore-mentioned determinants and conse-

1) That is to say, in the naṭas, actors, only.
2) This the theory of Śaṅkuka.

quents—and characterized by an intimate relish or lysis. According to this theory, the Rasas, are nothing but the drama.

Some others say that Rasa is the mere determinant or, again, the mere consequent; according to others it is nothing but the permanent state of mind ; others say that it is the transitory mental state ; to others, it is a combination of these ; others say that it is the situation to be reproduced ; and others, finally, that it is an aggregate of all that. But enough of these lucubrations !

The afore-mentioned Rasa occurs in poetry also, which, in the place of the realistic representation and of the theatrical conventions, possesses the natural and the extraordinary mode of speech.[1] The combination of the determinants, etc., by which it is produced, is, in poetry, afforded by words of a non-ordinary character, endowed with the qualities of clearness (*prasanna*), sweetness (*madhura*) and powerfulness (*ojasvin*). Even if it be admitted that in poetry the Rasa-perception is someway different from drama, because of the means which are different, the process, however, is the same.

Being it so, these faults concern the *prima facie* view only, for, according to it, perception is subjected to the distinctions proper to oneself to others, etc. Anyhow, no matter which the thesis is, Rasa results to be a perception. This is unavoidable. Indeed, the existence of an unperceived thing, as, for instance, a goblin, cannot be affirmed. The fact that this perception is called by the names of relish, tasting, or enjoyment,does not amount to any difficulty. We know indeed that the direct cognition, the inference, the tradition, the intuition,the supernormal experience, under their different names—caused by the different means which manifest them, are equally but forms

1) On the *svabhāvokti*, etc., see V. Raghavan, *Some Concepts of the Alaṃkāra Śāstra*, Adyar 1942, pp. 92-116.

of perception. Nothing then forbids us to admit that the same occurs in the case of Rasa also, for the very reason that the means by which it is manifested, viz. the combination of the determinants, etc., assisted by the consent of heart and so on, are of a non-ordinary nature. The use of the expression, 'The Rasas are perceived', is just like the one 'the porridge is being cooked'. The Rasa, indeed, is merely perceived. The relishing is only a particular perception. This perception, in drama, is different from an ordinary inferential perception; yet, in the beginning, this is required, as a means. Likewise, the afore-said perception, in poetry, is different from the other verbal perceptions ; yet, in the beginning, these are required, as a means.

Therefore, the *prima facie* views are put to death. But if you say that the exploits of Rāma, etc., do not earn the consent of heart of everybody, that, I answer, is a great mark of rashness ! Everybody's mind is indeed characterized by the most various latent impressions; for as it has been said, "As the desire is permanent, these are beginningless", and, "On the ground that the remembrances and the impressions are homogeneous there is an uninterrupted succession of latent impressions, even if they are separated by birth, space, and time [1]". Therefore, it is established that Rasa is perceived. This perception, in its turn, presents himself in the form of a relishing.

This relishing is produced by a new power, different from the power of denotation, which the expressed sense and the expressing words come to possess, that is the power of tune, of suggestion. The so-called power of bringing about enjoyment, proper to poetry, according to you, consists, actually, of this power of suggestion only, and has, as its object, the Rasa. The other power also, viz, the power of effectuation,

1) *Yogasūtra*, IV, sūtras 10 and 9.

is actually based on the usage of appropriate qualities and ornaments. We shall explain it diffusely. It is nothing new. On the other hand, if you say that poetry is effecting the Rasa, then you, by this very statement, resuscitate the theory of production. Besides, this power of effectuation can be proper neither to the poetical words only, because, if the express sense is not known, the afore-said power cannot logically exist; nor to the express sense only, because, this being conveyed by other words, it does not longer exist. We, on the contrary, maintain that this power of effectuation pertaining to the two of them, as it is confirmed in the stanza : " That kind of poetry, wherein either the sense of the word suggests the implied meaning ", etc..[1] Further, the effectuation-process (let us here remember) is endowed with three distinguished parts, that is, the means, the necessary measures, and the end. Therefore, if we make the power of manifestation correspond to the means, the appropriate qualities and ornaments to the necessary measures, and the Rasas to the end, produced by the effecting poem, it is quite clear that the power of suggestion will correspond to the first part, viz. the means. The enjoyment, in its turn, is not produced by the poetical word, but by this non-ordinary power of suggestion only, through the suppression of our thick pall of mental stupor and blindness. This enjoyment consists, according to you, of the states of fluidity, enlargement and expansion, is called also " tasting ", and is of a non-ordinary nature. In other words, having once established that Rasa is suggested, the afore-mentioned power of bringing

1) *Dh.Ā.*, I, 13. " That kind of poetry, wherein either the (conventional) meaning or the (conventional) word renders itself or its meaning secondary (respectively) and suggests the Implied meaning, is designated by the learned as *dhvani* or ' Suggestive poetry ' ". (Translation of K. Krishnamoorthy, ed. cit).

about enjoyment is, it too, fatally established, The enjoyment, indeed, is identical with the *camatkāra*, arising from the Rasa-experience itself. Further, as the constituent elements *sattva*, etc., can be found set out in an infinite member of different ways, according to the predominance of the one or the other, it is absurd to limit the forms of tasting to fluidity, etc., only. As to the theory, according to which the tasting of Rasa is similar to the tasting of the supreme *brahman*, we have nothing to object. Moreover, the teaching to be derived from poetry is different from the injunctions and instructions imparted by religious treatises and historical narratives. However, to them, who maintain that poetry produces at the end a teaching, which differs from usual analogy, viz. " as Rāma, so I ", and consists in an enrichment of our own power of intuition—the instrument which allows the tasting of Rasa—, we have nothing to reproach.[1] Therefore, this is definitely established—namely, that Rasas are manifested and are tasted through a perception.

1) See, in this connexion, the *A.Bh.*, I. p, 41: *nanu kiṃ guruvad upadeśaṃ karoti, netyāha, kintu buddhiṃ vivardhayati, svapratibhām evaṃ tādṛsīṃ vitarati* || Elsewhere (*Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 40) A.G. says that the principal element is not knowledge (for in that ease there would be confusion with works on ethics and historiography) but pleasure (*prīti*, *ānanda*). The pleasure and knowledge, both *sui generis*, aroused by poetry are not distinct from each other but are two aspects of the same thing (*na caite prītivyutpattī bhinnarūps eva, dvayor apy ekaviṣayatvāt*, *Dh.Ā.L.*, p. 336).

GENERAL INDEX

The numbers refer to pages.

